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Foreword 
 
 
This collective volume introduces ten European authors and their researches on political culture 
modeling. They share the interest for the political methodology, on the one hand, and for the political 
culture of the Eastern European post-communist regimes and their transition to democracy, on the 
other hand. Their research papers have been peer-reviewed and accepted as papers of the 2nd edition of 
the European Conference on Political Attitudes and Mentalities, ECPAM’2013, organized as a virtual 
conference by the European Research Group on Political Attitudes and Mentalities, EPAM, on November 
8th, 2013.  
The main theme of the conference has provided the subject of this collective volume: “Political 
Attitudes and Political Cultures: Theoretical, Analytical, Computaional and Simulation Models”.  
At its 2nd Edition, the European Conference on Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 
ECPAM’2013, suceeded to bring togeher faculty, research scientists, and doctoral students from several 
European universities and research centres and institutes: Centre for Policy Modeling, Manchester 
Metropolitan University Business School (UK), University of Belgrade and Institute for Social Science 
(Serbia), Centre for Human Rights, Department of Political Science, University of Crete (Greece), 
Institute for Information Systems in Business and Public Administration, University of Koblenz 
(Germany), Vytautas Magnus University (Lithuania) and University of Bucharest (Romania). 
ECPAM’2013 Founding President: Camelia Florela Voinea (University of Bucharest, 
Romania).  
Program Chairs: Camelia Florela Voinea (University of Bucharest, Romania), Bojan 
Todosijević (Institut for Social Science, Belgrad, Serbia), Guido Boella (University of Turin, Italy). 
Program Committee: Alexandra Petrescu (University of Birmingham, UK), Armano 
Srbljinovič (Institute for Research and Development of Defence Systems, Croatia), Bojan Todosijević 
(Institute for Social Science, Belgrad, Serbia), Bruce Edmonds (Manchester Metropolitan University, 
UK), Camelia Florela Voinea (University of Bucharest, Romania), Darko Nadič (University of Belgrade, 
Serbia), Dragan Bagić (University of Zagreb, Croatia), Guido Boella (University of Turin, Italy), Gulyás 
László (“Eötvös Loránd” University, Budapest, Hungary), Martin Neumann (University of Koblenz, 
Germany), Miruna Tataru-Cazaban (University of Bucharest, Romania), Nebojša Blanuša (University of 
Zagreb, Croatia), Dimitri Sotiropoulos (University of Athens, Greece), Kostas A. Lavdas (University of 
Crete, Greece), Ingrida Unikaitė-Jakuntavičienė (Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania), Matjaž Uršič 
(University of Ljubljana, Slovenia), Mina Petrovič (University of Belgrade, Serbia), Petar Atanasov (“Ss’ 
Cyril and Methodius” University, Skopje, Macedonia), Raluca Alexandrescu (University of Bucharest, 
Romania), Thomas Fent (Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, Vienna 
Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria). 
 
 
 
 
 
Bucharest, November 8th, 2013                                        Camelia Florela Voinea 
                                                                                University of Bucharest, Romania 
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Eastern European Political Cultures and the Need for Explanation.  
The Look from Inside. 
 
 
 
Camelia Florela Voinea 
University of Bucharest 
Romania 
 
 
 
 
This volume presents several authors who are developing research projects in 
various European universities and research institutions. In spite of the independent 
character of the analyses and of the most of the empirical observations and results 
reported here, there is something which unites them all, namely a certain similarity in 
looking at things from a political culture perspective. Moreover, there is something else 
which unites their perspectives over the Eastern European political cultures: a certain 
look from inside.The true motivation for what joins them all in this volume could be 
described as a need for explanation, no matter the different political and culture 
heritages of the countries, regimes, institutions and people targeted by the researches 
reported in this volume. 
It is this need for explanation which makes the true binding – either implicit or 
explicit – of this volume. What makes these few Eastern European political culture 
researches reported here prove the same need for explanation is the way they share the 
perception of the post-1989 Eastern European democracy experience, and certain 
stereotypes in relating variate political phenomenology to political culture. 
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The need for explanation should not surprise anybody, especially if we are to 
study the Eastern European politics. Nevertheless, it is more than just the necessity to 
explain (what?) and how? is going on in politics. It is also the need to understand why?, 
when?, orwhat for? The long transition processes from the communist to democratic 
regimes made almost all Eastern European people and their countries experience 
during the past two decades the need to explain their choices, values, beliefs, norms, 
attitudes, and symbols. Their grievances or prejudices. Their institutions, regimes, and 
discourses. All these entail a deep understanding of both remote cultural roots and 
current political perceptions, steadiness and variability, contingency and necessity, 
change and resistance to change. They require not only to explain things. First and 
foremost,they require a concept, a paradigm, and a method. It often requires a model. 
The modeling idea is as old as our philosophical thinking. It reminds us of Plato 
and makes us think about the city, world, society and politics as of imperfect shadows 
of one perfect idea. To understand them, we need first of all to overlap the “real” and 
the “ideal”, the “shadows” and the “model”. It is this overlapping which explains what 
the real construct – be it society or polity, tradition or institution, individual action or 
policy – actually needs in order to identify itself with the ideal construct. 
Modeling is, as a matter of fact, a relevant component of Political Science:  
ideology, political regime, state, governance or voting – all of them have been modeled 
and analyzed by means of models. 
Before anything else, a model “explains” the real world by capturing few but 
universal laws, principles. It thus makes both modeler and user develop expectations 
with respect to its explanative power. Whether these are finally fulfilled or not, this 
depends on the model. In the classical approach, models as explanative tools involve 
covering laws. For example, economic laws and ideas do explain the transformation 
processes in the Eastern European newly appeared democracies, but they cannot fully 
explain them, and obviously not them all.  
After the first decade following the 1989- Eastern European political 
phenomena, students of democracy identified the main characteristics of the Eastern 
European transition to democratic regime processes and tried to explain their 
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unfolding. It was probably the first time when many agreed that, beyond economical 
difficulties, there were some others which did not fit this model and resisted 
explanations based on covering economical laws. Explaining politics requires more 
than social, economical and financial methodologies altogether: it requires political 
methodology. Moreover, it requires a political methodology able to reconsider such 
issues like variability, context-, path- and initial conditions dependence in order to 
explain one of the fundamental questions in the post-1989 political analysis and 
methodology (Tilly, 1995): how should we study the political change? – Long after the 
1989 Eastern European political phenomena, people still argued on the nature of 
political change, on its real target and on its real means and ends. Invariable models of 
political change could not tackle anymore the complexity of the political history and 
failed to fulfill the need for explanation of both scholars, either old or young, and of 
the people, either ordinary people or elites. 
Unavoidably, political culture came to the front. In spite of the hard critics and 
apparently never ending disputes, political culture theories have suceeded to find room 
for “impressive” coming-backs (Mishler and Pollack, 2003) and for managing ambiguity 
in definitions and terminology.It is not the first time when they do come back and, 
most probably, not the last. However, this time there is something missing in the 
room: explanative power requires explanative methodology. And a good explanation 
methodology cannot ignore or avoid modeling. Nevertheless, it is modeling which is 
actually missing in this room. 
The past two decades have been known as a time of intensive theoretical and 
empirical research in Eastern European political cultures. Remarcable works have been 
published by now famous authors: “The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power.  
The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland” (Jan Kubik, 1994), 
“Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 41 
Societies” (Ronald Inglehart,1997), “Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-
Communist Societies” (Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer 1998), 
“Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? Explorations in State-Society Relations” 
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(Harry Eckstein, Frederick J. Fleron, E. P. Hoffmann, and William M. Reisinger 
(Eds.), 1998), “Eastern Europe: Politics, Culture, and Society Since 1939” (S. Ramet (Ed.), 
1998), “Political Culture In Post-communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies” 
(Detlef Pollack, Jorg Jacobs, Olaf Muller, Gert Pickel (Eds.), 20003), “Political Culture 
and Post-Communism”, Stephen Whitefield (Ed.), 2005), “Democracy and Political 
Culture in Eastern Europe” (Hans-Dieter Klingeman, Dieter Fuchs and Jan Zielonga 
(Eds.), 2006), to name but few of the most relevant ones. Many books and articles of 
these and other authors represent now the foundation of a difficult work of 
disentangling the complicated historical and political heritages of the Eastern European 
political cultures, aimed at understanding how people, cultures and polities endured 
altogether the hard experiences of the communist regimes. All these major theoretical 
works have been published soon after 1989, when the Eastern Europeans were 
struggling and striving in the sophisticated transition processes toward democratization 
and economic stability. It was a time of high political contend. However, more than 
two decades have passed and, not withstanding its weakness and scarcity, the 
democratic construction has provided a chance for reflection. As the time passed, the 
Eastern Europeans – citizens as well as elites – got enough distance from their personal 
experiences, sentiments and passions so as to be able to finally reflect as objectively as 
possible with respect to their communism and post-communism experiences. While 
much of the research works mentioned earlier were fundamentally about a look from 
outside, finally, a look from inside is now possible. How valuable it is right now or 
could be when compared with the above-mentioned high-level expertise works, 
depends on how much it suceeds to uncover its thick political culture roots. This 
volume is about this look from inside.  
The volume is divided in four sections, ballancing the interest for theoretical 
modeling with that for computational modeling and simulation of political 
phenomena. 
The 1stSection, “Theoretical Models”, concern theoretical modeling and 
introduces one research work which reviews major researches in the area of structure 
of political attitudes (structure of ideology) during the past 80 years in Europe. The 
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author, Bojan Todosijević, explains how political attitude and structure of ideology 
studies would impact the modeling of political action, especially in the Eastern 
European new democracies. 
The 2nd Section, “Political Culture Computational and Simulation Modeling 
Studies”, concern computational modeling and simulation of political action, policy, 
and polity. The three research works included here address the political action 
modelling (Bruce Edmonds), the polity simulation modeling (Camelia Florela Voinea), 
and the modeling of corruption, extortion and fiscal evasion phenomena (Martin 
Neumann).  
The 3rd Section, “Political Culture Analysis”, provides empirical comparative 
results on political culture vs. rational choice models, and proves their implications on 
the mass support for democracy in the Eastern European post-communist countries 
(Zoran Pavlovic). 
The 4th Section, “EUNon-State Partnership Modeling”, includes one research 
work on the political culture of EU partnership in the non-member states: the 
European Neighborhood Policy as a political culture model of partnership in the 
European politics (Sima Rakutiene). 
The 5th Section, “Welfare Culture Studies”, presents one modeling approach on 
welfare culture in Greece, combining governance, welfare economics and social 
assitance studies with public policy modeling (Dimitrios Kotroyannos, Stylianos 
Tzagkarakis, Apostolos Kamekis and Marinos Chourdakis). 
The Conclusions (Camelia Florela Voinea) presents a general Eastern European 
picture of political culture studies, including several other authors and research works 
besides those contributing to the present volume. The Conclusions show that the 
Eastern European political culture research exhibits preferences for a particular 
relationship between (i) the political values, identity, behaviors and attitudes modeling, 
on the one hand, and for (ii) the generative simulation modeling of political 
phenomena, on the other hand. This relationship is described as a political 
methodological relationship between political mechanisms and political cultures. 
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Getting back to the rationale of this volume, we should emphasize again the 
independent character of the researches presented in this volume. It is important to do 
this for three reasons. One relates their independent character to the reality that 
Eastern European political science research is guided from within the society, and this 
proves both the awareness of researchers and the social utility of their approaches. 
Another one relates the scarce appearances of political culture modeling research in 
Eastern Europe to the scarcity of its research funding, which seriously limits its 
development, but nevertheless cannot stop it. And finally, a third reason concerns the 
extension of political culture theories so as to include new elements provided by the 
interdisciplinary research in areas like European welfare culture or neighborhood 
culture, which emerged from latest political unfoldings in Eastern and Southern 
Europe following either 2008 economical crisis or EU partnership policies. 
First, although independently developed, some of the Eastern European political 
analysis researches included in the volumeshare a major theoretical tendency towards 
modeling approaches of political issues, including political action and political attitude, 
voting behavior and electoral campaigns, political messages and political images on the 
Eastern European electoral market, post-communist institutional authority and 
legitimacy, ethnicity and nationalism, constitutionalism and autoritarianism, 
corruption and extortion, and many others. As political methodology, Eastern 
European political phenomena modeling research reported in this volume addresses 
fundamental issues concerning (1) the type of democracy constructs elaborated by the 
Eastern European countries, and (2) political identity, sovereignity and political action 
of the new Eastern European democracies inside EU or outside EU, but expecting for 
the EU intergration.As concerning the type of democratic construct and democracy 
perception in each Eastern European country, these researches share the idea of 
political cultures as influence factors in the political change modeling. 
From this perspective, two authors succeed to bring to the front old political 
culture research issues and to provide fresh answers.  
Bojan Todosijević’s research on the structure of political attitudes reports 
fundamental approaches during the past almost hundred years in the area of structure 
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of ideology. Political attitudes made the subject of political analysis and political 
methodology from the beginning of the 20th century. Todosijevićsystematically reports 
research on attitudes in Social Psychology emphasizing the difference between the long 
tradition and huge number of theoretical and analytical works, on the one hand, and 
their low level of impact on the attitude methodological research and development, on 
the other hand. He is a promoter of the idea that ideological dimensions have a 
relevant impact on the political behavior. Such orientation of research would not only 
help understanding political action, but has a special relevance in the Eastern European 
political space, where the communist ideology’s late impact has shaped “atypical 
ideological configurations” (p. 35 in this volume). This idea points to the particular ways 
in which citizens in the Eastern European post-communist regimes “organize and 
express their basic political views” (ibid.). The study of political attitudes (formation, 
stability, structure, expression) in Eastern Europe would thus help in modeling the 
type of Eastern European democratic construct and explaining the atypical political 
behavior – a major concern in the EU structures, where the Eastern European 
democratic consolidation processes raise difficult problems, even long after the political 
integration of the new Eastern European democracies. 
Though from a slightly different perspective, but still in the same area of 
political attitude research like Bojan Todosijević’, Zoran Pavlovic addresses the issue 
of mass democratic expression and support for democracy in the Eastern European ex-
communist regimes by introducing a comparative analysis between two competing 
explanative models of political behavior: political culture vs. rational choice. His post-
elections survey research allows for the definition, empirical observationand analysis of 
socio-demographic, institutional and cultural predictors of the mass support for 
democracy. His variance modeling approach re-iterates the disputes concerning the 
explanative power of the defined survey variables. His approach tries to show the role 
the political values play in the development of a democratic political culture in a 
transitional society by influencing the consolidation of the democratic institutions. 
Pavlovic’s approach gives support to the theories relating political values and 
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institutions by arguing in favor of combining effects of cultural and institutional 
variables. His preference assumes actually an Eastern European stereotype model of 
“creating the democratic political culture” by “creating ‘democrats’ as well as creating 
democracy” (p. 136 in this volume).This position if often encountered in the current 
Eastern European literature on attitude, behavior and mentality in transition to 
democracy and consolidation of democratic institutions and proves once more the 
similarity in the preferences, understandings and expectation analysis of many Eastern 
European authors (Srbljinovic, 2012; Atanasov and Cvetanova, 2012; Petricušić, 2013; 
Ferićand Lamza-Posavec, 2013) .  
Second, although quite few anddisparate, the researches included in this volume 
prove a high interest and a considerable potential for research development in the area 
of political culture-based computational modeling and simulation ofpolitical 
phenomena. The issue seems rather strange for many of the works on political 
methodology published lately in Eastern Europe. For many reasons, computational 
modeling and simulations appears to Eastern European Political Science researchers as 
a remote area of research and development. Without being some particular weakness of 
the Eastern European research only, computational and simulation modeling has 
puzzled political methodology experts from allover the world by introducing a 
different concept on how we should describe and explain political phenomena. 
Following the example of Social Simulation, computational modeling and simulation 
has been accepted in Political Science as well. This volume succeeds to aggregate some 
disparate approaches on this modeling area and issues. The three research works 
presented in the 2nd Section of the volume address both the ontology and epistemology 
of political culture modeling, with a special focus on political methodology.  
In his chapter on cognitive modeling of political action, Bruce Edmonds 
introduces the problem of relating modeling methodology with political 
phenomenology. He highlights the issues of abstracting the types, levels and 
granularity of social and political phenomenology by means ofcomputational cognitive 
modeling descriptions of social actions, norms, interactions and goal-driven behaviors. 
As one of the leading experts in both social complexity modeling and agent-based social 
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simulation, Edmonds challenges the standard artificial society model by introducing 
elements of cognitive complexity in the individual agent descriptions. As a 
computational and simulation modeling approach, this endeavour brings to the front 
the now classical debate on the individual agency and the relationship between 
cognitive, social and political phenomena which might get computational and 
simulation expression in an artificial society model. The model he proposes actually 
challenges  the classical KISS style (Axelrode, 1995), and extends the representation 
issue to a methodological issue in political action modeling. 
Camelia Florela Voinea challenges both political methodology and simulation 
modeling of political phenomena. In her chapter, she addresses several issues in 
political phenomena modeling, like political mechanisms, processes and pathways, 
reviewing and revisiting some of their definitions and terminology. In addressing the 
political mechanism issue, Voinea answers the Tilly’s well-known claim (1995) for a 
change in political phenomena modeling methodology by introducing both emergence 
and downward causation modeling in the generative simulation architectures. Inspired 
by the artificial society models, she introduces anoperational concept of the generative 
simulation architecture in the artificial polity model. Her research aims at advancing 
the political phenomena modeling theory by including cross-recurrence and cross-
recursivity in generative process descriptions. Voinea’s approach addresses the need for 
a methodological shift towards complexity-based models in political phenomena 
modeling.In a much similar way to Edmonds’ approach, her work combines both 
philospohy of science and virtual experiments of simulation modeling. 
Martin Neumann focuses more on computational modeling by generalizing  
ontologies of Mafia-type systems to an artificial society model able to simulate the 
emergence and growth of extortion systems. Neumann uses his previous social 
simulation experience to develop computational models of social and political 
corruption which could allow for public policy modeling aimed at controlling the 
phenomenology of political and bureaucratic corruption. What makes his approach 
interesting for the theme of this volume is the use of agent-based system simulation in 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
18 
 
the development of a political culture model of a mafia-type social configuration inside 
an artificial society. His ontology identifies elements of political culture which exist 
and could generate deviant behavior in any kind of society, especially in the weak new 
democracies situated at the margins of the Eastern Europe. Extortion ontologies is but 
one example of how can they be used to develop models of culture and explain the 
generation of subcultures. 
Third, the researches on European political culture prove a tendency to extend 
their area by including new issues which emerged from the latest political 
developments in Eastern and Southern Europe. This explains the presence in this 
volume of two approaches on European welfare culture and EU non-state partnership 
culture. 
Sima Rakutiene introduces a model of EU neighborhood culture which 
captures the non-state partnership experiences associated lately to the EU accession and 
integration pending processes in non-member countries, like Lithuania, the Baltic states 
as well as some of the South-Eastern states. Rakutiene’s model description might 
suggests that computational and simulation modeling of such political phenomena 
should take into consideration revisiting the agent definition in agent-based systems, in 
which agents are usually described as either individuals, organizations or (nation)-
states. Non-state actors might involve a complexity approach to agent definition and 
agency concept in artificial society and polity models. 
Dimitrios Kotroyannos and his doctoral students, Stylianos Tzagkarakis, 
Apostolos Kamekis and Marinos Chourdakis introduce a model of welfare culture 
which is being developed in a Greek national education and social assistance research 
project. The welfare concept is usually related to the economic welfare theories. This 
approach suggests the extension of political culture area so as to includewelfare issues. 
Welfare culture modeling points to the subculture emergence in societies under 
economical and political stress – an issue which has not been approached so far in the 
literature on social modeling. 
As it is, this volume highlights the Eastern European political culture modeling 
research resources, tendencies and methodological contributions. It aims at introducing 
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young Eastern European authors and their researches and provides a signal that 
political methodology research needs further consideration, funding and networking in 
Eastern Europe and not only.  
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Structure of Political Attitudes. A Literature Review1 
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Abstract 
The paper reviews social-psychological literature on the organization of social 
attitudes, or the structure of ideology. Research on this topic started nearly eight 
decades ago, inspired by the research on the structure of intellectual abilities. Since 
then, a large body of literature has been generated, which has not been systematically 
reviewed. Despite the long tradition, this literature has not resulted in proportional 
cumulative scientific development. It is hoped that this paper may help in this regard 
by listing the relevant studies, examining the research methodology and the main 
findings. The review ends with the critical summary of the main findings and 
methodological problems, and recommendations for the future research. 
 
Keywords: social attitude, political attitude, ideology 
 
 
Introduction: The Dimensions of Ideology 
Social scientists often conceptualize ideology as a relatively organized set of 
attitudes towards various social and political objects that could be derived from more 
general values and world-views They, however, disagree about the level of coherence in 
such attitudes, and the number and content of the basic ideological dimensions. 
Advocates of the ‘end of ideology’ thesis have claimed that ideology “had come 
to a dead end” (Bell 1960, 370-3). Converse (1964) argued that the general public’s 
political attitudes are unstable, disorganized, inconsistent, and hence non-ideological 
(see also Zaller 1992). Political science is dominated by the view that the most 
important ideological dimension is the left-right distinction (e.g., Fuchs and 
                                                        
1 This is a revised and updated version of a chapter in the author's doctoral thesis (Todosijević, 2005). 
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Klingemann 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Other authors see authoritarianism 
versus libertarianism as the main overarching ideological dimension characterizing the 
contemporary (Western) political culture (Flanagan and Lee 2003).  
Social psychologists, however, contend not only that individual-level political 
attitudes exhibit a considerable degree of coherence and structure (if adequately 
measured) but also that they are generally organized along familiar ideological lines 
(e.g., Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1992, 1991, 1978; Shikano and Pappi 2004; Jost et al. 
2009). Scholars, however, disagree on how this organization is best conceived. The 
views range from, for example, one-dimensional models where all specific attitudes are 
seen as reflecting a single basic underlying attitudinal dimension (e.g., conservatism 
dimension, Wilson 1973a), to multi-dimensional models where related attitudes are 
grouped together in a number of specific factors, which are themselves unrelated (e.g., 
nine-dimensional model of Sidanius and Ekehammar 1980).  
The present literature review is concerned with the research on the 
dimensionality of ideology, or the structure of social attitudes. Structure of attitudes in 
this framework refers to the relationships between attitudes toward various objects, 
held by individuals in a certain population. According to Gabel and Anderson, 
 
 "Fundamental to this approach is the assumption that policy positions are 
structured by underlying ideological dimensions that account for covariation in 
these positions. These ideological dimensions represent the structure of political 
discourse, representing a linguistic shorthand for political communication and 
competition"  
(Gabel and Anderson2002, p.896). 
 
Psychological literature often refers to social attitudes, but references to 
ideologies or political attitudes are also common. Attitudes are regarded as social when 
they refer to objects which have  
“shared general societal relevance in economic, political, religious, educational, 
ethnic, and other social areas”  
(Kerlinger, Middendorp and Amon 1976, p. 267).  
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When adjective 'political' is included, that often means that items referring to 
specifically political objects are involved (e.g., Durrheim and Foster 1995). 
Social Psychology provided a significant contribution to understanding the 
structure of socio-political attitudes. Research on this topic started nearly eight decades 
ago, inspired by the research on the structure of intellectual abilities. Since then, a large 
body of literature has been generated. However, despite the long tradition, this 
literature has not resulted in proportional cumulative scientific development. One 
reason for such state of the affairs is perhaps the lack of a systematic review of the 
existing research. The aim of this paper is to help in this regard by listing the relevant 
studies, examining the applied research methodology, and critically summarizing the 
main results.  
This review is divided into six parts: 1) brief presentation of the basic paradigm 
of the research field, 2) early studies, 3) Hans Eysenck’s Two-Dimensional Model, 4) 
Wilson’s Theory of Conservatism as unidimensional and bipolar dimension, 5) 
Kerlinger’s Dualistic Theory, and 6) the 'Outliers'.  Discussion and recommendations 
for the future research finalize the paper. 
 
The Basic Paradigm 
The basic paradigm in this field states that social attitudes are interrelated and 
hierarchically organized. The interrelatedness means that, for instance, if someone has 
a negative attitude toward premarital sex, we would not expect that she endorses a 
particularly positive attitude toward striptease bars. Hierarchical organization means 
that specific attitudes have their roots in more general orientations or general 
ideologies. These assumptions led to the investigation of the so-called primary, latent, 
or basic attitudes, which could explain the correlation between many specific or 
manifest attitudes.  
The basic paradigm of this approach is represented by the Eysenck’s (1954; 
Eysenck and Wilson 1978) studies of social attitudes. In this view, attitudes are 
hierarchically organized in four levels, as in the following figure: 
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4 IDEOLOGY (Conservatism) 
3 ATTITUDES (Anti-Semitic)  
2 HABITUAL OPINIONS (“Jews are inferior.”) 
1 SPECIFIC OPINIONS (“Finkelstein is a dirty Jew!”) 
(From: Dator 1969, 74). 
 
At the bottom level is a large number of specific opinions,  
 
“which are not related in any way to other opinions, which are not in any way 
characteristic of a person who makes them, and which are not reproducible”  
(Eysenck 1954, p. 111).  
 
On the second level are habitual opinions, which are reproducible and more 
persistent individual features. They are expressed through different specific opinions. 
The first two levels are usually represented by various items in attitude questionnaires. 
Attitude is built of a certain number of related habitual opinions. For example, an  
anti-Semitic attitude consists of and is expressed through a number of negative opinions 
about Jews. This level can empirically be represented by summarized scores on attitude 
scales or by primary factors emerging from factor analyses of attitude scales. Attitudes 
at this level usually are not independent of each other; they tend to correlate, forming 
the fourth level - ideologies. For example, attitudes like anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, 
patriotism, pro-religious attitudes and strict up-bringing of children are components of 
conservative ideology (Ibid.112-3). Substance to these general factors is often given in 
terms of underlying dispositional features, such as tough-mindedness (Eysenck 1954) or 
the fear of uncertainty (Wilson 1973b).  
The other oftenly used model assigns the integrative role to value orientations. 
Here, more specific ideological dimensions and opinions are seen as derived from 
general values (e.g., Rokeach 1973; Maio et al. 2003). Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 
(1991) argue for a model where general values, i.e. ideology, determines intermediate 
values, which then determine specific attitudes. The idea can be illustrated by the 
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following sequence: conservatism - economic attitudes - health policy attitudes. Thus, 
the ‘deep’ values, that is general ideology, is the source of attitude constraint. 
In Middendorp's theory (1991), the 'theoretical' source of general conservative 
ideology can be found in two general values applied to their respective domains: 
equality to socio-economic and freedom to politico-cultural domain (1991, 113). In his 
words: 
 
"the interrelatedness of various ideas – expressed by statements about reality – 
comes about through the common reference of these ideas to one or a few 
underlying values" 
 (Middendorp 1991, pp. 60-61).  
 
However, Middendorp does not assume that each individual derives specific 
attitudes from general values on her own, nor that ideologies have to be consciously 
held. 
 
Early Studies 
Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson (1939) were among the first to use factor 
analysis in order to determine the structure of basic social attitudes. The attempts were 
inspired by the studies of the structure of intellectual abilities. At that time, possible 
research designs were limited by the unavailability of fast and powerful computers. 
Thus, factor analysis was applied not on correlations between scale items, but rather on 
correlations between scores on scales measuring specific attitudes. Table 1 summarizes 
the main methodological features and findings of Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson 
(1939, 1940, 1942, 1973). 
 
Table 1. Early studies: basic methodological features and results 
AUTHOR 
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD RESULTS 
Thurstone 
(1934) 
N=380, 
students, USA; 
ad hoc 
11 scales; Equal-appearing-
interval scale type; 
scoring: mean on each 
Centroid extraction method; 
Orthogonal/graphic rotation 
1. Radicalism-
Conservatism; 2. 
Nationalism-
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AUTHOR 
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD RESULTS 
scale internationalism 
Ferguson 
(1939) 
N=185; 
students, USA; 
ad hoc 
10 scales, each of 20 items; 
Equal-appearing-interval 
scale type (Thurstone); 
scoring: mean on each 
scale 
Centroid extraction; 2 significant 
factors; graphic/orthogonal rotation 
(excluded not in accordance with the 
two basic dimensions). 
1. Religionism; 
2. 
Humanitarianism 
Ferguson 
(1940) 
N=144; 
reanalysis: 
N=790 
students; USA; 
ad hoc 
2 scales of 38 items each, 
on the bases of the above 
results 
Same methods as above Previous two 
factors confirmed 
Ferguson 
(1942) 
Reanalysis of 
data from 1939 
Same methodology, 
previously excluded scales 
included in analysis 
Same methods as above  Earlier two factors 
confirmed; added 
3. Nationalism 
Ferguson 
(1973) 
N=1471 
students; ad hoc 
the same 10 tests as in 1939 Centroid 3 factors (G-K crit.) 
graphic/orthogonal and oblique 
1. Religion 
2. 
Humanitarianism 
3. Nationalism 
 
Ferguson began his analysis with 10 scales for the measurement of attitudes 
toward war, reality of God, patriotism, treatment of criminals, capital punishment, 
censorship, evolution, birth control, law, and communism (Ferguson 1939). The first 
factor, Religionism, was defined as the acceptance of God’s reality and negative attitude 
toward evolution and birth control. The orthogonal factor of Humanitarianism was 
defined by the attitudes toward the treatment of criminals, capital punishment and 
war. Later, he included the factor of Nationalism defined by positive attitudes toward 
law, patriotism, censorship and by negative attitude toward communism. His 
reanalysis in 1973 confirmed the stability of factors during time, with the suggestion 
that factors 1 and 3 could be collapsed into one dimension - Eysenck’s Tender-
mindedness - Tough-mindedness.  
Thurstone’s first factor, radicalism versus conservatism, should also be 
described, because it is representative of major factors in many subsequent models, 
usually labelled as conservatism versus liberalism in the US context. The Radicalism 
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pole was defined by positive evaluation of evolution theory, birth control, easy 
divorce, and communism (and with higher IQ), while the Conservative pole was 
defined by a positive evaluation of religion, patriotism, Prohibition, and Sunday 
observance (Thurstone 1934). 
None of the authors provided more detailed justification for the inclusion of a 
particular set of attitudes for analysis. It seems that they relied on common sense to 
include attitudes that are representative for the whole complexity of relevant social 
attitudes in a particular context. However, this point is crucial regarding the purpose of 
the studies. Final factors can only be defined by the variables entered into the analysis. 
Hence, the obtained results should be interpreted as the structure of the analysed 
attitudes, not as the structure of general socio-political attitudes, but this remark applies 
to subsequent studies as well.  
 
Hans Eysenck’s Two-Dimensional Model 
Eysenck’s model of the structure of social attitudes is directly connected to the 
previously presented studies. His first study (in 1944) is partly a reanalysis of the 
Thurstone and Ferguson’s data. A rather complete overview of Eysenck’s studies, and 
studies by other authors related to his model, are presented in Table 2. 
In this model there are two basic social attitudes: Conservatism vs. Radicalism 
(R-factor), and Tender-mindedness vs. Tough-mindedness (T-factor). Radical pole is 
defined, for example, as positive evaluation of evolution theory, strikes, welfare state, 
mixed marriages, student protests, law reform, women’s liberation, United Nations, 
nudist camps, pop-music, modern art, immigration, abolishing private property, and 
rejection of patriotism (Eysenck 1954, 1976; Eysenck and Wilson 1978). The 
conservative pole is characterized by positive attitudes toward white superiority, 
birching, death penalty, anti-Semitism, opposition to nationalization of property, birth 
control, etc. (Ibid.). Tender-mindedness is defined by items such as moral training, 
inborn conscience, Bible truth, chastity, self-denial, pacifism, anti-discrimination, being 
against the death penalty, and harsh treatment of criminals (Eysenck 1951, 1954, 1976; 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
30 
 
Eysenck and Wilson 1978). Tough-mindedness is expressed through favourable 
attitudes towards compulsory sterilization, euthanasia, easier divorce laws, racism, anti-
Semitism, compulsory military training, wife swapping, casual living, death penalty, 
harsh treatment of criminals. Thus, tough-minded individuals tend to be in favour of 
more harsh and tough social measures, including rejection of ethnic and other 
minorities (Ibid.). Since Eysenck argued for significant genetic determination of basic 
personality traits, social attitudes are seen as partly genetically determined as well 
(Abrahamson, Baker, and Caspi 2002; Bouchard et al. 2003; Eysenck 1982). 
Only the first dimension is interpreted as a “true” attitude dimension, in 
content similar to Thurstone’s Conservatism factor. The T-factor was explained as the 
projection of personality traits (‘extroversion’ in 1954, and in later works 
‘psychoticism’), onto the social field, and hence there were very few items loading 
exclusively on this factor. After one study with a more representative sample the 
possibility of the existence of a third dimension was suggested (Eysenck 1975). The 
conservatism factor was split into two dimensions: predominantly religious and 
predominantly economic. The latter factor was labelled as Politico-Economic 
Conservatism vs. Socialism (Eysenck 1975).  
 
Table 2.  Methodological features and results of studies within Eysenck’s model of 
attitudes. 
AUTHOR
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Eysenck 
(1944) 
a) reanalysis 
of 
Thurstone 
and 
Ferguson's 
results; 
b) 694 
adults, ad-
hoc sample 
a) same as 
Ferguson (1939) 
b) 32 
'propositions' for 
social change, 6-
point, Likert-type 
Centroid method 
of extraction, 
graphic rotation, 
2 significant 
factors (GKa) 
2 orthogonal factors: 
 1) Conservatism-radicalism; and  
2. Practical-theoretical2.  
Support for two additional 
factors:  
3. Aggressive-restrictive, and 
4. Freedom of interference-
coercion.  
Eysenck 
(1947, 
1954) 
N=750 (250 
conservative
s, 250 
liberals, 250 
40 item Inventory 
of Social Attitudes 
(ISA); Yes-no 
scoring 
2 interpreted
factors 
2 independent factors (r=-.12): 
 1. Conservatism-radicalism (R);  
2. Tender-tough mindedness (T) 
                                                        
2Later named tough mindedness vs. tender-mindedness. 
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AUTHOR
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
socialists)
Dator, 
(1969) 
192 High 
Court and 
15 Supreme 
Court 
judges from 
Japan 
24 items selected 
from Eysenck 
1947. Translated, 
and modified. 
Unspecified Confirms Eysenck’s two 
dimensions, but with different 
names:  
1. Progressive-conservative (or 
Superiority-equality), and  
2. Religiosity. 
Eysenck 
(1971) 
N=2000, ad 
hoc sample, 
but covered 
gender, age 
and class 
28 items, selected 
from ISA, 5-point 
Likert- type 
scoring 
PC extraction; 
Promax rotation; 
9 primary and 2 
second-order 
factors 
1. Authoritarianism-
humanitarianism,  
2. Religionism. Factors 
interpreted as rotated versions of 
the R and T factors. 
Eysenck 
(1975) 
N=368, 
quota 
sample 
from 
London 
88 items, 5-point 
Likert type 
PC extraction, 29 
factors; retained 
15 factors, in 
Promax rotation; 
10 factors 
interpreted, 3 
second-order 
factors extracted 
1. Conservative-radical factor, 
2. Tough-mindedness – tender-
mindedness, and  
3. Politico-economic 
Conservatism – Socialism. 
Eysenck 
(1976) 
N=1442, 
quota 
sample 
68 items; Wilson-
Patterson type of 
scale; Yes-no 
scoring 
PC extraction, 13 
primary factors 
(19 with 
eigenvalues>1); 
2 second-order 
factors  
1. R. and 
2. T factors. 
Stone 
and Russ 
(1976) 
N=206; 
univ. 
students; 
USA, ad 
hoc 
20-item Mach IV 
scale, and 18 items 
from Eysenck’s 
ISA 
PC extraction; 2 
components 
Varimax rotated 
(23% variance) 
1. Radicalism-Conservatism,  
2. Machiavellianism 
Bruni & 
Eysenck 
(1976) 
N=850, ad 
hoc sample 
(students, 
teachers, 
priests, 
adults); 
Italy 
48 items, three 
point, Likert-type 
scoring; Italian 
version of 
Eysenck’s ISA 
Image extraction, 
Varimax+graphi
c rotation of two 
significant factors
1. R, and 
2. T factors. 
Hewitt, 
Eysenck, 
& Eaves 
(1977) 
N=1492 
volunteer 
adults, 70% 
females; 
Canada 
60 items Public 
Opinion 
Inventory; Yes-no 
scoring 
PC extraction, 2 
factors retained  
out of 40 with 
eigenv.>1, 
oblique rotation 
1. Conservatism-radicalism;  
2. Tender-tough mindedness 
Singh 
(1977) 
N=215, 
probability 
sample 
(mail 
survey; 
response 
28 items, adapted 
from ISA; 5-point 
Likert type 
scoring 
Varimax 
rotation; 4 
factors, retained 2 
factors (scree 
test), expl. 53.8% 
of var. 
1. R, and 
2. T factors. 
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AUTHOR
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
rate=43%;  
Smithers 
& 
Lobley 
(1978a,b) 
N=539 
univ. 
students 
40 items 
Rokeach’s D-scale, 
Extracted 1st
principal 
component 
Dogmatism factor, independent 
of Conservatism; suggested 
similarity between Dogmatism 
and Eysenck’s T-factor. 
Stone,  286  60 items  PF analysis, 1. Conservatism (bipolar),  
Ommun
dsen & 
Williams 
(1985) 
students, 
USA; 273 
students, 
Norway 
measuring left-
right orientation 
and tough-
mindedness; 
various formats 
various types 
Varimax 
rotation; imposed 
No. of factors (2) 
2. Tender-mindedness 
(Humanism) 
 N=286 
univ. 
students, 
USA 
1. Nonpolitical Humanism,  
2. “Normative and tough-minded 
with a tinge of Conservatism” 
factor 
a Guttman-Kaiser criterion for factor extraction. 
b Principal component method of factor extraction. 
 
Replying to Adorno et al.'s (1950) positive psychological portrayal of (genuine) 
liberals,2 and an unflattering depiction of the conservatives, Eysenck (1954; Eysenck 
and Wilson 1978) suggested that British communists and fascists are both equally 
tough-minded, that is authoritarian. Thus, tender-minded liberals are contrasted with 
tough-minded extremists on both sides of the political spectrum (fascists are ‘tough 
conservatives’, while communists are ‘tough radicals’). In this way, Eysenck tried to 
supply empirical support for what is to be known as the ‘extremism theory’ of the 
relationship between ideology and authoritarianism (e.g., Greenberg and Jonas 2003; 
Shils 1954).3 
Regarding the methodology in Eysenck's studies, it can be noted that none of 
the surveyed samples were randomly selected, though occasionally considerably large 
and heterogeneous. Most studies used statement-scales in Likert format, with various 
possible degrees of agreement. The most interesting feature of data analysis is quite 
subjective determination of the number of significant factors. It is difficult to refute the 
model if two-factors solutions are imposed on the data. Relatively restricted range of 
items also favoured obtaining desired results. Nevertheless, the revision in 1975, i.e., 
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dividing conservatism in economic and religious-moral part, is a significant evolution 
of the original model.  
 
Conservatism as a unidimensional bipolar dimension 
Glenn Wilson began his investigations as Eysenck’s collaborator and co-author. 
While Eysenck shifted his interest the T-factor and its relationship to personality, 
Wilson remained focused on attitudes and the R-factor. He postulated 
unidimensionality and bipolarity of social attitudes: social attitudes are various aspects 
of one underlying dimension - Conservatism, with its opposite pole Radicalism 
(occasionally also called Liberalism, or Progressivism). In Wilson’s description, typical 
adherent of conservative ideology is characterized by religious fundamentalism, pro-
establishment politics, insistence on strict rules and punishments, militarism, 
ethnocentrism and intolerance of minority groups, preference for the conventional in 
art, clothing, institutions; anti-hedonistic outlook and restricted sexual behaviour, 
opposition to scientific progress, and superstition (1973a, 5-9). 
According to factor analysis results (Wilson and Patterson 1970), these traits 
converge into four related attitudes or components of the general conservative 
ideology: 1. Militarism or Punitiveness, 2. Antihedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, and 4. 
Religious Puritanism. Table 3 presents not only studies on the base of which Wilson 
formulated his theory, but also works of other authors applying his scales in different 
settings. 
Wilson and Patterson (1968, 1970) developed a new technique for measuring 
social attitudes: the so-called Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale (the 'C-scale'). It 
consisted of a list of words or ‘catch-phrases’, like Religion, Death Penalty or Abortion, 
and respondents were asked to express their approval thereof. Studies reported in 
Table 3 tend to support the unidimensionality hypothesis although sometimes relying 
on tenuous empirical foundation. For example, when the first principal component 
accounts for only 18% of variance (Truett 1993).  
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Table 3. Basic methodological features and results of Wilson’s main studies,  
and of other authors’ studies using Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale 
AUTHOR / 
YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Wilson & 
Patterson 
(1970) 
Samples 
from: UK, 
Netherlan
ds, New 
Zealand, 
West 
Germany 
50 items Wilson-
Patterson (W-P) 
Conservatism 
Scale (C-scale), 
yes-no scoring 
PC extraction, no 
rotation 
Conservatism as general 
factor, consisting of 4 
components:  
1. Militarism-Punitiveness,  
2. Anti-Hedonism,  
3. Ethnocentrism,  
4. Religion-Puritanism, 
Nias (1972) N=441 
children 
between 
11-12, 
England 
50 items, 
adapted WPAI 
scale 
PC extraction, 
interpreted 1st PC, 
and 4 Promax 
factors 
a) special version of Child 
Conservatism, and sub-
dimensions: Religion, 
Ethnocentrism, Punitiveness, 
and Sex (hedonism). 
Robertson 
& 
Cochrane 
(1973) 
N=329 
students, 
Edinburgh
50-items WPAI PC, Varimax, 17 
factors; interpreted 
1st component, and 
4 factors explaining 
28% of  variance (1st 
comp. only 12,9%) 
1st component: Religiosity; 
and 4 factors: 1. Religiosity, 
2. Prurient Sexuality, 3. 
Racism, 4. unnamed. “C scale 
does not measure a general 
dimension of conservatism”. 
Wilson & 
Lee (1974) 
N=356, 
adults, ad 
hoc, Korea
WPAI, adapted 
version 
PC extraction, 
oblique rotation of 
4 factors 
General factor of 
Conservatism; 1st order 
factors: 1. Militarism, 2. 
Antihedonism, 3. 
Ethnocentrism,  
4. Religious Puritanism 
Sidanius, 
Ekehamma
r & Ross 
(1979) 
N=327 
Australian 
& N=192 
Swedish 
psycholog
y students 
36-item, S5 
Conservatism 
Scale (W-P 
type), (3 answer 
options: yes, no, 
?) 
PAF extraction, 
Oblimin rotation, 
“psychological 
meaningfulness” as 
a criterion for the 
no. of factors 
6 factors, of which 5 
common in both samples: 
Auth. aggression or 
Punitiveness, Soc. Inequality, 
Religion, Pol.-eco. 
Conservatism, & Racism. 
Unique: Australia - Pro-west; 
Sweden:Xenophobia. 
Sidanius & 
Ekehamma
r (1980) 
N=532; 
“relatively 
representa
tive for 
students in 
Stockholm
”; Sweden 
36 items WPAI 
(Conservatism) 
scale 
Principal factors 
extraction, 9 factors 
with eigenval.>1; 
no inf. about 
rotation or correl. 
between factors 
1. Political-economic 
Conservatism, 2. Racism, 3. 
Religion, 4. Social inequality, 
5. Pro-West, 6. Authoritarian 
Aggression, 7. 
Conventionalism, 8. 
Ethnocentrism, 9. 
Xenophobia 
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AUTHOR / 
YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Green et 
al. (1988) 
N=499 
students 
and 
nurses; 
USA and 
New 
Zealand 
50-items; W-P 
Conservatism 
scale 
PC extraction; 
Varimax; 3 ad 4 
factors solutions 
tested 
General factor of 
Conservatism, but not 
previously defined sub-
dimensions 
Katz 
(1988a) 
N=356 
Israeli 
undergrad
uates (252 
Jews & 
104 Arabs 
50-items, W-P 
Conservatism 
Scale 
PC extraction; 
Varimax; 4 factors 
according to scree-
test 
General Conservatism, and 
the same 4 factors as in 
Wilson 1970 
Katz 
(1988b) 
N=217 
Israeli 
schoolchil
dren 
(Mean 
age=12.8) 
Children’s Scale 
of Social 
Attitudes (W-P 
type) 
PC extraction; 
Varimax; 7 factors 
with eigenval.>1; 4 
factors according to 
scree-test 
The same as above 
Ortet, 
Perez & 
Wilson 
(1990) 
N=185 
university 
students; 
Catalonia 
50-items WPAI PC extraction; 
scree-test for No. of 
factors; 5 factors 
extracted; no 
rotation 
1.General Conservatism and 
‘specific content’ factors: 2. 
Realism-Idealism, 3. 
Permissiveness-Conventional 
Institutions, 4. Women’s 
Liberation, 5. Punitiveness. 
Walkey, 
Katz & 
Green 
(1990) 
Volunteers
: 203 from 
South 
Africa, 252 
Jews and 
104 Arabs 
from 
Israel, 219 
from 
Japan 
23 items from 
W-P 
Conservatism 
scale 
PC extraction; no 
rotation; 
interpreted only 1st 
principal 
component 
C scale measures concept 
“related to the Judeo-
Christian religious tradition, 
with its firmest roots in the 
English speaking branch of 
that tradition” (p.988) 
Heaven 
(1992) 
N=273, 
heterogene
ous 
sample, 
Australia 
50-items revised 
C-Scale (W-P) 
PC extraction, 
Varimax rot., 15 
eigenval.>1; 
extracted 4 factors, 
according to scree-
test 
1. Religion/morality, 2. 
Equality, 3. Punitiveness, 4. 
Hedonism 
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AUTHOR / 
YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Truett 
(1993) 
N=29055(
!) 
volunteers
; 14466 
twins & 
14589 
their 
family 
members; 
USA 
28-items W-P 
Conservatism 
Scale; Likert 3-
point 
PC extraction; no 
rotation; 
interpreted only 1st 
PC accounting for 
18% of variance 
General Conservatism 
Riemann et 
al. (1993) 
N=184; 
univ. 
students; 
Germany 
162 items - 
“political issues 
currently 
discussed in 
Germany”; W-P 
type; 7-point 
Likert 
PC extraction; 10 
factors 
eigenval.>1; 4-
factor Varimax 
solution retained 
a) 1st principal component as 
General Conservatism 
dimension; b) 4 Varimax 
factors: Conservatism, Social 
welfare and women equality, 
Liberalism and technological 
progress, and Taxation for 
environmental purposes. 
 
Strategy of the data analysis, i.e., the interpretation of the first principal 
component as a general dimension, and then orthogonal rotation of theoretically 
correlated four factors – elements of conservatism – is questionable. If lower-order 
factors are elements of the higher-order factor, they have to be correlated, and thus 
obliquely rotated. Interpretation of the lower-order factors in orthogonal position is 
inconsistent with their hypothesized role as related components of a general 
dimension. In cases when analytic methods were less restrictive, the results provided 
less clear support for a general overarching dimension. For example, Sidanius, 
Ekehammar, and Ross (1979) and Sidanius and Ekehammar (1980) ended their analyses 
with 6 and 9 factors respectively, thus suggesting rather loose organization of primary 
social attitudes. 
Riemann et al.'s (1993) research is a good example of studies following Wilson's 
approach. Using a relatively small student sample from Germany (thus providing a 
cross-cultural test), they applied a 162-item W-P type of scale referring to a wide set of 
“political issues currently discussed in Germany”. The first principal component was 
interpreted as the General Conservatism dimension. Varimax rotation of four factors 
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resulted in the following components of the general conservatism: (1) Conservatism, 
(2) Social welfare and women equality, (3) Liberalism and technological progress, and 
(3) taxation for environmental purposes. Although the results lend some support for 
Wilson's model, it is clear that particular attitudinal configuration depends on the 
context, but especially on the particular set of items included in the analysis. This 
explains, for example, the emergence of an environmentalist factor. However, 
Riemann et al. provided an independent test of the psychological roots of ideological 
orientations. They correlated a Big-Five personality questionnaire with the isolated 
attitudinal dimensions. They found that Openness to experience was strongly related 
with general conservatism. This is important since this trait is related both to Wilson's 
concept of the fear of uncertainty and to Eysenck's concept of psychoticism.4 
Conscientiousness correlated with general conservatism as well. This personality trait 
is similar to what was in earlier psychological vocabulary referred to as anal character 
or obsessive personality.5 Finally, agreeableness, as well as openness to experience, was 
positively related with the social welfare factor and with environmentalism. 
Sampling of respondents and items in this group of studies is again far from 
being representative, making the conclusions difficult to generalize to non-student 
populations. However, an interesting and valuable feature of the studies in this group is 
the attempt to test the scale and theory in various cultural settings. Several studies (e.g., 
Green et al. 1988; Heaven 1992; Robertson and Cochrane 1973; Walkey, Katz, and 
Green 1990) supported the almost abandoned idea about the multidimensionality of 
social attitudes and their cultural determination. For example, Walkey, Katz, and 
Green (1990) found that the first principal component was less consistently structured 
the more the samples were culturally distant from the Western, English-speaking 
samples. However, their conclusion that the C-Scale measures a concept “related to the 
Judeo-Christian religious tradition, with its firmest roots in the English speaking branch of 
that tradition” (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990, 988), is not necessarily a difficult 
theoretical problem for the Wilson’s theory. He psychologized the concept of 
conservatism, viewing it as  
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“a reflection of a generalized fear of uncertainty, whether stimulus uncertainty 
(complexity, ambiguity, novelty, change, etc., as states of the physical and social 
environment) or response uncertainty (freedom of choice, need conflict, etc., 
originating from within the individual)” (Wilson 1973b, p. 187, italics in 
original).  
 
Hence, it is predictable that in different environments the fear of uncertainty 
(i.e., the personality foundation of conservative attitudes) should be expressed in 
different ways.  
 
Kerlinger’s Dualistic Theory 
The main feature of Kerlinger’s (1984) model is a dualistic conception of social 
attitudes: Conservatism and radicalism (or liberalism) are not opposite extremes of one 
dimension. Rather, they are orthogonal, independent dimensions. One’s position on 
the conservative dimension does not tell anything about ones position on liberalism. 
The explanation is that for the conservatives, criterial referents are different than for 
liberals. Private property or religion are, for example, criterial referents for 
conservatives, while civil rights and socialized medicine are for liberals. Thus, 
according to the theory, one can be both: conservative and liberal, or neither. Frequent 
negative correlations between Conservatism and Liberalism according to Kerlinger 
(1984) are the result of improper scaling, factoring, or sampling bias (too many 
extremists in samples, who are by definition against something). 
Results of his analyses led to the conclusion that the higher-order Conservatism 
factor is defined by three lower-order factors:  
1. Religiosity (and corresponding referents: religion, church, Christian, faith in 
god, etc.);  
2. Economic Conservatism (referents: profits, money, business, free enterprise, 
corporate industry, capitalism, private property, etc.), and  
3. Traditional Conservatism (referents: discipline, law and order, authority, 
family, tradition) (Kerlinger 1984, 239).  
Five Liberal factors received repeated confirmation:  
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1. Civil Rights (civil rights, blacks, racial integration, desegregation),  
2. Social Liberalism (social security, socialized medicine, poverty program, 
economic reform, social welfare, etc.),  
3. Sexual Freedom (equality of women, women’s liberation, birth control, 
abortion),  
4. Human Warmth and Feeling (love, human warmth, affection, feeling), and  
5. Progressivism (child centred curriculum, child’s interests and needs, pupil 
personality, etc.) (Kerlinger 1984). Kerlinger’s main results and works of some of his 
associates are presented in Table 4. 
Middendorp and deVries (1981) performed an important methodological test in 
their research. Namely, they compared the catch-phrase and statements types of scales 
(80 items in each of the two types of scales), and, despite some differences, obtained 
generally similar results. In this way, the claim that some differences between various 
models are entirely based on methodological grounds was refuted. Although they 
started from the Kerlinger's model, their conclusions provided the basis for the later 
more elaborated Middendorp's (e.g., 1991) model of the structure of ideology. They 
concluded that behind the obtained structure, one can detect a theoretical ideological 
model of the "progressive-conservative domain". In their words,  
 
“progressive attitude ‘applies’ the value of equality to the economic realm 
(equality of income, property, life chances, etc.) and the value of freedom to the 
non-economic realm (e.g., tolerance, permissiveness). Conservative attitudes are 
the opposite of this: freedom is applied to the economic realm (free enterprise, 
opposition to government interference) and equality, in some sense at least, is 
applied to the non-economic realm (e.g., conformist to conventional social 
norms and to traditional standards of behaviour).”  
(Middendorp and deVries 1981, p. 252, italics in original). 
 
 
Many methodological features of studies in this group are similar to the 
previously reviewed studies, but there are significant improvements. Several Dutch 
studies are based on random national samples. Kerlinger (1984) adopted Wilson-
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Patterson type of scales (calling the items ‘referents’), but he selected referents out of 
more than 400 possibilities found through the systematic analysis of literature in 
political philosophy, public discourse, etc. He was more methodical in data analysis as 
well, systematically performing higher-order extraction and applying confirmatory 
procedures. Still, the applied methodology favoured the confirmation of the theory 
through subjective determination of the number of significant factors and through the 
orthogonal rotation of the second-order factors.  
 
Table 2. Kerlinger’s studies and studies testing the dualistic theory of social attitudes 
AUTHOR 
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Kerlinger 
(1972, 1984) 
N ~ 530; 
students of 
education, 
teachers; 
USA 
50 
items/referents 
selected from the 
sample of 400; 7-
point, Likert 
Principal factors (PF) 
extraction, Promax 
rotation, 6 first-order 
and 2 second-order 
factors 
Two independent factors:  
1. Liberalism,  
2. Conservatism 
Marjoriban
ks & 
Josefowitz 
(1975) 
N=460, 
secondary 
school 
students; 
England and 
Wales 
50-items 
Conservatism 
Scale (W-P), + 2 
other Likert-
type scales 
a) PF analysis of each 
scale, b) PF of 41 
selected items, 8 factors 
extracted 2nd-order 
factoring - 2 factors; 
Varimax rot. 
8 1st-order factors: Racial 
prejudice, Nationalism, 
Patriotism, Social 
conservatism, Disrespect for 
authority, Political activism, 
Modern art, and Sexual 
freedom; Conservatism and 
Liberalism as 2nd-order factors. 
Kerlinger, 
Middendor
p and 
Amon 
(1976) 
N=1925; 
students from 
USA & Spain 
& random 
sample from 
Netherlands 
72-78 items, W-P 
type REF VIA 
scale; “freely 
adapted” for 
European 
countries 
PF extraction; subjective 
criteria for No. of 
factors; 8-12 1st-order 
factors; Promax 
rotation; three 2nd-order 
factors 
”General support” for 
independent factors of 
Conservatism and Liberalism 
which “underlie many or most 
social attitudes”. 
Kerlinger 
(1984) 
12 samples, 
N from 206 
to 685; 
mostly 
students; 
USA and 
West Europe 
Total ~200 
items; 6 different 
scales, mostly 
W-P type; 30-78 
items, 7-point 
Likert 
Principal Factors 
analysis; Analysis of 
covariance structures  
Two independent dimensions: 
1. Conservatism,  
2. Liberalism 
Middendor
p and 
deVries 
(1981) 
N=815; 
general 
population; 
Netherlands 
80 items - 
referents (W-P 
type); 6-points of 
dis/agreement 
PF extraction; Varimax 
& Promax rotations; 
extracted 4 factors - the 
‘best interpretable’ 
solution; two 2nd-order 
factors 
1st-order: 1. Consensus, 
2.Libertarian-Traditional, 3. 
Left-Right, 4. Liberalism-
Conservatism; unclear 2nd-
order factors 
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 N=1927; 
general 
population; 
Netherlands 
80 items - 
statements, 
based on the 
above referents; 
5 or 7-point 
Likert 
1st-order: Liberalism-
Traditionalism, 2. Left-Right, 
3. Liberalism-Conservatism, 4. 
Attitude towards social change 
 
 
'Outliers' 
There is a considerable number of socio-psychological studies more or less 
directly related to the problem of the structure of general social attitudes which are not 
related to the reviewed three models. Some of them are presented in Table 5. 
The importance of these studies it twofold. First, they show the dependence of 
the results on theoretical background and methodological approach (variables, samples, 
statistical analysis). Second, they document a considerable similarity between findings 
in these studies and those from the previous three groups, in spite of the differences in 
methodology.  
 
Table 5.  Outliers: Methodological features and main results of some relevant studies out 
of the three main approaches. 
AUTHOR 
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Sanai (1950) N≈300 
adults; 
London, 
UK 
16 items; 7-point 
Likert type 
collapsed to 2 
points 
Burt’s Bipolar Analysis; 
extracted: 1 general 
factor and 2 bipolar 
factors 
1. Progressivism-conservatism, 
2. Atheism/socialism vs. Social 
progressivism,  
3. Socialism vs. 
atheism/agnosticism 
O’Neil & 
Levinson 
(1954) 
N=200 
university 
students 
32 items: 10 from 
Traditional family 
ideology, 8 - 
ethnocentrism, 8 
authoritarianism, 
and 6 religious 
conventionalism 
Centroid method, 4 
orthogonal factors 
extracted 
1. Religious Conventionalism, 
2. Authoritarian submissiveness, 
3. No name,  
4. Masculine strength façade. 
Rokeach & 
Fruchter 
(1956) 
N=207 
college 
students 
43-item 
Dogmatism scale 
(D), and 9 other 
scales  
Analysed are 
summarized scores on 
scales; Centroid 
extraction, orthogonal 
rotation of 3 factors  
1. Anxiety,  
2. Liberalism-conservatism, and  
3. 
Dogmatism/authoritarianism/ri
gidity 
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AUTHOR 
/YEAR 
SAMPLE ATTITUDE 
SCALES/ITEMS 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
METHOD 
RESULTS 
Comrey & 
Newmeyer 
(1965) 
N=212 
volunteers
; USA 
120 items: 4 
homogeneous 
items for each of 
30 attitude 
variables; 9-point 
Likert 
a) FA of items 
intercorrelations and 
construction of 25 
‘micro’ attitude scales 
for the main analysis; b) 
‘homogeneous-item-
dimension’ extraction, 
Varimax rotation 
One second-order factor: 
Radicalism-Conservatism, and 5 
first-order factors:  
1. Welfare-State attitudes,  
2. Punitive attitudes,  
3. Nationalism,  
4. Religious attitudes,  
5. Racial Tolerance. 
Kerlinger & 
Rokeach 
(1966) 
N=1239, 
mostly 
students, 
USA 
D-Scale (40 items)
F-Scale (29 items); 
7-point Likert 
type 
Principal axes analysis; 
Promax rotation, 2-nd 
order analysis 
2nd-order factors:  
1. Dogmatism,  
2. & 3. Authoritarianism 
(fascistic version) 
Durrheim 
and Foster 
(1995) 
N=244 
psycholog
y 
students, 
South 
Africa 
27-item, shortened 
C scale 
4 factors (Scree test), 
Orthoblique rotation 
1. Inequality, 2. Religious 
conservatism, 3. Political and 
economic conservatism, 4. 
Punitiveness. 
Enyedi & 
Todosijević 
(2003) 
Random 
national 
sample of 
adult 
Hungaria
ns (N 
=1002) 
18 statement-type 
items & 22-item 
catch-phrase scale 
PC extraction and 
Oblimin rotation; Scree 
test; 4 factors 
explaining 36,3% of 
variance 
(1) Conventionalism,  (2) 
Socialist conservatism, (3) Right-
wing conservatism, (4) 
Libertarianism 
Todosijević 
(2005) 
Random 
sample of 
Belgrade 
residents 
(N=502) 
70 Likert-tipe 
items, derived 
from theoretical 
and empirical 
literature 
Initial extraction, 
construction of mini-
scales – 15 primary 
dimensions; 4 order 
factors 
Four 2nd order factors: 1) 
socialist conservatism, 2) right-
wing conservatism, 3) social 
order and hierarchy orientation, 
and 4) post-materialist 
orientation 
Todosijević  
(2008) 
Hungary: 
national 
random 
sample, 
N=1000 
Serbia: 
students, 
N=120 
17 Likert-type 
items, “relevant 
for constructing 
more general 
ideological 
orientations.” 
PC extraction; 2 factors 
according to Scree test; 
explain 38.12% and 
27.92% of variance in 
Hungary and Serbia, 
respectively. 
Hungary: (1) social alienation 
&socialism and (2) nationalist 
anti-socialism. 
Serbia: (1) social alienation 
&egalitarianism; (2) pro-
communist nationalism 
Kandler et al. 
(2012) 
872 twins, 
Germany 
8 bipolar items, 
intended to 
measure the left-
right 
differentiation 
PCA extraction; 2 
factors according to the 
minimum average 
partial tests for the 
number of components. 
Two factors: (1) acceptance of 
inequality [AI], and (2) rejecting 
system change [RC]. 
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A particularly interesting example is Comrey and Newmeyer’s study. It is one 
of the methodologically best studies reviewed here, but without much visible influence 
on later research (apart of Todosijević, 2005). Yet, the results fit the Eysenck’s and 
Wilson’s models well. A serious problem in many of the reviewed studies based on 
item analysis is low commonalty and consequent low percentage of explained variance. 
The root of the problem is in the inadequate reliability of the single items. One 
solution is to use hierarchical factor analysis. Another answer to the problem, adopted 
by Comrey and Newmeyer (1965), is to construct ‘micro-scales’, consisting of several 
semantically close items, thus providing more reliable measures for the beginning of 
analysis. At the end of their analysis a single second-order factor accounted for 42% of 
variance, which is considerably more than, for example 18% in Truett (1993).  
In recent years, several studies were conducted in Eastern Europe (Enyedi & 
Todosijević 2003, Todosijević 2005, 2008). Todosijević (2008) conducted a study based 
on a random sample of Belgrade residents (N=502) in the Spring of 2002. The results 
showed that Serbian mass political attitudes vary along fifteen latent dimensions, 
including dimensions such as nationalism, militarism, economic liberalism, and 
environmentalism. Second-order factor analysis revealed four general ideological 
dimensions: 1) socialist conservatism or the “regime divide”, 2) right-wing 
conservatism, 3) social order and hierarchy orientation, and 4) the post-materialist 
orientation. This, as well as various other studies in the post-communist context, 
provide evidence of the association between political left and authoritarianism (e.g., 
Enyedi and Todosijević 2002; McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996), suggesting 
the importance of political history and socio-cultural factors.  
Yet, on another level, the same evidence supports the general association 
between personality dispositions and attitudes. In Serbia, authoritarianism correlated 
both with the 'socialist conservatism' and the more common type of right-wing 
conservatism. Hence, authoritarianism appears to be at the roots of psychological 
conservatism and anti-democratic orientation more generally, the expression of which 
depends on particular cultural context. 
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Discussion and implications 
It is difficult to make firm generalizations about the reviewed studies because of 
differences in the applied methods and in the amount of details reported. However, 
some principal tendencies and features can be outlined. Three models of the structure 
of social attitudes have dominated the field for several decades: Eysenck’s, Wilson’s and 
Kerlinger’s. Eysenck’s Conservatism-Radicalism dimension served as the basis for the 
development of Wilson’s and Kerlinger’s models, disputing over its bipolar or dualistic 
nature (Kerlinger 1972, 1984; Wilson 1973a; Wilson and Patterson 1968). Tough-
mindedness has been linked to psychological variables, such as authoritarianism (e.g., 
Eysenck and Wilson 1978; Ray 1982) or dogmatism (Rokeach 1960). However, it is 
difficult to see which of the models is on firmer empirical grounds. 
Most studies are based on small, ad hoc samples, usually social science students. 
Two types of instruments have dominated the field: lists of statements in Likert 
format, and Wilson-Patterson lists of referents. The size of scales varies from less than 
20 to more than 200 items. The content of the items and process of their selection 
often remains unexplained, but there are exceptions where the selection of questions is 
explicitly justified (e.g. Kerlinger 1984, Middendorp 1989, Todosijević 2005). 
The interpretation and labelling of the extracted factors is a separate problem. 
Many of the proposed labels are synonymous. Sometimes the same label denotes 
different factors, and vice versa - similar factors have different labels. Frequently, there 
is not enough information to compare the content of factors besides their labels. For 
example, Ortet, Perez, and Wilson (1990) named one of their second-order factors as 
idealism vs. realism. However, the real meaning of this factor is clearer after finding 
that the realism pole is defined by the support for apartheid and white superiority.  
Overall, more than thirty different factor labels figure in the reviewed studies, 
various versions of conservatism and liberalism being the most common. Other 
frequent labels are nationalism (and varieties like ethnocentrism, racism, patriotism), 
tender-mindedness (and related concepts - authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, 
Punitiveness, dogmatism), and religiosity.  
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The review shows that it is not always easy to connect theoretical concepts 
with the empirically obtained attitudes. In order to avoid subjectivity, it is useful to 
pre-define ideological content of the items. In this way, the obtained factors will be 
interpreted in a more ‘objective’ manner, but also the results would have more explicit 
theoretical importance. If a dimension contains items or scales supposed to measure 
different ideological dimensions, yet they still appear on a single factor, such results 
suggest ‘factor convergence’ specific for the analysed case. This strategy is not 
applicable in a purely inductive research. 
It is important to note that the reviewed theories evolved over time. Eysenck 
(1975) introduced the third dimension, representing the economic left-right division. 
Wilson and collaborators extensively compared results from various cultures. They 
observed that with the greater cultural difference from the English speaking Judeo-
Christian tradition there is less evidence of the ideological unidimensionality (Walkey, 
Katz, and Green 1990). Middendorp and deVries’ (1981) results provide the basis for 
the integration of Kerlinger’s dualistic and Wilson’s bipolar theories.6 When there is a 
consensus in the population about certain referents, they are not the basis for the left-
right division. Inclusion of referents about which opinions are polarized produces 
polarized factors.  
Referring back to the hierarchical model of attitude structure, the literature 
proposes different origins of co-variation between elements in the hierarchy. Semantic 
similarity and logical constraints operate predominantly on the lower levels. Common 
psychological functionality, elite discourse, basic political values are more relevant for 
the structuration at higher levels. Moreno (1999), for example, sees the source of the 
most general ideological configuration in elite divisions and visibility of different elite 
fractions. Middendorp (1991) attributes the strongest influence to the elite discourse 
and influential intellectual traditions, as well as to the general political values from 
which the main ideological streams are derived.  
Researchers in the socio-psychological tradition offer potentially universally 
applicable models attempting to explain individual differences in ideological 
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orientations (Jost et al. 2009). Dispositional and personality concepts such as 
authoritarianism, the ‘need for cognitive closure' (Jost et al. 2003; Maltby and Price 
1999), "the tough-poise, extroversion and rigidity" (Birenbaum and Zak 1982, 512), fear 
of uncertainty (Wilson 1973b), or general values (Rokeach 1973; Maio et al. 2003), 
contributed significantly to our understanding of the integrating factors behind certain 
attitudinal configurations. Recent research suggests that causal chain might start before 
personality – in genetic factors. According to Kandler et al. (2012), political attitudes 
are transferred between generations not environmentally but genetically, via 
personality. 
The best contribution of the future research would, perhaps, be in comparative 
analysis of the interplay between psychological and socio-political determinants of the 
attitude structuration. Thus far, we know that both personality and social factors (e.g. 
class divisions, political history) and politics (ideological polarization) affect the 
attitude organization. but, we lack the knowledge about the nature of interaction 
between these factors. 
 
Methodological implications 
Several methodological improvements could move the field forward. It would 
be useful to develop more reliable measures of primary attitudes, through creating 
‘mini-scales’ for measuring habitual opinions (for examples see Comrey and Newmeyer 
1965; Todosijević 2005). Without more reliable measures at the lower level, it is 
difficult to obtain reliable and valid measures on higher levels. Kerlinger’s three second-
order factors (Kerlinger, Middendorp, and Amon 1976), for example, accounted only 
for 18% of total variance of 11 primary factors. With results such as these, it is difficult 
to justify the claim that higher-order factors are really relevant ‘underlying dimensions’ 
of all social attitudes.  
The selection of items should be substantively representative for the domain in 
question. Biased and partial coverage of the ideological dimensions often characterizes 
both empirical models and more theoretical accounts. Reliance on ad hoc sampling of 
variables tends to violate one of the basic requirements for discovering the 'laws of 
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structure', namely, representativeness of the sample of variables for the domain under 
investigation (Nesselroade and Cattell 1988).7 In some contemporary studies in post-
communist context (Todosijević 2005), for instance, theoretical and empirical literature 
about relevant political-ideological dimensions guided the selection of items. 
Particular attention should be given to the interpretation of the obtained 
factors. It can be enhanced by systematically relating the isolated factors to a broad set 
of theoretically relevant independent and dependent variables. The former group, for 
example, would include standard socio-demographic background variables, 
dispositional variables such as personality dimensions, authoritarianism, prejudice, and 
political preferences.  
Additional avenues for the future research include the question of the relevance 
of ideological dimensions for political behaviour. Describing how political attitudes are 
structured and explaining individual difference thereof are important topics in their 
own right. The significance of such knowledge, however, vastly increases if it helps 
understanding political action. For instance, in Serbia in 1998, the dimension of pro-
communist nationalism strongly correlated with party preference, unlike the 
alienation-socialism factor (Todosijević 2008). 
Social and political context affects attitude structure - ideology appears 
differently structured in Western Europe, Middle and Far East, and post-communist 
world. In order to understand the logic of variation, additional comparative research is 
needed. For instance, 'new democracies' of Eastern Europe provide an attractive 
ground for the discovery of atypical ideological configurations. On the one side, these 
countries are, in the global perspective, relatively close to the 'West' in terms of 
cultural and social features, and in their exposure to the main ideological currents and 
intellectual traditions inspiring them. Yet the unique experience of the communist 
monopoly over political discourse has left at least a temporary mark on the way 
citizens organize and express their basic political views (e.g., Berglund, Ekman, and 
Aarebrot 2004; Evans and Whitefield 1993).  
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Finally, reliance on national representative samples would be more than 
welcome. It would secure that respondents of various ideological orientations are 
adequately represented. The typical student samples are likely to introduce biases, 
particularly in this area. 
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Endnotes 
1 Later named tough mindedness vs. tender-mindedness. 
2 Adorno et al. (1950) were concerned primarily with the psychological sources of ethnocentrism and 
prejudice. However, the authoritarianism dimension that they described and the F-scale measuring it 
have remained an important influence in this field. For instance, four components of general 
conservatism in Wilson's (1973a) model (Punitiveness, antihedonism, ethnocentrism and religious 
puritanism) are described as characteristic for individuals with high score on the F-scale. 
3 Shikano and Pappi (2004), though coming from entirely different research tradition, recently reported 
broadly corresponding findings. Their second dimension of political space in Germany was defined as 
"the degree of radicalism in the sense of non-established vs. established parties" (Ibid., 10). 
4 And to recently elaborated concept of the need for cognitive closure as well (Jost et al. 2003). 
5 In this sense, their results are in line with Adorno et al.'s (1950). 
6 Birenbaum and Zak (1982) argue that Kerlinger and Eysenck models can be integrated as well. 
Birenbaum and Zak’s results support Kerlinger’s idea bout criteriality, as well as Eysenck’s hypothesis 
about the role of personality. They obtained two orthogonal factors in Israel, similar to Kerlinger's 
conservatism and liberalism factors. Personality correlated with one of the dimensions, i.e., "only 
traditional attitudes correlate with personality traits" (Birenbaum and Zak 1982, 512). This personality 
trait is described as consisting of "the tough-poise, extroversion and rigidity" (Ibid., 512). 
7 Saucier's (2000) lexical study of ideology is clearly an example of the care given to the selection of 
variables. 
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Abstract 
The consideration of political action by individuals is constrained by what those people 
consider possible, in terms of not only their immediate actions but also in terms of 
what changes in the world those individuals believe could occur because of their, or 
others’, actions.  However, there are two major complications to this picture: (a) 
people are heavily influenced by others they are in social contact with in terms of both 
goals and assessment of possibility, and (b) since what people do is influenced by what 
world-changes they consider possible, and people know this, what can change is 
influenced also by what others think others around them think is possible.  Politics 
thus involves complex processes at several levels, including: the spread of goals and 
possibility assessments throughout a local social network, and adjustments in what 
people think about others’ possibility judgements.  An implementable cognitive model 
suitable for building into an agent-based model is proposed, drawing on existing 
cognitive structures to simulate social contact, goal-directed action choice, negotiation 
and social norms. 
 
 
Introduction 
This paper represents the view of a computational social modeller, not an 
expert in political theory or literature.  This is therefore somewhat of an outsider’s 
view of what might be appropriate.  It outlines a proposal for a possible cognitive 
model that directly addresses the question of action choice in political situations – ones 
where the actions of one actor (or actors) constrain what is possible for others, that is 
where some have power over another or over what may transpire.  
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I will start with some example situations to highlight the core elements of the 
proposed model.  Both of these are highly simplified accounts of such situations, 
involving only a few of the different political viewpoints that might be involved, but 
they do highlight some important factors that (I argue) do need to be taken into 
account but are amenable to computational simulation.   
In the discussions below, I will use a style of diagram that directly corresponds 
to the cognitive representations that might be used in a simulation of actors3.  They 
represent states of the world (the nodes) and what transitions between these states (the 
arrows) are believed to be realistic possibilities.  The transitions between states are 
labelled by the events or agent actions that may cause the transition.  These actions are 
not necessarily those of the actor with the beliefs illustrated, since many transitions 
depend upon the actions of others (otherwise politics would be redundant).  The states 
of the world come with their valency for the agent – that is, how desirable the agent 
considers them.  However to keep the diagrams simple I will usually leave valency out, 
since it is clear by context. 
This is an extension of the possible world semantics (PWS) of Kripke (1963).  In 
standard PWS, nodes represent possible states of the world and directed arcs the 
possible transitions between those states. Here this is slightly extended to allow the 
accessible labelling of nodes and arcs, which can be explicitly reasoned about by the 
actors.  Each actor may have a different “map” of what the relevant possible states of 
the world and the connecting actions are (and, very relevantly, who they think can do 
those actions).  Of course, their mental maps may turn out to be wrong, and be 
updated by future events, but this snapshot of maps does form a coherent and powerful 
model for how such political decisions are made. 
In the paper below I seek to show that this kind of reasoning is especially 
important for political reasoning and action.   
 
  
                                                        
3For a history of the many people involved in the development of this style of representation, see the 
appendix of (Edmonds and Hales 2004). 
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there is a small demonstration, emphasise that things will not change regardless of 
protest, and try to encourage the perception that even if a few protest most will not.  
Further they might try to socially denigrate few protesters by portraying them as 
“extremists” or otherwise antisocial.  It is notable that many of these steps are matters 
of persuasion/propaganda as well as actions of force.   
Those agitating for change might try to persuade people that change is possible 
if enough protest and that it is likely that many will protest.  If they can persuade 
enough people to join the protest that others will feel relatively safe in joining in they 
might obtain a significant protest, since the bigger the protest the less dangerous it will 
appear to join it.  Further, they will know that the social experience of joining with 
others on a social experience may help persuade people of the possibility of change.  
Their problem is getting enough to protest if it is perceived as being pointless, that few 
people will join and thus would be vulnerable to individual arrest. 
 
Example 2. A Political Dialogue 
This example is loosely derived from a report on the Maaswerken negotiation 
process (van Asselt et al. 2001) designed to achieve a consensus about flood prevention 
measures in the Maas river basin. Here there are some possible flood prevention 
measures: building dykes and extending flood plains.  Clearly, the Netherlands, with 
their tradition of working towards a consensus, is very different from one in a 
dictatorship where supressed conflict might be the norm. 
For both citizens and government it is overwhelmingly important to prevent 
getting to the state possible floods anytime in the future.  The citizen thinks it is 
possible to prevent this by getting to one of the high flood defence states since even 
High rain will not then cause floods (Figure 3).  The government thinks there is a 
possibility of abnormal rain that the citizen does not think possible (Figure 4).  Hence, 
the government does not think that attaining to the state of High flood defences will 
prevent the possibility of getting to possible floods in the future.  Other things being 
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think about how to achieve this. This is completely different from “indicators”, such as 
happiness, prosperity, amount of food, pain, fairness etc.  Although, overall, what 
people desire in terms of these indicators is pretty clear (if not for themselves then for 
family or others), they are not something from which one can reason to determine 
what action to take.  Just because one desires more happiness does not mean this helps 
directly in determining what to do to get it.   
Indicators do help in determining goals, but as feedback for learning goals.  
Thus, one might learn that some experience of some state of the world does change 
indicators in a desirable direction and so, subsequently, attaining to this state might be 
adopted as a goal.  Similarly, others might suggest goals, which might be “sold” on the 
basis that it might increase desirable indicators (or decrease undesirable ones).  For 
example, it might be suggested that everybody works hard and puts up with temporary 
discomfort in order that a project is attained that will eventually benefit all (e.g. 
bringing in the harvest).  Thus, goals change from time to time and which goals are 
adopted is a political matter.  For a more comprehensive discussion of indicators, goals 
and goal-directed reasoning, see (Milgram 2001). 
Which goals are most important to individuals is often a matter of dealing with 
immediate problems or constraints in their lives.  Thus, even though growing enough 
food might be a general goal, if it gets cold enough staying warm might rise above this 
in importance for a while.  Thus, in crises preventing an indicator from becoming too 
bad (too little food, too much unhappiness, too much pain, too great a chance of death 
etc.) might become an immediate goal.  Clearly, by threatening people with a severe 
deterioration of such indicators one can motivate people to behave in ways one wishes 
(if one has the power to enforce this), however there are two solutions to such a threat: 
to comply and avoid the consequences or to get rid of the possibility of the threat. 
 
Possibility Beliefs 
Key in both of the above examples is which destination states people believe are 
reachable, i.e. what they think is possible.  In the first example, what was key was 
which actions (causing transitions between states) individuals believe could occur, and 
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which transitions between states were possible.  In the second example, the suggestion 
of new possibilities in terms of new states and transitions enabled a decision to emerge 
despite the fact that (overall) citizens and the government had different views of what 
was possible.  This structure of beliefs and possibilities was implicit in (van Boven and 
Thompson 2001) and made explicit in (Edmonds and Hales 2004). 
 
Social Influence 
Others can suggest both beliefs about possibility and which goals might be 
adopted.  In particular if a person is a part of a group they identify with and they think 
that a majority of others share certain beliefs then it is particularly likely that they will 
come to share them.  Goals can be adopted if people share their possibility, salience 
and broad desirability.  The effect of participating in a crowd or tight group can be 
particularly powerful, with people being persuaded of things that they might later 
reject.  For example in such situations one can feel temporarily powerful and immune 
in a way that is far beyond that supported by an objective evaluation. 
 
Reflexivity 
As illustrated in the above examples, what is considered possible is not only 
what an individual directly considers, but what they consider are other people’s beliefs 
about possibilities.  Although not always the case, one of the biggest clues as to what 
others might believe is what you believe – an individual might thus project their beliefs 
upon others around them, assuming they think the same things are possible as you 
think are possible.  Of course, occasionally, what happens might be determined by 
what others think your possibility beliefs are, or what others might suspect your 
beliefs are. For example, if you think the authorities suspect you believe it is possible 
to overthrow them you might well act differently than the case where you believe they 
can not know that you believe this.  This inherent and deep reflexivity in human belief 
about others can thus be critical to what actions are taken. 
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Culture 
Although clearly societies develop means to constrain the real affordances 
available to individuals in terms of which actions are possible (for example making 
keys so that only people with the keys can open a door or start a car), another set of 
constraints is in the assumptions passed down within cultures as to what is considered 
possible (Sugden 2000)4.  Not only might this body of cultural beliefs be difficult to 
question (since one would be brought up assuming them), but such beliefs may be self-
confirming (due to the fact they are widespread).  For example, if a certain 
distinguishable group in a population is considered as particularly aggressive then 
people may actively look for signs of aggression when interacting with them, and by 
their anticipations prompt the aggression they were expecting.  Those who are 
expected to be aggressive might find that they will be perceived as aggressive anyway 
and so lose nothing by being aggressive.  Thus the culture of expectations might 
entrench itself over time, providing all with many apparent confirmations of their 
assumptions.  To give a more positive example, if everybody thinks there is a high 
probability that the corrupt will be found out and prosecuted then fewer people will 
be corrupt and also the social institutions that enforce non-corruption will have a 
greater chance of being effective (since they have a manageable number of cases to 
deal). 
Thus human institutions are not only distinguished by the visible structures of 
power (legal rules, sanctions etc.) but significantly also the less visible structure of the 
raft of cultural assumptions about what is possible, what people will think possible, 
what is expected, social norms etc. that hold.  It is perhaps these assumptions that, 
taken as a whole, best characterise the different “political mentalities” that seem to be 
common within each country. 
Of course, there is rarely only one such set of cultural assumptions that exist in 
any country, but rather an “ecology” of different assumptions.  For example, different 
                                                        
4Indeed (Elkins & Simeon 1979) consider political culture as the set of assumptions held. 
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classes, sexes, ethnic groups, religions etc. might share and pass on different sets of 
assumptions. 
 
Towards a Computational Cognitive Model 
The basic cognitive model I am proposing should be somewhat clear from the 
above discussion.  It combines elements that are already present in previous social 
simulation models.  This style of model is not designed to be parsimonious but rather 
descriptive in style (Edmonds and Moss 2005), though if my arguments that beliefs 
concerning possibility are key to determining political action are right, it is difficult to 
see how a simpler model would suffice. 
 
Core Structures 
A working model of the simulation following the above suggestions is not 
available here, but rather a closer specification of what it would consist of.  The 
framework is an ambitious one going beyond the current state of the art, however all 
its elements have been included within past simulations, so their combination in the 
way discussed below is entirely plausible, and I hope that future versions of this paper 
would include working examples. 
The basic elements of this model are: 
Beliefs. The agent’s beliefs are encoded as a set of states of the world and 
transitions between them that the agents considers relevant and possible.  This is 
represented as set of nodes and directed links between them.  The nodes represent the 
possible world states and the links possible transitions between them.  Transitions are 
labelled with the conditions for them occurring which will be typically a combination 
of events and actions that might occur by the agent or others.  States might also be 
labelled to enable communication about these between agents.  Actions or events 
occurring would trigger a change in the state of the world, which may or may not 
correspond with what an individual’s model of the world said would happen. 
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Current State of the World. One of the possible states will be the one that 
corresponds to the individual’s perception of the current state of affairs.  This 
perception might be misconceived or biased, for example when an individual thinks 
many more will come out in protest that actually occurs. 
Fundamental Indicators. As discussed under the goals subsection these are some 
kind of comparable indication of how desirable (or far from undesirable) states are 
from the point of view of the agent.  They are associated with the states in the 
cognitive model. The simplest way to do this is via floating point numbers5.  These 
might well be built into the agent and relate to its basic well being (e.g. lack of pain, 
status with peers, amount of money etc.)6.  There might typically be more than one 
relevant dimension of such indicators7.  Indicators will be updated from the world (i.e. 
an external change such as getting hungry) or due to a change in the world state.   
Environmental/scarce resource frustrations. Each of these dimensions is 
associated with a threshold for each individual; such that if the indicator drops below 
this, redressing this particular becomes a priority for the agent.  Thus an indicator 
dropping below its minimum can change the current goal of the agent to a state where 
this indicator is improved (e.g. if one gets hungry then eating becomes a goal unless 
there is another overriding objective). The values given to these indicators are not 
directly effectible by the agents themselves but only by changing state of the world via 
actions (e.g. eating). 
Current Goals. Given the: current values of the indicators, the current state of 
the world, and what transitions are considered possible by the agent, the agent may 
                                                        
5 In general, it is only essential that enough of the states can be compared to determine which is better when 
faced with a choice.  Not all pairs of states need to be comparable; indeed, for many possible pairs it may not 
be meaningful to compare them. 
6 For any particular modelling task, these dimensions will probably be fixed, but one kind of subtle political 
action involves the introduction of a new dimension, e.g. amount of freedom, which provides another 
dimension under which nodes can be judged.  However, it is probably difficult for a third party to “create” 
effective minimum thresholds for another.  Thus unless an agent comes to value the dimension a lot (e.g. it 
becomes part of their self-image which takes time) then this dimension might only be used to compare states 
if all other, more entrenched, indicators are at satisfactory (above threshold) values. 
7 It is not necessarily true that all states are associated with all indicators, so some states might be comparable 
using some indicators but not others.  However, it is simpler to give a value for all indicators to all states.  
Another extension might be to add some uncertainty or fuzziness to these values. 
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determine which state of the world is their current goal (if any). This goal helps 
determine what actions will be taken.  The situation is complicated because achieving 
many goals requires coordination with others (e.g. protesting together).  The agent 
then tries to achieve this state via its actions, including negotiating with others for 
them to take appropriate contributing actions (or withholding from taking actions that 
might prevent the goal being achieved). 
Environment. The agents are embedded into an environment that gives meaning 
to their perceptions of which world state they are in, and which may determine the 
values of their indicators.  In most political situations the most important parts of this 
are the other actors and their actions – a wide range of other actors will impact upon 
the world states relevant for any individual, whether they know them or not.  
Additionally, there may be a real set of states of the world and transitions, upon which 
the perception of the agents is based – a “Ground Model” (e.g. whether it really is 
possible to build dykes that prevent floods under any weather conditions), but often 
there is no accessible ground model of truth.  Some beliefs may simply be individual 
and others determined by the beliefs of others (e.g. whether most consider that they 
inhabit a democracy). 
Action Plans. Since in many political cases, in order to obtain many goals, 
immediate reactive actions and not sufficient but coordinated plans of action are 
necessary, plans of action with a degree of commitment may need to be remembered.  
However, these are subject to continual comparison against alternative plans and 
evaluated as to their likelihood of being completed. 
Social Influencers. Some of the other actors will be influential upon an 
individual in terms of their beliefs.  These may be personal social contacts, or people 
with power or status (such as leaders, TV presenters, etc.).  The web of influence may 
be represented by a social network or just be implicit in the structure of the 
environment (e.g. neighbours).  For example, social norms prevalent among these 
influencers may determine whether a particular goal is acceptable or what actions are 
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permissible in the current situation (Conte, Andrighetto, Andrighetto, in press).  It is 
probably sensible to distinguish friends from other influencers. 
 
Basic Processes 
The following computational processes will need to occur in either a cyclic, 
event-driven or a parallel fashion8. 
Current State. The agent needs to determine which state (that they believe in) 
the world is in (or they are in).  This may be the result of external observation, but also 
might be based on which previous state they perceived was current, updated by the 
events and actions they believed to have occurred in the intervening period. 
Belief Update/Creation. Beliefs may need to be continually updated/revised, 
created or discarded.  This is primarily from two sources: (a) observation of the 
external world, including the traces left by others there and (b) as a result of 
communication from others.  The former requires some inference and/or induction 
from what is observed.  The later may be more direct in terms of statements of what is 
true and/or possible.  However, it does not mean that belief acceptance is 
straightforward or “rational”9. One persuasive and possibly realistic scheme for belief 
acceptance/revision is Thagard’s theory of “explanatory coherence” (Thagard 1989), 
where beliefs are accepted or rejected according their total coherence with an actor’s 
existing beliefs10. 
Indicator Update. The current levels of each agent’s indicators need to be 
updated.  Often this is concerning the ground model and the agent’s situation therein.  
However, indicators can be socially grounded so that their update depends on the 
states of other agents, e.g. reputation or status. 
                                                        
8The order these occur in can be important.  Thus it may be that these have to effectively occur in parallel, 
with time represented at a fine enough grain so that the necessary sequences of decisions represented. 
9That is, not necessarily rational in the sense of adhering to some normative scheme of rationality, e.g. 
economic rationality or Bayesian learning. 
10In later work, Thagard extends this to include the coherence between goals and beliefs, so that beliefs that 
are in dissonance to one’s goals (e.g. travelling and climate change) might be dismissed regardless of their 
evidential base. 
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Goal Selection. Given a agent’s situation, beliefs and indicators a goal needs to be 
selected in the form of deciding upon a state the agent will try and reach next. This has 
to be a state that the agent believes is accessible from the current state, even if this 
might involve events and/or actions by others that cannot be guaranteed (e.g. one only 
enters a lottery if there is a possibility, however remote, that one could win).  If 
different goals are considered accessible then the selection of a goal state might involve 
weighing up the benefit (in terms of improved indicator values), risk (perceived 
probability of events and actions outside the agent’s control of occurring) and cost of 
actions.  As mentioned above, attention might be restricted to indicators whose value 
has dropped below the minimum acceptable to the individual. 
Action Negotiation. The individual may enter a sequence of communications 
with other agents to see if they might collectively agree on a joint plan of action that is 
coherent with everyone’s goals.  This is composed of an: exploratory series of offers, 
suggestion of joint plans, and their acceptance by necessary participants.  See (Edmonds 
and Hales 2004) for details about how this works within the context of a working 
simulation of such negotiation processes.  This is especially important in this context 
since most political actions are in the context of cooperation or opposition where goals 
are socially co-dependent (Conte and Sichman 1995). 
Action Choice. Given the assessment of the above, and action (or action plan) is 
executed. 
State Update. Given the actions of the agents (and possibly external factors) the 
state of any Ground Model needs to be updated. 
 
Initialisation 
Politics always has a history.  This poses a problem for the simulator because 
they have to start their simulation at some particular point.  There are basically two 
approaches to this: (1) running the simulation from some null or random state for 
some period of time until the effects of the initialisation seem to have disappeared (2) 
initialising the ground model, agents’ beliefs etc. to represent some kind of specific 
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situation11.  Both have different disadvantages: approach (1) may result in artificial 
situations that have never been observed (and maybe would never be observed), 
approach (2) is onerous and might require a very details initialisation, for which one 
may only have partial data and thus requiring much guesswork.   
If one has access to stakeholders or their accounts it might be possible to elicit 
their beliefs or extract some of these, as in (Hare et al. 2002a, Taylor 2003, Bharwani 
2004) or by analysing the narrative texts as in (Urquhart 2012).  One interesting 
possibility is that of eliciting such data by engaging participants in role-playing games 
(Hare et al. 2002b, Bharwani 2006). 
 
Concluding Discussion 
This kind of model can be seen as an answer to the critique of theoretical 
models of politics that were “too neat” in (March & Olsen 1984).  In that they made a 
strong critique of theories that either were reductionist or “too efficient” in terms of 
functionally reaching desirable societal goals.  In that paper they came against the 
barrier of how much complexity might be included in a political theory, however 
agent-based modelling breaks this limitation, allowing complex mixes of social, 
normative, institutional, individual and economic processes to be investigated together, 
without premature simplification. In this way individuals embedded within their 
societies (neither over- nor under-socialised) can be posited, explored and (ultimately) 
confronted with empirical data (Granovetter 1985). 
 
The Use of This Kind of Model 
A simulation constructed using such a cognitive model will not be a predictive 
model in a probabilistic sense.  That is, it will not estimate probabilities of sequences of 
events occurring.  However, it would allow the mapping out of real possibilities, 
including those that would not have been considered otherwise.  In this sense it is a 
possibilistic model. This can be a fruitful source of hypotheses for further empirical 
                                                        
11One can also have a mixture of approach (1) for some aspects and (2) for others depending on what is 
practical and/or known. 
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research12, or in the design of “early warning indicators” of developing socio-political 
processes (e.g. growing inter-community tension).   
Prospects for Validation 
Scenarios constructed from the outputs of such models can be presented to 
stakeholders and other domain experts as a test of their plausibility.  Also one can form 
a list of kinds of situation that one would expect to be possible given certain 
initialisations (e.g. those derived from case studies) and then the simulations inspected 
to check for their occurrence.  However, this kind of model does have a distinct 
advantage in that not only the outcomes but also the process by which they develop 
within the simulation is suitable for inspection and critique.  A particularly strong 
result is if unexpected outcomes emerge from a model and these turn out to be 
confirmed by domain stakeholders/experts that allows for a “cross-validation” of both 
micro- and macro- levels of a simulation (Moss and Edmonds 2005). 
The fact that any such model can only be partially validated is not an obstacle 
for it being attempted, nor indeed for its utility.  It is likely that good models of 
political processes will only emerge after many iterations of model building and 
empirical research.  What is important is that the process is begun and that it is 
accessible to critique, re-implementation and improvement by other researchers as part 
of an open and long-term joint scientific effort (Edmonds 2010). 
 
Further Development 
I hope that the ECPAM’2013 conference will provide a chance to confront the 
computational structures I present with some of the known case studies and political 
theory and enable a more sophisticated model to emerge, one that is more rooted in 
evidence. 
 
  
                                                        
12 For a more detailed discussion of model types and purposes, see (Edmonds et al. 2013). 
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Abstract 
 
Social modeling research has had major contributions to mechanism and process 
modeling by introducing micro-macro models able to replicate social mechanisms and 
allow for bottom-up constructive approaches like the artificial societies. Applied to 
political mechanisms, the social simulation modeling paradigm proves one major 
weakness, namely its low capacity to deconstruct the political phenomena and thus 
explain the macro-micro patterns. In this paper we argue that the individual 
interactions mechanism is not enough for the computational and simulation modeling 
of political phenomena. We suggest a political culture approach to polity agent-based 
modeling and simulation and introduce an operational concept and architecture.  
 
Keywords: political mechanism, political culture, artificial polity, simulation modeling 
 
 
Motto:  
“But there is more to social mechanisms than just individual interactions…”13 
“Give me a good speculative mechanism any day rather than a batch of useless survey data”14 
 
 
  
                                                        
13 Steel D. 2003. Social Mechanisms and Causal Inference, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, No. 34, p.58. 
14Gambetta D. 1998.Concatenations of mechanisms, in: “Social Mechanisms. An Analytical Approach 
To Social Theory”, HedströmP. and Swedberg R. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, Ch. 5, p.120. 
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Introduction 
Social modeling is understood as a complex way of explaining social 
phenomena. It has been successfully used in Social Simulation as a way of explaining 
social action and emergent phenomena. With just a step behind, Political Methodology 
has included simulation modeling only recently and only in some areas of simulation 
modeling research, International Relations and Voting Behavior being the most 
preferred for their rather easy appropriation of agent-based system models.  
In Agent-Based Modeling (ABM), the current specifications of the concepts 
artificial society and artificial polity share the notions of “agent” and “individual 
agency”, and also the methodological individualism approach on social action 
modeling. However, as simulation models, they prove notable differences. Compared 
to the Coleman’s model of social action (Coleman, 1986, pp. 1322;  Coleman 1990, 
pp.19-21), the artificial society would mainly address the micro-macro link in explaining 
emergent social phenomena (Squazzoni, 2008), while the artificial polity would also 
address the macro-micro link, where by “emergence” we take as a basis the view 
proposed by agent-based system modelers of the social phenomena as macro (high-
level) effect of the micro (low-level) interactions (Axelrod 1997, p.4; Epstein and Axtell 
1996, p.35), which are not deducible from the laws characterizing the lower-level 
domain phenomena (“strong emergence”, Chalmers, 2006). 
Explaining these differences is important for both theoretical and experimental 
modeling purposes. In our approach it is important for explaining the role political 
culture theory might play in the modeling and simulation of both society and polity. 
 
Premises and Basic Terms 
For modeling purposes, we compare the artificial society and the artificial polity 
in a scenario of attitude change and show that, in experimental setups based on 
emergence, (political) culture and recurrence of phenomena, the artificial polity models 
prove “downward causation” (Sawyer, 2002). We generalize these results as a 
conclusion drawn from the comparison of these two abstract models used for political 
culture-based simulation of political phenomena (Table 1). 
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Table 1. Comparative View: Agent-Based Modeling of Social vs. Political Phenomena 
 Social Science
 
Political Science 
Computational 
and Simulation 
Modeling 
- Social Modeling
- Social action model (Coleman, 
1986) 
 
- Political Methodology 
- International Relations  
(Axelrod, 1995) 
Agent-Based 
Modeling and 
Simulation 
Systems 
- MAS
- CAS 
- ABMS 
 
- ABMS: state-actors in 
International Relations 
(“tribute model”, Axelrod, 
1995) 
- CAS: (Cederman, 1997) 
Reference 
Model(s) 
Artificial Society
“Sugarscape” Model (Epstein and 
Axtell, 1996) 
Artificial Polity  
“RebeLand” Model 
(Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 
2009, 2010) 
New scientific 
disciplines and 
research areas 
- Social Simulation
- Computational Sociology 
- Computational Political 
Science 
Modeling 
Paradigm(s) 
- Methodological Individualism
- Interactions among micro-level 
individual agents  
- Generative mechanisms and 
processes  
- Methodological 
Individualism 
- Interactions among 
individual agents (state-agents) 
- Generative mechanisms and 
processes  
- Social forms (Simmel, 
[1908]1971) and  
generative configurations 
(Cederman, 2003a, 2003b) 
Simulation 
Patterns 
1. micro-level interactions (social 
life) 
2. micro-to-macro phenomena 
(social structure) 
1. macro-level interactions 
(example: IR emerging 
phenomena, like violence, 
terrorism or armed conflict) 
2. macro-to-micro phenomena 
(example: influence of the 
international relations context 
on the individual state-agents) 
Simulation 
outcome(s) 
1. Emergence of macro-level 
phenomena  
1. Emergence of macro-level 
phenomena  
2. Downward causation 
 
 
Earlier Simulation Modeling Studies of Polity 
We should mention first the agent-based models of nation-states as individual 
agents in modeling and simulation research on war, rebellion, civil unrest and armed 
conflict (Cederman, 2003b; Cioffi-Revilla and Gotts, 2003) or collective identity agent-
based models (Lustick, 2000) which include both methodological individualism and 
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(political) culture as modeling dimensions, but employ them only at the state-, and 
collectivity-level agent. We should also mention the differences from the individual 
citizen agent-based models inspired by the “sugarscape” model (Epstein and Axtell, 
1996; Epstein, 2002), which use the individual agent as a typical basic agent, involve 
methodological individualism as an interaction generative paradigm, and also include 
self-organizing and complexity features (Ilachinski, 2004), but do not address (political) 
culture theories as a modeling dimension. Finally, we should mention differences from 
the approaches which include psychology and social psychology (Bennet, 2008) or 
institution representation aspects (Bhavnani, Miodownik and Nart, 2008) as modeling 
dimensions, but which  again do not involve (political) culture as generative or 
influence factors  of the individual agents relationships with the institutions and  with 
the state itself.  
Previous and current simulation modeling research work on artificial polity has 
been and stil is mainly concerned with macro-level agents (“states”) modeled as 
individual agents. Some of these approaches focus on the individual citizen as the 
typical agent, of which the ReBeLand Model (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009; 2010) is 
considered here to be most representative. It includes a culturalist approach of the 
origins of political instability by modeling the ethnical conflicts as a source of political 
violence. However, the debates on the appropriateness of the culturalist aspects in this 
and in other similar models like Cederman and Girardin’s model of ethnicity and 
nationalist insurgency (Cederman and Girardin, 2007, 2010), have weakened this 
hypothesis so as to leave the political culture modeling dimension open to further 
debate. 
On the other hand, previous computational and simulation modeling of polity 
has intensively used agent-based models, namely Sugarscape Model (Epstein and Axtell, 
1996; Epstein, 2002) in order to get bottom-up models of political violence, explaining 
it therefore as emergent macro-scale social phenomena rooted in the micro-dynamics of 
the interactions between individual agents (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2010, p. 34). 
This has led researchers of emergent political phenomena to concentrate more on the 
micro-to-macro link so as to show how the dynamics of micro-level individual 
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interactions could impact the stability of the state. Such polity models like GeoSim 
(Cederman, 2003b), RebeLand (Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009), REsCape (Bhavnani 
et al., 2008) address the relation between the individual agents and the state as a means 
to study the polity’s response to variability in the individual interactions at the micro 
level. 
In this respect, our approach looks very much similar since it models the polity 
itself as a macro phenomenon. The difference is that our model is applied to studies of 
the conceptual and operational principles which makes a polity model uncover the 
“downward causation” effect. To this aim, the model includes political culture as a 
modeling dimension. 
 
Justification of Approach 
The present paper, which combines political culture modeling and the simulation 
of an artificial polity in a complex account on political change phenomena, has been 
inspired by the computational and simulation modeling experiments which have been 
developed during the past years (Voinea, 2012, 2013). These experiments, aimed at 
computationally modeling and simulating the Eastern European political phenomena 
after 1989, included corruption, political attitudes towards the state, and trust in state. 
The experiments used agent-based simulation: an artificial society has been “grown-up” 
so as to model the above-mentioned phenomena. Earlier reports of experimental results 
and performances showed that the major weakness of the artificial society model, 
namely its poor capacity to account for the macro-level and macro-to-micro 
phenomena, can be overcome by constructing a more comprehensive model: the 
artificial polity. Our model employs political culture theories in order to model the 
macro-level and the macro-to-micro phenomena. Notwithstanding its apparent 
flexibility, robustness and attractiveness, the model we are trying to work out opens 
actually a kind of “Pandora’s Box” of theories on ‘political mechanism’, ‘process’, 
‘modeling’ and ‘explanation’. Each of these concepts, already defined by ealier theories 
and modeling approaches, brings back old disputes, fuels new ones, and demands 
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further defining work, since polity simulation models might differ in some essential 
terms from their social counterparts. Studying the origins and natures of these 
differences has been a challenging experience, since all this might provide enough 
arguments for developing a polity simulation modeling paradigm: the political culture-
based modeling paradigm of a polity. Since both artificial society and artificial polity 
share the agent-based simulation modeling methodology in order to account for the 
implicit methodological individualism of the macro emergence phenomenology 
described by each, a differentiation of these paradigmatic approaches should therefore 
focus on details, like (i) the type and level of complexity and emergence involved by 
each,  and (ii) the ways in which macro-level and macro-to-micro phenomena are 
modeled in each. 
Our approach is inspired by a social-psychological account of the relation 
between the individual agent (micro-level) and the polity (macro-level) and includes 
political culture as a fundamental modeling dimension. On this background, we 
reconsider agent’s, mechanism’s, process’s, and polity’s theoretical and operational 
definitions so as to specify the role they play in the modeling of political change 
phenomena. We have therefore proceeded to evaluate our previous experimental 
simulation experience in order to get the necessary background for a correct 
understanding of the nature and type of theoretical issues hidden in rich experimental 
clues. 
The paper approaches the artificial polity as a political culture-based model of a 
body politic. It involves political culture concepts and theories to account for the 
complexity of domestic political phenomena, going from political attitude change at 
the individual level up to major political change at the society level. Architecture, 
structure, unit of interaction, generative mechanisms and processes are but few of the 
modeling dimensions manifold. Both conceptual and experimental issues are described 
so as to highlight the differences between the simulation models of society and polity.  
This approach addresses in general lines fundamental problems of society and 
polity simulation modeling and, obviously, does not provide answers to all theoretical 
questions. However, it stands for one more step towards finding the proper answer to 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
83 
 
an old fundamental requirement formulated by Charles Tilly in 1995 with concern to 
the way in which political processes are explained. Computational and simulation 
modeling scientists should perhaps pay particular attention to the requirements of 
political scientists and to their oftenly discouraging skepticism with concern to the 
newly developed simulation modeling methods, no matter how revolutionary these 
might be: what they ask for is not always what they get from us. Looking for the 
proper answer to their requirements, challenging their skepticism, and paraphrasing 
Tilly, we could ask ourselves: “how, then, should we search for the causses of revolutions?” 
(Tilly, 1995, p. 1602). 
The present approach provides a theoretical account of several interconnected 
issues which are essential in our political change simulation model: (1) the artificial 
polity, (2) the typical agent, (3) political mechanisms and processes, (4) political culture-
based modeling of political phenomena, (5) experimental setup, (6) the need and 
direction of further experimental and conceptual developments, and (7) half-title of this 
paper explained: why individual interactions are not enough? 
 
Artificial Polity: A Political Culture-Based Simulation Model 
Eastern European political regime changes initiated in 1989 provided shortly 
afterwards a particular impetus for the revived interest in political culture studies. 
Notwithstanding the major differences in the conceptual paradigms of the various 
schools of thought, and the hardness of their critical views with respect to their 
explanative power, these studies acknowledge the come back of political culture theories 
and shed light on several issues addressing its modeling propensities.Though not at all 
surprising, since such “revivals” seem to have been re-iterated by periodically emerging 
major crises and/or political changes all over the world (Elkins and Simeon, 1979; 
Inglehart, 1988), the post-1989 revival has been especially relevant for at least one 
reason: old and new political culture theories “clashed” on the atypical analysis “battle 
field” of the Eastern European post-communist political regime. One particular 
outcome of this after-1989 clash is considered one of the most challenging political 
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culture theories: Mishler and Pollack’s “Thick-and-Thin” Neo-Cultural Synthesis 
(Mishler and Pollack, 2003).  
Political Culture studies and analyses of the Eastern European political 
phenomena after 1989 put a special emphasis on the need to develop models of the 
complex processes of transition to democracy, democratization, and democracy 
consolidation in post-communist political regimes (Mishler and Pollack, 2003; 
Whitefield, 2005). Explanative by their definition and concept, models have been 
understood as abstract constructions which best capture the causality issue in context-
dependent political phenomena (Merton, 1948, 1957). The undeniable need for models 
in an area of research in which empirical data and analysis are still the dominating 
paradigm, is perhaps the “engine” which has constantly moved things forward, even if 
not always fast enough for the expectations of the political scientists. From the times of 
the “The Civic Culture” (Almond and Verba, 1963) and its “clash” with the alternative 
theory elaborated by Lijphart (1968), the need for political culture-based models of 
political phenomena has increasingly fueled the controversies over their explanative 
power, and has more profoundly penetrated the epistemology of the domain, shaping 
the demand for a consistent methodological change (Eckstein, 1988, p.790) from 
model-invariant to context-based variation modeling paradigms. In spite of their long-
standing principles, their clear dominance and stability in the domain’s research 
methodology, and the substance and accuracy of their analytical achievements, the 
deductive-nomological explanations and their associated modeling theories (Hempel, 
1965) have increasingly been subjected to critical evaluations and disputes during the 
past decades.  
Completely different from the empirical modeling theories, newly emerging 
computational and simulation modeling technologies have definitely contributed to the 
decline of the model-invariant explanative theories and to the methodological shift 
towards generative mechanisms, bottom-up models, and virtual experiment techniques. 
Undoubtedly, this methodological change has been claimed long before, since scholars 
like Charles Tilly (to take but one example) have started to criticize the inability of 
model-invariant methodology to capture the variability and contextual dependences of 
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the major political change phenomena. All the way from the genuine demand of-, up 
to the proper methodological change has oftenly seemed a difficult-to-cross borderline 
between different epistemologic constructions of what a model could and should 
explain in political culture theories. 
Computational and simulation models in social sciences have inspired much of 
the modeling work which has been lately developed in political science, in mainly two 
areas of research: International Relations, and Voting Vehavior. Social Simulation, 
Computational Sociology, Complex Adaptive Systems, and Agent-Based Modeling 
Systems have provided the background concepts and techniques used now largely in 
political methodology in these areas of the simulation modeling research. Theoretical 
and formal social action models, for instance, which have inspired the well-known 
artificial society model (Epstein and Axtell, 1996), have provided the dominating 
modeling theory, concept and paradigm in the International Relations area of research. 
Political Methodology, traditionally based on empirical research and statistical tools of 
analysis, has increasingly manifested a clear tendency in the direction of identifying 
specific tools and evaluation frameworks (King, 1991) which could provide for a 
different and more believable approach on issues like context-, path-, and initial 
conditions-dependency of political phenomena. Not only the practitioners, but the 
theorists themselves (Tilly 1995, 2000, 2001), have given strong support to the claim for 
a radical change in the political methodological research paradigms, which should 
approach political phenomena in their real complexity. The interest on the complexity 
of phenomena has been transferred rather quickly on the complexity of methodology, 
so that individual agent, social interaction, emergent social phenomena, and society 
could thus be considered dimensions in the methodological shift.  
Both computational and simulation modeling have brought from Social 
Simulation the basic concepts and paradigms which have assisted Computational 
Political Science to emerge and grow-up as a new discipline. Unavoidable though, 
controversies on both epistemologic and ontological aspects in the Social Simulation 
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theories have extended their reach to the modeling research, which has lately included 
both agent-based and complex adaptive modeling techniques. 
(Political) Culture models on the one hand (Inglehart, 1990; Putnam, 1993; 
Eckstein, 1988; Diamond, 1996), and Social Simulation modeling theories (Axelrod, 
1995; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005; Macy and Willer, 2002; Squazzoni, 2012) on the 
other hand, have been so hardly disputed as to make this methodological shift even 
harder. Nonetheless, political culture theories have endured and “… not only survived 
but mounted an impressive comeback over the past decade....” (Mishler and Pollack, 2003). 
The question now is what their impact actually is on the massive modeling re-shaping 
attempts supported by the newly developed social simulation and artificial society 
technologies? – As a matter of fact, this question is just a re-iteration of both Tilly’s 
famous request and Mishler and Pollack’s claim for renewing the political phenomena 
modeling methodology.  
Natural and undoubtedly justified as it is, modeling is the missing part of this 
“impressive comeback” of political culture theories. Moreover, if there is a point of 
convergence of various types of skepticism and denial with respect to the explanative 
power of political culture modeling, than this has to be the simulation modeling. It is 
this particular weakness, this particular skepticism and, especially, this particular 
convergence point of denial positions with respect to political culture-based modeling 
that we are going to tackle in this approach.  
With their neo-cultural synthesis, Mishler and Pollack (ibid.) have actually 
threw the glove to all modelers of political culture, political and social scientists as well. 
Notwithstanding its strength, their challenge has left some category of scientists 
untouched: the computational and simulation modelers. The reason? – To the 
satisfaction of those who have given support to the classical so-called “thick” theories 
and who hang on empirical data and statistical analysis, and to the disappointment of 
those who have given support to the so-called “thin” theories and who might expect 
something different then just survey stuff, in spite of Mishler and Pollack’sown claim 
for a unifying, synthetical approach, their political neo-culture synthetic model (ibid., 
p. 247) is just a common analytical model. Though extremely challenging in theory, 
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their neo-cultural synthetic model itself is deeply rooted in the empirical analytical 
tradition.  
Explaining what is disappointing in it would actually offer the chance to make a 
description and analysis of the modeling approach in the present paper.  
 
Aim of approach 
In the present approach, we aim at modeling what some authors call “situationl 
context” (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998) or “downward causation” (Sawyer, 2002), 
namely the macro-level and the macro-to-micro phenomena.  
From a theoretical point of view, our approach is a hybrid one, combining both 
collectivist and individualist tenets into an unifying view much inspired by the neo-
cultural synthesis proposed by Mishker and Pollack (2003). The fundamental 
dimension of our approach is therefore the political culture and the role it plays in 
explaining and making effective the macro-to-micro link. We therefore aim to prove 
effective the four types of downward causation defined by Sawyer (2002, p. 217) in our 
artificial polity experimental settings. 
The previous reseach aproach, Briberyscape (Voinea, 2012, 2013), models 
corruption as a micro-to-macro emergent phenomenon in an authoritarian regime. It 
exhibits downward causation effects by increasingly getting the political macro 
structures (the state) constraining the patterns of individual interactions among citizens 
and among citizens and institutions. Both Privilegescape (also called the “Privilege 
Market” Model) and Baronscape (also called the Local Patron-Client Networking 
Model) model the macro emergence of political phenomena which characterize the 
failure from inside of an authoritarian regime: one such phenomenon was 
theemergence of autonomous networks of trust which parallel and weaken the 
network of trust in state. In these models, the downward causation concern (a) macro 
structures which constrain the individual interactions, (b) stable emergents, like 
emergent networks of trust, which constrain the individual agents and their 
interactions. The proposed model of the artificial polity has been further applied to the 
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analysis of scenarios of socialization (Voinea C.F., “Culturepiles”, forthcoming paper), 
in which political culture macro phenomena exhibit effects of downward causation by 
influencing the individual behavior. 
Our simulation model uses both mechanisms and processes as generative 
engines, combining substantialist with relationistconcepts of the generative theory of 
political interaction. The main differences from other approaches on polity simulation 
models concern (1) the type and domain of studied political phenomena, (2) the type of 
generative architecture and (3) the types of objects and/or processes which are 
considered as generative ‘engines’ in the hypothesized scenarios of political change. 
The type of political phenomena considered is the political change phenomena, 
and the area of study is the political change in domestic politics, as a difference from 
approaches concerning political change in International Relations (Axelrod, 1995; 
Cederman, 1997, 2003b; Cioffi-Revilla, 2010b). We are mainly concerned with the 
transition-to-democracy political phenomena and, in particular, with political change 
phenomena in the Eastern European communist and post-communist regimes. As a 
difference from other simulation modeling approaches, ours models the polityby 
involving the political culture as a key component in describing the political change. 
As it regards the architecture of a simulation model, the above-mentioned term “ 
type of generative architecture” is based on the concepts of generative political 
mechanism and process, and includes social action issues (individual interactions), 
polity issues (power, inequality, coercion and institutions), and political culture issues 
(attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms).  
As a modeling background, our approach starts from the social simulation 
prototype model: the artificial society described by the Sugarscape Model developed by 
Epstein and Axtell (1996). Our approach modifies this basic simulation model as to 
achieve an explanation of the macro-level and macro-to-micro phenomena and of their 
impact onto the behavior of the individual agents. In order to achieve this goal, the 
proposed simulation model introduces three levels of generative objects and processes: 
social, political, and culture objects and relations.  
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The idea of using political culture objects (beliefs, values, norms and attitudes) 
and their generative ontologies is aimed at proving that political culture objects and 
processes could and should be used as both generative and control engines with regard 
to the proper workings of a polity.  
 
What is our approach arguing for? 
Our approach constructs arguments on three issues:  
(1) political culture as a matrix of recurrent political processses (macro 
operational level) and as a matrix of generative mechanisms and processes (micro 
operational level);  
(2) modeling issues like “multilayer generative architecture”, “methodological 
individualism” and “relationism” should be used in combination so as to allow for both 
micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro explanations; 
(3) “thick-and-thin” continua could be identified in social, political and culture 
phenomena. 
What we argue for is briefly described bellow: 
We argue in the first place that modeling as explanation of political change 
phenomena cannot exclude political culture as both change generative and change 
control ‘engine’. As an alternative to the “figurations” introduced by Norbert Elias 
(1978, 1982) and the topological “configurations” described by Cederman (2003a), we 
suggest a new taxonomy of configurations: political cultural configurations, which 
include attitudes, beliefs, values, and norms configurations.  
Secondly, we argue that modeling of political phenomena could use various 
operational concepts, either (1) separately (i.e.: agents modeled as “objects”, and 
interactions and relations modeled as “processes”, which actually represents the current 
approach in the area), or (2) or combined(i.e.: agents, interactions and relations are 
modeled as “processes”, which is our suggestion). 
Generative modeling in social science is based on mechanisms which generate 
social structure by means of individual interactions (methodological individualism). 
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The original model of the artificial society (sugarscape) provides for a bottom-up 
account on the emergent social outcomes of micro-level individual interactions. Simple 
as idea and efficient as architecture (two-layer architecture), the artificial society model 
is interesting for its methodological individualism and for introducing the concept of 
generative mechanism as a basic ‘engine’ of the social action. The model cannot 
however provide any account on the macro-to-micro social phenomena, nor does it use 
a (political) culture model15. Hedström and Swedberg (1998) have introduced the 
notion of “structural individualism”, which represents an advanced version of 
methodological individualism able to provide for an explanation of the macro-to-micro 
phenomena.  
We start from this idea and modify the artificial society model. Our approach 
introduces a multi-level generative operational architecture concept. We describe and 
employ a class of experimental simulation models of (i) change in the attitude toward 
the state, and (ii) change of the trust in the state in both communist and post-
communist Eastern European polity inspired by the political qualitative and empirical 
models elaborated after 1989  (Tilly, 2000; Whitefield, 2005; Kubik, 1994, 2012; Mishler 
and Pollack, 2003; Pickel and Pollack, 2013; Wildavaski, 1987; Diamond, 1996; 
Inglehart, 1992, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Rohrschneider, 2002, 2006; Sztompka 
1993a, 1993b).  
On the basis of this class of simulation models, we argue that political culture 
mechanisms and processes provide support to-, and are able to explain the idea of 
downward causation, by identifying the kind of influence of the macro-to-micro 
phenomena on the behavior of the individual agents.  
 
 
                                                        
15 Epstein and Axtell developed several research experiments on conflict resolution in terms of 
international relations and state agents. However, these researches cannot provide for a political culture 
model. 
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Figure 1. 
Black area describes current Agent-Based Simulation Models (“sugarscape”).  
Blue area describes what capabilities the Agent-Based Simulation Models should include in  
order to be able to generate “macro-to-micro” phenomena. 
 
 
Finally, we argue that the “thick-and-thin” continuum pattern could be 
identified at all levels of study: society, polity, and (political) culture. The concept of 
“thick” social system and interaction have been developed by Sylvan (2003, 2010). The 
concept of thick culture was theoretized by Geertz (1973b). The concept of “thick-and-
thin” culture has been introduced and developed by Mishler and Pollack (2003). We 
extend this concept to the modelling of political phenomena by identifying several 
continua in the classical Coleman’s Model (1986): (1) an interaction continuum, which 
specifies the generative mechanisms and/or processes underlying agents interactions at 
both micro and macro levels, (2) an interconnection continuum, which specifies the 
mechanisms and/or processes underlying relations among agents at both micro and 
macro levels, and (3) a (political) culture continuum, which specifies the mechanism 
and/or processes which influence both micro-to-macro (emergent) and macro-to-micro 
(downward causation) phenomena and provide for the control modeling dimension.  
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Figure 2. 
The “Thick & Thin” continua in the Artificial Polity Model. 
 
We introduce the idea that an agent-based simulation system is a multi-layered 
structure, by “layer” denoting a certain level of activity pattern characterized by a 
specific degree of complexity, namely: (1) the micro and macro layers, where the agents 
interact and their dynamic interaction patterns evolve in either directly observable or 
implicit frames, (2) the micro-to-micro and macro-to-macro layers, where the relations 
between agents emerge from their interactions and the dynamic relational patterns are 
described as interconnection processes, and (3) the micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro 
layers, where the political culture agents (values, beliefs, norms, attitudes) and their 
dynamic change patterns are described as emergent and/or downward control 
processes.   
The advantage of this multi-layer structural architecture is that it provides the 
operational framework in which the macro-to-micro and macro-to-macro phenomena 
can be described. 
 
Political Culture: On Modeling “Thick-and-Thin” 
The debates on political culture addressing its explanative power are mainly 
based on the controversies concerning the definition of culture as either a “property of 
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colectivity” or as a property of the individual agent (Elkins and Simeon, 1979, p.129) 
emphasizing both a theoretical and a methodological ambiguity characterizing distinct 
schools of thought. The controversy comes from the different theoretical backgrounds: 
while the former is insired by anthropologist and sociologic theories, the latter is of 
social-psychology inspiration. Advocates of the collectivity alternative as Bourdieu 
(1972), Geertz (1973a; 1973b), Inglehart (1990), Putnam (1993), or Huntington (1996), 
inspired by Tylor’s classical definition of culture (1871), are more concerned with 
anthropological and sociological perspectives on culture. A second school of thought 
advocates an individual-based view of culture, like Conover and Searing (1994), 
Norander and Jones (1996), McFalls (2001), who are generally inspired by classical 
works of Almond and Verba (1965) and Converse (1964), emphasizing concern with 
social-psychological perspective on culture. Conceptual controversies based on the 
dichotomy between ideatic (idealist) and economic (materialist) views of culture have 
generated also methodological controversies mainly focused on the methods of 
measurement and collection of empirical data. As much as the conceptual ones, the 
methodological disputes are opposing different views on the modeling methodologies.  
Mishler and Pollack’s neo-cultural syhthesis (2003) challenges both the 
collectivity-based, and the individual-based approaches by mixing them up in a 
continuum of cultural agency concept which associates to both societal and individual 
level of interactions. 
Among the seven dimensions on which (political) culture is “poorly explicated” 
(Reisinger, 1995), the interaction between culture and polity highlights the 
instrumental role culture plays in the emergence and dynamics of political phenomena. 
Culture as a “control mechanism” (Geertz, 1973a, p.87; Elkins and Simeon, 1979, 
p.129) concerns a societal perspective on how culture is defined. 
We base our approach on Mishler and Pollack’s definition of political culture 
(2003) as the conceptual support of a strategy of explanation based on an unifying 
paradigm of both micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro explanatory components of the 
political change phenomena. The political culture concept defined by Mishler and 
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Pollack (ibid.) brings to the forefront an unusual idea for the current definitional 
approaches on both the concept of political culture process and mechanism: the 
‘continuum’. Their “thick-and-thin” definition uncovers several epistemologic 
hypotheses which have been and still are very much opposed by different schools of 
thought on what has been too much disputed a concept in both social and political 
sciences during the past half of century European intellectual history.  
In their 2003 article, published in one of the best approaches to Eastern 
European post-communist transition to democracy, “Political Culture in Post-
communist Europe: Attitudes in New Democracies” (D. Pollack, J. Jacobs, O. Muller and 
G. Pickel (Eds.), 2003), Mishler and Pollack argue for a neo-cultural synthesis which 
could explain the complexity of the attitudes toward democracy of the people in 
countries which have experienced authoritarian regimes and which undergo major 
political regime change processes. Their approach brings to the front the need for 
models able to provide explanations of both past and present phenomena unfolding in 
Eastern European politics and polities. 
Though oftenly subject to intense conceptual debate in both social and political 
science, the issue of explanation should be approached from a culture-based modeling 
perspective. Causal models of explanations have been mainly elaborated in social 
theory with little or no cultural explanative factors. New emphasis on culture theories 
and on political culture in particular has emerged from both the study of social and 
political evidence and from the need to uncover the deep complexity of major political 
change phenomena like those discussed in the introduction part of this paper.  
Mainstream political theory and modeling methodology is deeply anchored in 
the Humean inspired deductive-nomological framework of causation and explanation 
as it has been theoretized by Carl Hempel (1965). Nomothetic modeling is always in 
search for the so-called ‘covering-laws’, i.e. universal laws able to explain political 
phenomena no matter the spatio-temporal conditions and characteristics of their 
development (Bennet, 2003). Though extremely powerful at the level of global or 
universal regularities (patterns) extracted by comparative analysis from huge amounts 
of empirical data, the nomothetic models fail to capture the variability and context-
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dependency of political phenomena. This methodological weakness induces a more 
subtle one at the conceptual level, since nomothetic modeling does not base causation 
in the variability of phenomena, and hence cannot explain it. The complexity of 
political phenomena made the model-invariant explanative solutions often inadequate. 
The mainstream political modeling methodology has been challenged during 
the past decades by a powerful alternative, namely the generative theory. 
Starting with Thomas Schelling’s dynamic model of segregation (1971), the 
generative theory of social action covers both mechanism-based and process-based 
modeling approaches on social interaction. Mechanism-based modeling of social action 
is mainly concerned with the explanation of micro-macro phenomena described in the 
well-known Coleman’s model of social action (Coleman, 1986). The strength of 
Coleman’s model resides in its capacity to explain the micro-level and the micro-to-
macro emergent social phenomena. In this model of social action, mechanism-based 
modeling’s explanative power is limited to the micro-macro link (Sawyer, 2005; 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2008).  
“Downward causation” is a term used in the emergence theory to describe the 
influence the macro level phenomena might have on the micro-level phenomena 
(Sawyer, 2005; pp.69-73). It has been the subjet of epistemologic disputes over the 
existence of the emergent structures at the macro level and of their impact on the 
individual level of social interaction. Mechanism-based versions of generative theory 
cannot explain macro-level, and macro-to-micro phenomena.  
Process-based modeling is usually connected to the sociological process theory. 
While mechanism-based theories have been mainly employed to explain micro-to-
macro emergent social structure, the process-based modeling has been used by the 
generative theory in what regards the explanation of macro phenomena. It has inspired 
two schools of thought: substantialist and relationist (Emirbayer 1997). The 
substantialist paradigm starts from individual actors and society as ultimate generative 
social units and works with ontologies of objects which are involved in dynamical 
processes of interaction. The relationist paradigm starts from the relations between 
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social units as the true dynamical generative processes (Emirbayer 1997; Cederman, 
2003a). 
One of the breakthroughs in the theories on political mechanisms was the 
concept of relational mechanism as a generative engine in scenarios of political change  
(McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2008). It combines, at least in theory, the idea of object 
(individual actor) as generative mechanism with the idea of process as a generative 
“engine” in the study of political phenomena. This combination has actually 
represented the answer to an earlier request made by Charles Tilly during the mid’90s 
with concern to the need for new causal and explanative paradigms in political 
methodology. In spite of considerable development of computational and simulation 
modeling theories and technologies, Tilly has re-iterated his demand several times over 
a periode of fifteen years (1995, 2001, 2008). 
Though there is a rich literature on epistemic and ontologic aspects of the 
political mechanism issue, the answer to Tilly’s 1995 claim has been provided by the 
computational modeling theories in social simulation by means of the generative 
techniques. They mainly refer to agent-based simulation modeling 
techniques.However, Tilly’s request has not received the full proper answer so far. He 
provides very interesting collections of empirical descriptions on political phenomena, 
mechanisms and processes which have not been addressed or used so far by the 
contemporary generative modeling theories.  His examples have not been re-
constructed on a generative modeling basis, though many authors admit the limitations 
of current models (Sawyer, 2004a, 2004b) and the need for enhanced process 
description and representation tehniques (Fararo, 1989).  There still is a considerable 
need for modeling in the area. 
 
Model Structure  
The basic configuration of the experimental simulation models is shown in 
Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. 
Artificial Polity Model. 
Basic configuration of agents: various types of citizens  
(circles, triangles, squares, stars), culture items (large coloured  circles),  
and resources (large green shapes). 
 
The Agents 
A heterogeneous collection of agents (as “objects)” configures the three 
components of the model: active, environmental, and cultural.  
Environmental Component: it consists of agents which represent resources 
(financial, economical, institutional); these agents have quantitative variability, and 
their dynamics depends on the interactions with the other agents. The state and the 
government are institutional resources, playing a normative role in their relationship 
with the individual agents.  
Individual Agents Component: it consists of individual agents, which assume 
different social roles (ordinary citizens, bureaucrats, magistrats and politicians), and 
interact amongst them and with the resource agents. The dynamics of their interaction 
may result in emergent phenomena at the macro level. 
(Political) Culture Component: it consists of agents which model values, norms, 
beliefs and attitudes.  
At the micro level, the individual agent (citizen) interacts with the culture 
agents (values, norms, beliefs). Their interaction may result in relationships 
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characterized by an intensity attribute, which model how much an individual agent 
“holds” a belief, “appreciate” a value or “comply with” a norm. These relationships 
result in a “cultural networking” of individual and culture agents: the connections in 
this network are dynamic, expressing strong/weak (in various degrees) relationships. 
In order to make the system operational, the activity of all types of agents 
inspired a bottom-up multi-layer architecture, where by “layer” we describe the types 
of generative mechanisms and processes and the dynamic patterns of activity they 
generate. 
In the discussion part of this paper, we also describe agents as “processes” and 
how they might be used in a bottom-up simulation model. 
 
Model Architecture 
The operational architecture used in our approach is depicted in Figure 4. 
Sugarscape Model is based on agents and generative mechanisms and processes. 
As a bottom-up model, it describes the emergence of phenomena and explain by means 
of micro-level interactions of individual agents. Sugarscape models a society in which 
individual social interactions could result in emergent social phenomena at macro 
levels. 
Our present approach models both the society and the polity as different layers 
of the overall architecture of the simulation model. It differs from the Sugarscape 
Model in several aspects.  
First, the generative mechanism-and-processes architecture is defined, described 
and explained as a multi-layer architecture, in which each layer is characterized by the 
same processing principle and structure.  
The artificial society model uses a two-layered architecture of generative 
mechanisms: the basic layer is that of biological inspired mechanisms, like hunger, 
motion, reproduction; the second layer is that of socially inspired mechanisms, like 
interaction among the individual agents. Our model aims at further developing this 
type of architecture by including three layers: the basic layer is that of survival 
mechanisms, the second layer is that of social mechanisms, and the third layer is that of 
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cultural mechanisms. This three-layer architecture might be scaled-up at a multi-layer 
architecture in which several types of generative mechanisms and processes are 
included in each layer.  
 
Figure 4.  
Abstract operational architecture. 
 
Second, the structure consists in the generative mechanisms and the processes 
which they trigger and maintain. Both the mechanisms and the processes they produce 
are classified as (i) generative, and (ii) control. The generative mechanisms are basically 
social interaction mechanisms. In our approach however, the generative mechanisms 
include environmental and culture mechanisms. 
Third, the control mechanisms are basically culture mechanisms: they consists 
in a structure of evolving culture entities, like values, beliefs, norms and attitudes, and 
the processes associated to them. The evolution of each such entity is described as a 
separate process which interacts with the other processes, producing a cultural context 
and influencing the processes associated to the generative mechanisms. This simulation 
model based on a generalized generative architecture is used to build-up an artificial 
polity, which represents the experimental setup in which several political phenomena, 
like the emergence of networks of trust or the emergence of corruption, are simulated. 
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Mechanisms  
Political Mechanism has been the subject of intense theoretical debates during 
the past decades. Debates covered the theoretical definitions of political mechanism and 
focused on the comparative analysis with classical nomothetic models (Tilly, 1995, 
2000, 2001; Bunge, 1997). The controversies over the nature of mechanisms and causal 
models start from the definitions of mechanisms and causal modeling of social 
phenomena16. With the advance of Social Simulation, this debate extended to 
computational and simulation modeling research with the aim of developing 
techniques and methodologies able to replicate real political mechanisms and provide 
for explanative computational models of political phenomena (Cederman, 2003). 
The interest in political mechanisms and causal models has been justified and 
sustained by several theorists and philosophers in social sciences. The need for 
explanation with concern to major social phenomena has resulted in the mechanism-
explanation model theories (Merton, 1948; Tilly, 1995; Bunge, 1997; Elster, 1998; 
Hedström and Swedberg, 1998).  
While some authors are advocating a logical-based approach to mechanism 
(Tilly, 1995), others are advocating a methodological individualist approach, mainly 
promoted by the school of Analytical Sociology (Hedström & Swedberg 1998). The 
latter is close to the idea of mechanism used in Social Simulation. Both of them 
consider the agents as separate “entities”, and the overall variation of the system as 
“activity”, including both the interactions and the processes they generate and 
maintain. Though the mechanisms are defined in terms of their outcome, and not in 
terms of their making, this kind of definition avoids confusion and concentrates on 
their “generative” nature: 
 
                                                        
16Mechanism has been defined by several authors in very different ways: some authors define what 
mechanisms are, others define the way they work, their making or their outcome, some see them as 
having explanative properties, others as having generative properties. For discussions and exhaustive lists 
of definitions, see the works of Mahoney, Gerring and Gambetta. 
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“In order to explain macro-level outcomes, an additional step typically is 
required: the mechanisms must be assembled into a generative model which 
allows us to derive the macro-level outcomes they are likely to bring about […] 
A social mechanism, […] refers to a constellation of entities and activities that 
are organized such that they regularly bring about a particular type of 
outcome.”  
 (Hedström & Swedberg 1998, p. 112) 
 
Major advances in computational and simulation agent-based models of society 
and social systems have shaped the interest in emergentist models of explanation, 
which are based on generative mechanisms. Hedström has repetedly explained and 
illustrated the strong connection between the two approaches on the basis of 
methodological individualism. He stressed the role structure plays in such approaches, 
elaborating a new version of methodological individualism, namely the structural 
individualism (Hedström  and Swedberg, 1998; Hedström, 2005; Hedström and 
Bearman, 2009).  
Mechanisms are classified in several types by different authors: McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2008) identify environmental, cognitive, and relational mechanisms, 
Hedström and Swedberg classify mechanisms in complex, mediating, and theoretical 
building blocks (Leuridan, 2012). Described as either a “mechanical engine” or as a 
process itself, the ‘mechanisms’have been associated with the dynamic capabilities of 
agents, and are usually meant to represent these capabilities in an operational effective 
way in simulation models. In spite of diverse and multiple ways of defining it, the 
notion is still confusing, since no author provides a clear and complete idea. 
For this reason, our approach on mechanism in the present model avoids the 
‘mechanistic’ type of definition, and prefers the ‘emergentist’ one. The generative 
mechanism in our approach isan abstract model of processes unfolding, whose proper 
workings can-, but whose outcome cannot be described in terms of its inputs. It is 
rather a tentative operational description of what a mechanism is supposed to do in an 
agent-based generative setting.  
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In agent-based systems, mechanisms are usually regarded as basic elements 
which make a generative structure operational, and include pre-defined aspects either as 
combinations of contextual conditions and agents’ interaction capabilities or as “black-
boxes” (Boudon, 1998). 
In this paper, we address two types of operational descriptions of mechanisms. 
The first is the usual one in social simulations, namely a condition-based or context-
based evaluator & triggering engine. The second one is used by the emergentist 
modeling paradigm in complex adaptive systems, where a mechanisms is sometimes 
operationaly described as a set of processes which converge to a shared, global outcome 
(Cederman, 1997; 2003a). 
 
Processes 
In this paper, we base our abstract architectural concept on the notion of process 
as it has been associated to generative models by sociological generative process 
theorists (Fararo, 1989), by  theories of social forms of Simmelian inspiration 
(Cederman, 2003a) and in the agent-based modeling literature (Emirbayer, 1997).  
The notion of process in our approach combines the perspective of political 
process (Tilly, 1995, p. 1595) with the perspective of generative modeling (Schelling, 
1978; Axelrod, 1995, 1996, 1997; Casti, 1997; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Epstein, 1999). 
In generative modeling, political phenomena should be explained by 
constructing generative processes as artificial counterpart of the real ones and make 
them effective in contexts which are themselves artificial replications of real contexts. 
The idea of describing a process by actually generating and running it as a simulation 
has been introduced by Axelrod (1995) and also by Epstein and Axtell (1996) and it has 
been ever since considered as the basic principle in Social Simulation.  
Following the description of Fararo (2000) we use the concept of generative 
process as a computational run of an operational construction whose behavior 
manifold reproduces a relational pattern by means of “recursively iterated operations” 
(Cerderman, 2003a) of simpler (lower-level) processes, which we agree to identify as 
rules or mechanisms. This operational definition provides for modeling processes as 
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either variational structure-dependent or structure-emergent outcomes. As Fararo 
defines it, a process is the emergent phenomena associated to structural variation. The 
basic idea in using generative processes as recurrent outcomes of computational 
runnings of recursively iterated operations is to reproduce by means of simulation the 
recurrent patterns of political phenomena. The notion of recurrence has been 
employed by different social process theorists (Giddens 1979, p.5; 1989, p.252; Tilly, 
2000, p.3; Fararo, 2000) as a generative principle of macro-level emergent phenomena. 
In our artificial polity model architecture, the notion of recurrence addresses 
both the patterns of historical phenomena and the principles of their generative 
modeling. 
The typical operational layer in this architecture combines the idea of 
continuum with the idea of ‘cross-recurrent’,‘cross-recursive’ processes17, terms used in 
our approach to describe political processes with simultaneously or asynchronoulsy 
receurrence (see Tilly, 1995) and political processes whose evolution is strongly 
influenced by their history and also by the history of other co-existing recursive 
processes. The operational structure consists in a set of processes, described as 
                                                        
17 The notion of ‘recursivity’ in social and political sciences has been addressed in various types of 
approaches including the dynamics of public relations (Holmström S. 2005. “Reframing public relations: 
The evolution of a reflective  paradigm for organizational legitimization,” Public Relations Review 
No.31, Elsevier Science Inc., pp. 497–504), collective identity and political participation (Simon B. 2011. 
“Collective Identity and Political Participation,” in: A.E. Azzi, X. Chryssochoou, B. Klandermans, and 
B. Simon (Eds.) “Identity and Participation in Culturally Diverse Societies: A Multidisciplinary 
Perspective,” Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,  Part II: Introduction, pp.89-91), European security (Mallard G., 
Foucault M. 2010. “The Fractal Process of European Integration: a Formal Theory of Recursivity in the 
Field of European Security,” Working Pape No. 110-006, Roberta Buffet Center for International and 
Comparative Studies Working Paper Series, Buffet Center, Northwestern University), or governance 
(Crozier M. 2006. “Rethinking political communication as recursive governance,” paper presented for 
the 20th International Political Science Association World Congress , IPSA RC 22: Political 
Communication, Panel: Communication and Democratic Political Culture , Fukuoka, Japan; Bache I., 
Flinders M.V. 2004. Multi-Level Governance, Oxford Universty Press). The multitude of approaches 
highlight different ideas of recursivity, from Luhmann inspired  complexity-based characteristic of 
societal communication processes, to game-theoretical descriptions of federalism and European 
integration. Most of these approaches put a special emphasis on the path-dependence aspects associated 
with recursive descriptions of institutions, organizations or political communication and are usually 
related to complexity-based modeling approaches on historical causality and self-organizing hierarchies 
(see also Page S.E. 2006. Path Deependence, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, No.1, pp. 87-115; 
Bonabeau E., Theraulaz G., Deneubourg J.-L. 1996. Mathematical Model of Self-Organizing Hierarchies 
in Animal Societies, Bulletin of Mathematical Biology Vol. 58, No.4, pp. 661-717, Elsevier Science Inc.). 
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generative nodes in Figure 5. Each process is defined recursively and its operational 
description might include as inputs other processes defined recursively themselves.    
 
Figure 5. 
 
In this case, we can describe the typical generative structure as a set of cross-
recursive processes as depicted in Figure 6. 
In the simulation experiments we used a set of cross-recurrent cross-recursive 
processes describing the political attitude change in individual agents (Voinea, 2012, pp. 
130-135; 2013, pp. 41-43).  The recurrence of one process (i) depends on the recurrence 
of another process (j) and each process is dependent on both its own history and on the 
history of the other process;  at the moment of time t+1, itprocess 1 is described with a 
logistic function, in which the outcome of itprocess at the moment of time t is adjusted 
by the effect of a cross-recurrent jtprocess (Zbilut and Webber Jr., 1992; Webber Jr. 
and Zbilut, 1998; Webber jr. and Zbilut, 2005). 
An example of cross-recurrent cross-recursive processes in our simulation 
scenario (see Figure 6): apolitical-attitude-change is a process generated by the dynamics 
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of trust-in-stateprocess (representing itprocess ). The ‘trust-in-state’process is in turn 
described as depending on the “individual responsibility” process, in which 
‘responsibility’ represents jtprocess :  trust-in-state is modeled as a process which 
combines responsibility (towards state, family and self), fairness (in relations with other 
citizens and with the state),honesty (in personal relations amongst individual citizens). 
The cross-recurrent cross-recursive process description is further used to specify the 
responsibility  process (i) as influenced by the fairness process (j), and so on. As the 
examplein Figure 6 shows, cross-recursivity is used as an unidimensional dependence 
relation between two processes only. We have limited the description for the sake of 
simplicity so as to be able to express in an operationally efficient way the idea of cross-
recurrence, cross-recursive processes18. This allows us to express simple relationships 
between several processes in generative terms as follows: the individual agent develops 
a political attitude toward the state, which depends on the agent holding a certain belief 
(trust-in-state), appreciating a certain value (honesty), and complying(fairness) with the 
norms of centralized access to resources (coercive rules, as described in Voinea 
(2012)).As the difference between agent’s personal needs (in terms of personal 
resources) and what the state offers (constraining access to public resources) increases, 
the agent’s cognitive dissonance increases as well, which has a negative impact on the 
individual agent’s trust in state and, therefore, on her attitude toward the state. This 
circular dynamics makes the downward causation efective: the emergent macro 
phenomena, that is the emergence of new networks of trust and agents migration from 
one network to another have an explicit and quantifiable influence on the individual 
behavior (see Privilege Market simulation model in (Voinea, 2012)).  
                                                        
18For multiple cross-recurrence and cross-recursivity scenarios, the expression (1) requires a more 
complicated  specification which however does not make the subject of this paper.  
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Figure 6. 
 
Recurrence is thus based in both individual agents interactions (bottom-up or 
“emergent”) and interactions between individual agents and (political) culture 
agents(top-down or “downward causation”). This makes the operational architecture 
work as a continuum of generative processes – an operational idea which is meant to 
support the three continua description of the artificial polity conceptual model. 
This architecture allows for the approach of political processes as context-, and 
path-dependent processes. The notions of  “increasing returns” (Pierson, 2000) and the 
dynamically recurrence of complex conditions in structures of generative processes can 
thus be achieved in our operational architecture.  
Our approach on recurrent process takes it into consideration in connection to 
the self-organization of complex processes (Voinea, 2012). Phenomena like context-
dependence, path-dependence and recurrence described by Tilly, for example, get thus 
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an operational expression as cross-recurrent, cross-recursive processes generated by the 
operational structure described above. 
  
Pathways 
Addressing the issue of political change, Tilly’s view was that the explanation of 
political change phenomena should be based on mechanisms and processes which, 
properly chained, could provide for real causal chains or “pathways” (Tilly, 2001). 
Introduced as an explanative concept, the pathway has been for some time the 
theoretical icon of explanative causal chains of political processes (J. Friedrichs19). 
Though causal modeling tried hard, the pathway concept has never become effective as 
a causal modeling technique. In our modeling approach, the pathway concept further 
extends Friedrichs’recurrence-based idea of the “social pathway”20 concept and provides a 
new operational support. In our model, the pathway is defined as an activation path in 
a lattice of processes interconnected by means of shared political culture agents (i.e. 
beliefs, values, norms and attitudes). Its effectiveness resides in the capacity of the 
activation network to chain active processes on an cross-reference basis, by identifying 
shared activation context and/or constraints. The idea is not completely new for areas 
like semantic networks or coupled lattices, but its use in a political culture-based 
simulation model of a polity is new. The pathway could thus be considered and 
described as a phenomenon emerging frommultiple interconnected (cross-recurrent 
cross-recursive) processes characterized by different levels of activation. 
Without being causal in nature, but emergent, the pathwayconcept thus gets a 
considerable explanative power in much the same way in which this has been claimed 
by Tilly: it shows how processes describing political phenomena chain to one another 
                                                        
19 Friedrichs J. “Causal Mechanisms and Process Patterns Thinking Within or Without the Box,” paper draft 
available by Author’s courtesy, unpublished paper, currently under revise and resubmit with Millenium. 
20JoergFriedrichs, “Causal Mechanisms and Process Patterns Thinking Within or Without the Box”:“The 
idea underlying social pathways is that the social world is punctuated by recurrent sequences of human 
interaction. Apart from causal mechanisms, process patterns are another promising subcategory of social 
pathways. They can be understood as recurrent sequences of human interaction that are observed prior to the 
specification of social domains over which empirical generalizations may be postulated. This opens a promising 
methodological route for research design and empirical research”, p. 2, unpublished paper, currently under 
revise and resubmit with Millenium. 
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on the basis of a generative principle of activation and provide therefore for a global 
outcome. 
 
The Artificial Polity: A Political Culture-Based Simulation Model   
There are several classes of generative mechanisms, which could be classified on 
several criteria. We only address in our approach two such criteria: (1) the level of 
generated patterns (micro, macro), and (2) the nature of generated patterns, such as 
(emergent) interaction, (emergent) structure, (emergent) interconnection, and 
(emergent) control patterns.  
Following the criterion of the level of generated interaction, the generative 
mechanisms classify in two classes : (i) a class of generative mechanism at the level of 
micro (individual) agents, and (ii) another class of generative mechanisms at the level of 
macro (aggregate or emergent) agents. We include here generative mechanisms for 
micro-to-macro and macro-to-micro emergent phenomena. 
Following the criterion of the type of generative capacity, there are three 
classes: (i) interaction generative, (ii) structure generative, and (iii) control generative 
mechanisms.  
Our simulation model of artificial polity has been tested in three simulation 
scenarios: (1)the emergence of corruption as macro-level phenomena,  (2) the 
emergence of networks of trust (privilege networks) generated by the change in the 
political attitude of the individual agent toward the state, and (3)the emergence of 
patron-clients networks generated by the dynamical decreasing levels of individual 
agents’ trust in political institutions (“briberyscape”, “privilegescape”, and “baronscape” 
models, respectively, as described in (Voinea, 2012). 
 
The Simulation Loops and the Simulation Runs 
Political culture is used as a generative mechanism at both micro and macro 
levels.  
The micro-to-macro link (emergence) employs the “thick-to-thin” direction on 
the political culture continuum. Emergence of macro-level phenomena as outcomes of 
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individual interactions are coupled with processes of political culture dynamics. As 
new networks of trust emerge and co-exist, the individual agent escapes the network of 
trust in state and joins private networks (the so-called “networks of privileges”(Voinea, 
2012). As the sizes of private networks of trust grow, they insulate the network of trust 
in state. This results in emergence of change in political attitude towards the state. The 
macro-to-micro link (downward causation) employs the “thin-to-thick” direction on the 
political culture continuum, in which a shift in basic preferences emerges as attitudes 
(“thin” preferences) change: a change in the “thin” aspects of political culture like 
attitudes and beliefs, in the context of macro phenomena (corruption, eemergence of 
networks of trust) induces a change in the preferences over the basic values, namely 
basic (materialist) values are preferred with respect to self-expression (post-materialist) 
values. 
The main simulation loop (Figure 7): an artificial society with citizens 
(individual agents), resources (environmental agents) and political culture (culture 
agents), is grown-up. Individual agents interact in the dynamic normative and relational 
context of a particular type of polity, namely the Communist Polity Model (CPM), 
Democratic Polity Model (DPM) and their variants (see Table 2). Dynamic contexts 
are created by endowing the different types of agents with different capabilities of 
interaction: for example, in the CPM model, resources cannot be accessed unless the 
individual agents accept constraints and obey certain rules of access. Coercive 
centralized control of resources is thus achieved as an emergent outcome of individual 
interaction typology and variability. As individual agents interact in the context of 
coercive centralized control, two outcome emerge simultaneously: on the one hand, 
macro-level phenomena emerge, like the new networks of trust. On the other hand, 
individual agents’ political attitudes change as an effect of the macro-level emergent 
phenomena. All this result in modified individual behavior (downward causation). The 
system is run over long simulation time intervals.  
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Simulation Models 
The experimental setup models a polity by selecting some of the relevant 
features of (a) authoritarian and (b) democratic regimes. Two main polity models have 
been constructed: the Communist (CPM) and the Democratic Polity Model (DPM). 
The Democratic Polity Model has also two variants: the Transition-to-Democracy 
Polity Model (Ts-DPM) and the Democratic Consolidation Polity Model (Cs-DPM) 
(Table 2).  
 
Figure 7. 
Simulation Loop. 
 
For each of them, only some relevant features have been modeled: for the 
CPM, for example, we have modeled the centralized structure, the inequality of 
resource distribution, the co-existence of parallel networks of trust (the ideology-based 
and the resource-based networks of trust), and public politics.  
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In our approach the individual agents act always in a norm space, and with 
permanent reference to a value system: the individual actions and the patterns of 
collective action always include a relation to the associated value system. 
The simulation scenarios are based on few number of mechanisms and/or 
processes. There have been developed several simulation scenarios for the study of 
emergent phenomena and their downward causation effects at the level of individual 
behavior. As a reference, the simulated political mechanisms and processes have been 
identified in  Tilly’s diagram of political mechansims-based democratization (Tilly, 
2001, p.32; Figure1) and selected from Table1 in same work (Tilly, 2001, p.34).  
 
 Table 2. The Simulated Political Mechanisms in the Artificial Polity Model 
Simulation Scenario(s) /  
Political Mechanisms 
Networks of Trust Inequality 
Authoritarian Polity Model 
(CPM) 
 
a.Generalized network 
of trust; included in 
polity;  
b.Coercive centralized 
control and the macro-
level emergence of 
parallel autonomous 
networks of trust 
(patro-client networks) 
a.Coercive control of 
the access to resources 
enables relations of 
exploitation 
b.Generalized 
categorial inequalities 
in public politics 
Democratic Polity Model 
(DPM) 
 
a.Insulation of existing 
categorical inequalities 
from public politics 
b. Incorporation and 
expansion of existing 
trust networks into the 
polity 
a.Dissolution of 
coercive controls 
supporting current 
relations of 
exploitation 
b. Insulation of existing 
categorical inequalities 
 
 
The simulation system has been developed in NetLogo (Figure 8). The 
interface consists in agents, resources, and political culture components. The setup 
provides the initial conditions for the evolution of interactions. The dynamics of trust 
and attitude change are plotted automaticaly as the simulation runs. 
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insulating the central authority and the emergence of parallel networks of trust: while 
official networks are networks of trust in state the local networks are networks of trust 
in the local baron, which becomes the true authority of the local domain (county). 
Downward Causation Effect: local patron-client networks (emergent macro level  
phenomena) influence the political culture and behavior of individual agents. The 
attitude of individual agents toward the state changes as the newly emerged networks 
of trust co-evolve and attract more individual agents. Individual behavior is influenced: 
individual agents escape network of trust in state and join private networks of trust 
(patron-client networks or “baron networks”)22. 
 
Political Attitude Change  
A second experimental setup models the emergence of patron-client networs as 
a macro-level phenomenon in an experimental simulation of cognitive dissonance 
reduction of the individual agents (citizens) with direct impact on their trust in state. It 
models the emergence of the so-caled “privilege markets”. 
The “privilegescape” simulation model of corruption suggests a scenario of trust 
variability which is based on value change dynamics. The political mechanisms 
invoked here are both interaction and value change, even if at different time scales 
(asynchronous). 
Downward Causation Effect: the privilege market, as a macro-level emergent 
phenomenon, influences the attitude of the individual agent toward the state (micro-
level). 
 
Discussion. Why Is Interaction Not Enough? 
To answer this question, we address two issues: one is the agent in polity 
modeling. The other one is the issue of relation. 
As regards the first issue: Individual interation is not enough for simulating the 
downward causation effects. Therefore, simulation modeling concepts of individual 
                                                        
22See also privilegescape model in (Voinea, 2012, 2013). 
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agent and artifical polity should be revisited. This issue has found a solution: the 
aggregate or collectively emergent macro-level agent.  
As an essential difference from the artificial societies, which are described as 
micro simulations (Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Gilbert 1995; Sawyer, 2003), the artificial 
polities are macro simulations, i.e.: simulations based on macro-level emergent processes 
which model the dynamic of complex systems. In the current literature, the artificial 
polity is an agent-based simulation model which uses a single type of agent: the micro-
level individual agent.  In this context, the termmacro-level “aggregate” agent might 
denote the kind of simulation agents usually involved in MAS (Conte, Edmonds, Moss, 
and Sawyer, 2001), DAI (Conte, Gilbert, and Sichman, 1998) and also in CAS 
approaches (Cederman, 2003). These kinds of agents could be described as micro-level 
collective agent (pre-defined structured agents, like in MAS and DAI, or emergent 
unstructured collective agents, like in the artificial societies or in CAS-based simulation 
models). 
In our approach, this type of agent is described as macro-level “connected” agent, 
meaning a macro-levelnetwork of agents, in which the agents are actually processes 
interconnected by means of shared cultural attributes, like symbols, rituals, beliefs, 
values, norms, behaviors, attitudes.These interconnections are described themselves as 
macro-level emergent processes. In this context, both the agents and the relations 
between them are emergent phenomena (Figure 9). 
The former is a typical agent in agent-based simulation models, where the unit 
of interaction is the individual agent. This agent is typically used in simulating the 
micro-macro social emergent phenomena, and the conceptual paradigm involved – the 
methodological individualism – provides appropriate background for explaining the 
emergence of social macro patterns. However, the macro-to-micro phenomena, and 
their impact onto the individual agent are not covered by this conceptual paradigm. 
This makes difficult to explain how macro phenomena can impact the micro level 
agent and the individual interactions.  
The latter is a typical agent in agent-based simulation models of macro-level 
phenomena, where the unit of interaction is the process. A macro-level process 
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description assumes several micro-level agents and/or lower-level processes involved in 
a type of “activity” which connects them all in a particular activation pattern with a 
global emergent outcome. It is this type of agent that we aim to define and use in our 
present approach.  
The concept of agent in agent-based systems, no matter if we talk about MAS, 
artificial societies, or CAS-based systems, is still influenced by the classical artificial 
intelligence type of agent defined as a separate entity (‘object’) in the 
world/environment, endowed with internal mechanisms and processes, (eventually) 
memory, a set of basic reactive and (eventually) cognitive capabilities. All these provide 
for one fundamental capability, which is that of interaction with both the environment 
and the other agents (see (Sawyer, 2004a, 2004b, 2005) for a comprehensive description 
of the agent concept in agent-based systems). This type of agent is characteristic for 
agent-based systems which model the social micro-level and the micro-to-macro 
emergent phenomena.  
The concept of agent in our approach must meet the requirements of agent-
based system able to model both micro- and macro-level phenomena, as well as micro-
to-macro and macro-to-micro phenomena. Such systems might involve another type of 
interaction unit: the process.  
 
Figure 9. Types of agents. 
(a) the agent in the artificial society setting is a separate pre-defined entity able to interact with other 
agents and with the environment; (b) the agent in the artificial polity setting is a set of processes which 
might get connected in small networks, each such network becoming a macro-level emergent agent able 
to interact with other agents at both micro-, and macro levels. 
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For the second issue, we assume a more important role for relational dynamics 
in the artificial polity. In agent-based systems, social behavioral patterns arise as direct 
outcomes of agent interactions. However, it is not only interaction which makes social 
behavior patterns to emerge, but oftenly the dynamics of the relationship between 
‘individual agents’ and ‘culture agents’, namely values, beliefs, norms, attitudes, 
symbols, rituals, etc. Relationships of this kind can vary as a consequence of dynamic 
normative, belief or attitude changes. 
For example, in the communist regimes, individual trust in the state decreases 
over a long time interval. The autonomous patro-client networks of trust emerge as the 
trust in state decreases, but all this happen at a large temporal scale. The reason 
concerns values change: the individual agent changes the degree in which he or she 
values something (Archer, 1996). Level of trust in state in the Eastern European 
communist regimes took almost half-century to decrease up to the bottom because the 
process of values change was rather slow. This process took very long time, so that we 
cannot identify it with the direct outcome of an interaction mechanism. The other way 
around is also true: the level of trust in state in post-communist regimes has not 
increased in more than twenty years after the Fall of Berlin Wall, because individual 
agents are very slow in changing the materialist value system (Inglehart, 1997, 2000; 
Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). Therefore, patterns of trust cannot be identified with 
patterns of direct interaction between the agent and the state. Their emergence should 
be directly connected to the patterns of relationships (or ratherto the degree of 
intensity of such relationships) between the individual agent and a political culture 
which guides the interactions and which vary itself as significantly as to be considered 
as the very source of trust variability. Therefore, a political mechanism which could 
explain the variability of trust needs at least two levels of description: one is the level of 
direct agent interactions, the other one is the level of relationship between agent and a 
political culture. Relational patterns vary much more than individual interaction 
patterns actually do. Nevertheless, agent-political culture relationships and the 
relational variability provide the sources for the attitude and behavioral variability. 
This view, inspired by the Weberian concept of “value-directed action” and adopted by 
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the political culture-based modeling research, seems much more appropriate to explain 
how a particular political mechanism and process work in a polity. 
 
Conclusions 
Our present simulation models are aimed at testing the downwad causative 
power and effectiveness of macro level phenomena. 
We aim at elaborating a political culture model of polity which can give an 
account of both emergence and downward caustaion phenomena. Such model needs 
however strong philosophy of science and modeling defining approaches on the 
concepts of mechanism, process and culture.  
 The artificial polity model needs to be extended wit a complete description at 
the institutional level and with a process-based architecture, so that generative agents 
and relations could be described in an uniform framework. It is not the “uniformity”, 
but the process-generalized view which seems to fit better the artificial polity 
modeling. Moreover, accomodation of political culture theories in polity simulation 
and modeling needs a more comprehensive approach on mechanisms and processes, 
since their definitions are still open to debate.  
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Abstract 
Extortion is forced extraction of money from a victim. The paper describes an 
ontology of extortion racket systems (ERS), derived from empirical evidence from the 
Sicilian Mafia. It is centered round a typology of Mafia type organizations 
distinguishing between Mafia in a traditional and non-traditional environment. In a 
traditional environment Mafia is perceived as a legitimate authority undertaking 
systematic extortion and offering private protection in return. It operates in a social 
environment consisting of a normative system characterized by distrust and a lack of 
civil society. Mafia in a non-traditional environment results from coerced migration 
and concentrates on legal and illegal economic activities.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Extortion racket systems (ERS) are powerful and dynamically expanding 
criminal as well as economic organizations that cause considerable disruption to the 
global financial and economic system. If they are further more culturally entrenched in 
a society they shall be denoted as Mafia Type Organisations (MTO). In this talk an 
ontology of an ideal-typical MTO will be presented. Key terms and relations are based 
on a detailed analysis of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (Scaglione 2011). Empirical evidence 
indicates that the Mafia operates differently within different social environments. This 
begs for an explanation. For this purpose a simulation model will be developed that 
enables to study the dynamics of ERS. A first step is to integrate existing domain 
knowledge in an ontology that can be implemented in a simulation model. An 
ontology is defined as an explicit specification of a conceptualisation (Studer et al. 
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1998). Following the formalisation of Guarino et al. (2009), the notions of ‘explicit, of 
‘specification’, and of ‘conceptualisation’ can be clarified using intentional logic. A 
conceptualisation can be defined as an intensional relational structure, consisting of a 
universe of discourse D, a set of possible worlds W and a set of conceptual relations R 
on the domain space <D,W>. The set of possible worlds is introduced in order that 
the domain does not only consist of the relations that have actually been realised 
between the objects but includes also possible relations. Thus the formulation of an 
ontology enables first a formal precision of a summary of the knowledge about the 
domain of study. However, in our case the knowledge is derived from one particular 
case. Second, intensional logic is used to achieve a theoretical generalization of the 
description. This enables to overcome the restriction of the data basis. These features 
make an ontology a diagnosis tool. It allows identifying the elements which are 
necessary and sufficient for a certain state of a system, may it be cancer in a human 
body or the establishment of MTOs in human societies. Finding out what elements are 
present in a particular situation within a certain environment allows assessing the 
danger of establishment of ERS and their transformation towards an MTO. This is of 
particular relevance for Mafia migration or spontaneous emergence of ERS, i.e. for 
monitoring environments which are not traditionally affected by the presence of the 
Mafia.   
The paper is organized as follows: first an overview of key concepts for the 
analysis of Mafia type organizations is outlined. Subsequently the ontology will be 
described. This consists of three steps: First, the general characteristics of the domain 
are outlined. Second, key terms and relations of the ontology are provided. While key 
terms describe the atomic elements, the relations specify the driving mechanisms of the 
system. Third, these are further specified by introducing details of organizations, the 
internal structure of the Mafia and the actors of the organisations. Finally, emergent 
properties that should be realised by the system will be listed.  
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Characteristics of the domain  
The perception of the Mafia alternates between a cultural phenomenon and a 
hierarchical organization. While early scholars emphasized that individuals become 
Mafiosi because of their public perception (Hess 1970), in the 1980s its organizational 
structure became visible; in particular,  the witness of so-called pentiti was important 
(Catanzaro 1988; Arlacchi 1989). The history of the Sicilian Mafia goes back to the 
mid-19th century. Until the 1950s it was primarily a rural phenomenon. The Mafia 
offered private protection and established a monopoly of violence (Gambetta 1993) in 
case of weak state authority and a lack of civil society. This triggered a view on the 
Mafia as a state-like organization (Nozick 1974). However, a process starting with 
smuggling cigarettes in the 1950s culminated in the 1970s and 1980s when the Mafia 
radically enlarged its business segment with drug trafficking and other illegal economic 
activities. Economic enrichment became a dominant motive (Gambetta 1993; Dickie 
2006; Gambetta and Reuter 1995; Paoli 2003). This went along with two Mafia wars in 
the 1960s and from the 1970s to 1980s (Dickie 2006). Since this time the phenomenon 
is integrated in the discussion of transnational crime taking advantage of globalized 
markets (Shelley 2006). The process of globalization challenges the state-centered view 
of international relations theory. Other actors such as criminal organizations enter the 
stage (Madsen 2009).However, evidence remains mixed. In part, this depends on the 
definition of organized crime, namely whether emphasis is put on a stable 
organizational structure or on illegal market activities which can be undertaken also by 
small groups (Hagan 1983). However, while factually the Mafia migrated to other 
territories, often this was not voluntarily and changed the structure and the course of 
action (Varese 2011). Extortion remains a local phenomenon. There exist evidence that 
Mafia is a territorially based phenomenon that is not easy to reproduce in a foreign 
territory (Campana 2011; Varese 2012).  
This can be summarized in the distinction between Mafia in a traditional 
environment, undertaking systematic extortion within a territory, and Mafia in a non-
traditional environment, using opportunities of various types of legal and illegal 
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economic activities and only occasionally undertaking predatory extortion. In in a 
traditional environment the Mafia is perceived as a legitimate authority. However, the 
high number of victims in the Mafia wars and the subsequent war of the Mafia against 
the state, triggered the emergence of Anti-Mafia movements. These indicate a cultural 
change in the traditional environment, challenging the legitimacy of the Mafia as ruling 
authority (Battaglia 2012).  
 
Conceptual relations  
The Mafia can be characterized as a secret organization (Simmel 1999) in 
relation to other organizations, such as the police or companies that are extorted by 
the Mafia. Thus the events in the domain are determined by organizations. 
Nevertheless actions are undertaken by actors. Thus the basic unit of the domain are 
actors that belong to a certain organization. However, these are situated a) in a physical 
territory (such as Sicily, Northern Italy or Germany) and b) in a system of social 
norms and values. Both the dynamics of the internal organization of the Mafia as well 
as the relation of Mafiosi to the overall society is considered. A key research question is 
how the normative system of the society is related to the organisational norms in the 
various organisations and how cultural change triggers organizational structures.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Key terms. 
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Organisations 
Actors act as members of certain organizations. For this reason, organizations 
determine the actor classes, which determine the choice of actions for the individual 
actors. Thus, first the organizations of the domain system and the relations between 
these are outlined in Figure 2. This is a specification of the ‘organization’ package of 
Figure 1. The Mafia gains profit from extorting entrepreneurs and corrupting the 
public administration. Court and police fight the Mafia. However, they may get 
corrupted as well.  
 
Figure 2.  
Conceptual relations between the organizations. 
 
Internal Organisation of the Mafia 
Reflecting the internal organizational structure of the Mafia is the most 
precarious part of the domain ontology. The witness of approvers has made clear that 
the Mafia has an internal structure (Arlacchi 1992; Gambetta 1993). However, the 
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structure remains fragile (Arlacchi 1992). There exist no formal positions that are 
secured by enforceable rights. While rules exist, they are to be enacted by the way 
Mafiosi act. This is partly determined by habits and partly determined by individual, 
strategic interest (Arlacchi 1992). Moreover, Mafiosi actions are also influenced by the 
external organizations, such as Police or Politics and administrations. An ideal-typical 
reconstruction of the organization reveals the hierarchical structure of a secret society 
(Simmel 1999) is outlined in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. 
Internal organization of the Mafia. 
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Actors 
Actors are affiliated to different organizations. Organizations are further 
differentiated. Others provide a reservoir for organizations and Anti-Mafia movements. 
These might evolve in the case that Mafia violence exceeds a tolerated degree. It is a key 
feature of the domain system that membership in organizations is not a disjoint feature 
of the actors. On the contrary, traditionally Mafiosi do have a legal job (Arlacchi 1992). 
This may result in conflicts between different behavioural rules and obligations. This 
can be reflected by using the EMIL architecture for normative software agents 
(Andrighetto et al. 2007). EMIL agents posses a normative board, containing normative 
beliefs and normative goals, organized and arranged according to the salience that they 
obtain in a specific social and cultural context. Thus membership in an organization 
may be stored in the normative board of the actors, activating a context in which 
organization-specific norms are stored. However, the subjective salience of the 
organizational context may vary. Salience determines the degree of the activation of a 
norm dependent on its consistency with other moral dispositions (Andrighetto et al. 
2007). In particular, in case of conflicting normative demands from organizational and 
personal friendship contexts, organizational norms may be followed with different 
probabilities according to the salience of the context. This might trigger corruption. 
The different probabilities of different obligations can be implemented as event-action 
trees in the EMIL-S modelling platform (Lotzmann et al. 2013). 
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Figure 4. 
Actor classes. 
 
Emergent properties  
The ontology describes the knowledge about the static components of the 
domain. The goal is to identify the elements and the relations between them to specify 
the mechanisms of the emergence and entrenchment of ERS in a society. It is known 
that societies which are infiltrated by MTOs exhibit certain characteristic systemic 
properties. Unknown is whether the knowledge of the elements and relations which is 
derived from the evidence of one particular case of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra is sufficient 
for the emergence of these systemic properties. For the purpose of testing the 
hypothesis that these are sufficient conditions, a simulation model will be developed.  
Implemented in a simulation model, the dynamics can be studied, i.e. whether a 
differential behaviour of Mafia type organizations can be observed in a simulation. If 
this test proves to be successful, the ontology can enfold its potential as a diagnosis 
tool. The central distinction is between Mafia operating in traditional and non-
traditional environments. However, this requires further specification. Initially, only 
Mafia in a traditional environment is implemented. The hypotheses that should be 
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tested by a simulation is whether the domain knowledge is sufficient for a simulation 
to generate the following systemic properties:   
Market: competitive / non-competitive (Cartel): Mafia activities may destroy a 
competitive Market by organizing the formation of Cartels (Arlacchi 1989; Gambetta 
and Reuter 1995). This may hold for all types of environment, i.e. traditional and non-
traditional ones.  
systematic / predatory extortion: The most important difference is whether it can 
be observed that different Mafia type organizations exhibit either regular extortion of a 
territory or occasional extortion of individual entrepreneurs (Scaglione 2011). 
However, beyond systematic extortion a traditonal environment is characterised by a 
further element:   
Legitimacy: It should be observed that the Mafia is perceived as a legitimate 
authority in a traditional environment. This is a question of degree, not of yes or no 
(Battaglia 2012). However, it should include that in the competition of Mafia and the 
court the normative sanctions of the Mafia are perceived as more relevant and 
trustworthy. In operational terms, this is dependent on a) the relative number of 
punishing events and agents, and b) the degree of corruption in the territory. 
Corruption lowers the number of police and court members that actually sentence 
Mafia activity and the perception of legal sanctions as predictable and legitimate.  
traditional (consensus) / non-traditional environment (Mafia expansion): If both 
systematic extortion and legitimacy of a Mafia authority can be observed, one can 
speak of a Mafia operating in a traditional environment. While systematic extortion 
refers –also– to organizational power, the aspect of legitimacy refers to cultural 
differences (Scaglione 2011). 
Mafia migration: The investigation of the cultural influence implies also the 
question whether migration of Mafia (i.e. Mafiosi) to a culturally different 
environment changes its organizational structure. This means that the Mafia is able to 
adapt to cultural changes by developing new business strategies (Varese 2011). These 
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may eventually include predatory extortion but primarily legal and illegal economic 
activities (Scaglione 2011).   
 
Finally, any research on the Mafia is also research on what can be done against 
it. In Sicily in the past decades a strong anti-Mafia movement has emerged. The 
objective of this movement is to strengthen the civil society and public responsibility.  
Cultural change: The ontology includes the possibility of the emergence of Anti-
Mafia movements in case of excessive violence. During a simulation it can be tested 
what conditions foster the emergence of such movements, to what degree this 
influences the development of a civil society, and inasmuch a cultural change triggered 
by an anti-Mafia movement influences the effectiveness of a Mafia as a legitimate 
authority over a territory (Battaglia 2012).  
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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with some predictors of the general support for democracy in the 
light of the two competing models, cultural and rational choice, which have different 
implications for the possibility of the development of mass support for democracy in 
former communist societies. The paper aims at clarifying the importance of certain 
“institutional” and “cultural” variables for the general support for democracy in Serbia. 
The data used in the paper were collected in the post-election survey, conducted after 
the May 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections on a representative sample of 
Serbian citizens (N=1,568). The relative importance of 15 predictors was analyzed: the 
socio-demographic variables (respondent’s gender, age, educational level, monthly 
household income), the institutional variables (satisfaction with Serbian democracy and 
economy, evaluation of the government performance before the election, the perceived 
level of respect for individual freedom and the quality of voters’ view representation in 
elections) and the cultural variables (political tolerance, authoritarianism, nationalism 
and socialist egalitarianism). In the hierarchical regression analysis, the general support 
for democracy was first regressed on socio-demographic variables, then the cultural 
variables were added as well as the institutional variables in the final step. Each model 
had a greater explanatory power, significantly increasing the explained percent of 
variance. The most important predictors of support for democracy were satisfaction 
with Serbian democracy (β=.12, p<.001) and evaluation of government performance 
(β=.23, p<.001); the citizens who were more satisfied with democracy and more 
inclined to positively evaluate the government performance were more supportive of 
democracy. The concluding part discusses the implications of the obtained results for 
the development of democratic political culture and consolidation of democratic 
institutions in a transitional society. 
 
Keywords: political culture, democracy, political values, Serbia. 
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Introduction 
It is almost a truism to say that effective functioning of a political system 
heavily depends on the quality of the prevailing political culture. Without the mass 
support for the rules of political game and consensus on the norms and principles it is 
based on, there is no legitimacy or stability of a political system (whether democratic 
or not). While this is almost self-evident in a stable or a slowly progressing society 
which „reproduces“ itself by socializing the citizens into its prevailing norms and 
values, rapid societal changes (such as an „overnight“ ending of the communist rule in 
the East European countries) put forth several dilemmas about the congruency 
hypothesis.   
According to the well-known Dahrendorf’s (1990) claim that it takes six 
months to replace a political system, six years to transform an economic system, and 
sixty years to change a society, the culturalist theory of political culture and political 
change posits rather pessimistic expectations regarding the possibility of democratizing 
post-communist societies. The proponents of this model argue that democratic political 
structure stems from democratic political culture and that, simply, “democracy cannot 
be built without democrats” (Klingeman et al., 2006, p. XI). In spite of the possible 
institutional changes, citizens will accept only those political and economic structures 
whose institutional and legal procedures are compatible with their relatively stable 
cultural orientations and political values. Being a product of the common (early) 
socialization, they can only be changed during the socialization process, under the 
influence of more general structural factors such as economic modernization, 
urbanization etc. (Almond & Verba, 1963/1989; Eckstein, 1988; Huntington, 1991; 
Lipset, 1959; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Individual’s political values and beliefs are 
heavily determined by specific social/political/economic circumstances from early 
childhood. After one reaches adulthood, the changes in political outlook are possible, 
but not that probable (Inglehart, 1990). The effects of the changed institutional context 
are necessarily delayed and postponed, visible only in younger cohorts or by the 
process of generational replacement in general population. The prevailing political 
culture can therefore change only slowly and in the long term, which is why it takes a 
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long time for democracy to consolidate in a previously non-democratic country 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klingemman et al., 2006).  
The rational choice (or institutional) model, on the other hand, posits that the 
current social context, i.e. more recent political, economic and social events, play a 
more important role than early socialization. The evaluation of system performances, 
in economic and political terms, and the quality of citizens’ experience with the system 
shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to 
democratic institutions and norms (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 2002; 
Muller & Seligson, 1994). Early instilled beliefs and values are not unimportant, but are 
strengthened or weakened by the later experiences. In a newly democratized society, 
citizens can and must learn to be “democrats” and that is only possible in the context 
of democratic civic culture and pluralism and through the experience with the 
democratic political process (Dalton 1994; Fleron, 1996; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). 
Thus, it is not that important to create democrats as to create democracy; once 
established, it is highly probable that democratic institutions will produce democratic 
values (Fleron, 1996). Democratic political culture is hence rather the effect than the 
cause of democratic structure.  
Although the empirical tests of the relative explanatory power of the two 
competing models are rather limited and mixed, each model has its own empirical pro 
and cons. The failure of communist regimes to transform the pre-communist political 
culture (Almond, 1983) and to create the new socialist man (Gray, 1979) is considered 
to be the major argument in favour of the primacy of the culture over structure view. 
In the words of Brown, “it would appear that the dominant Czech political culture 
came much closer to changing Czechoslovak Communism than Czechoslovak 
Communism came to procuring acceptance of its official political culture” (cited in 
Almond, 1983, p. 137). Some more recent empirical findings support the view that the 
prevailing political culture in the East European countries lacks some main democratic 
qualities in spite of (more or less) limited experiences with democracy. Compared to 
the citizens of the Western democracies, the citizens of post-communist countries are 
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less supportive of democracy (Klingeman et al., 2006; Pavlovic, 2007), less politically 
tolerant (Gibson, 1998; 2002; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003) and less politically active 
(Dekker et al., 2003). Inglehart has argued that self-expression values are an essence of 
the democratic political culture, showing that their acceptance in post-communist 
countries was lower not only compared to the Western societies, but even to poorer 
and less developed African and Asian countries (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & 
Inglehart, 2009).   
However, some studies have called into question the culturalist view that the 
quality of the post-communist political culture is an obstacle to democratization. 
Gibson (1996) showed that the support for democracy in Russia and Ukraine was “a 
mile wide and more than an inch deep” (p. 417), suggesting that this was not a mere 
case of lip service to democracy. Other studies have suggested that democratic values in 
some former Soviet Union countries were present “at levels the pessimists would not 
have expected” (Reisinger et al., 1994, p. 185) or that there were no significant 
differences in the acceptance of numerous political attitudes and values between the 
citizens of East and West Germany (Dalton, 1994). Contrary to Inglehart’s (1990) 
assumption of unidirectional causation – civic culture affects democracy but not 
viceversa – some researchers have shown that democratization increased the 
importance of pro-democratic values (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000), as well as that most 
civic culture attitudes did not have any significant impact on change in democracy and 
some of them were rather effects of democracy (Muller & Seligson, 1994). 
Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that the levels of political tolerance (Duch & 
Gibson, 1992), trust in social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997) or 
support for marketization and democracy (Whitefield & Evans, 1999) in post-
communist countries can be explained in rational choice terms, as the products of 
resocialization during the period of democratization, i.e. the effects of economic and 
political performance evaluations. 
 This paper aims at clarifying the relative importance of some cultural 
and institutional variables in explaining the support for democracy in the post-
communist Serbian society. After almost half a century of communist regime and ten 
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years of Milosevic’s authoritarian rule, democracy was introduced in Serbia overnight 
in 2000. The democratic political system was implemented in the society which 
survived severe interethnic conflicts, international isolation, NATO bombing and 
political, social and economic collapse. The studies from that period have shown that 
antidemocratic political attitudes and values were predominant in the Serbian 
population (Golubovic et al., 1995; Pantic, 2002; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Some of the 
main features of the non-democratic political culture (e.g., authoritarianism and 
ethnocentrism) remained intact in spite of democratic changes and are still relatively 
widespread (Biro et al., 2002; Kuzmanovic, 2010; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Mass 
protests which caused the fall of Milosevic in 2000 were rather motivated by a growing 
dissatisfaction with extremely poor life conditions than by intrinsic mass demands for 
democracy (Pavlovic, 2010). If individual’s political outlook is primarily determined by 
relatively stable cultural orientations and political values, there was no fertile ground 
for the acceptance of democracy in Serbia. The prevailing political culture was marked 
by high authoritarianism, nationalism, intolerance etc., incongruent with the 
democratic political system which, according to the assumptions of the culturalist 
view, would result in the low support for the newly established democratic institutions 
and norms among citizenry. However, the opinions about the democratic political 
system before as well as after 2000 were quite favourable. Based on the data collected in 
the three waves of the World Values Survey in which Serbia participated (in 1996, 2001 
and 2006), the measure of relative support for democracy, combining the acceptance of 
democracy and rejection of autocracy as used in similar analyses (Klingemann et al., 
2006), showed that 56% of Serbian citizens were supportive of democracy in 1996 
(during the Milosevic’s era) and 69% of them in 2001 (after the democratic changes in 
2000) (Pavlovic, 2010). The lowest support for democracy was registered during the 
democratization process, in 2006 (46%), while the acceptance of democracy was quite 
weakly linked with the acceptance of some more general pro-democratic beliefs and 
values (social tolerance, autonomy, gender equality, market orientation etc.). These, as 
well as some other studies pose questions regarding the sources of support for 
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democracy in Serbia and the relative importance of the “cultural” versus “institutional” 
factors. 
 
Method 
Sample and procedure. The data used in the analysis were collected in a post-
election survey conducted on the representative national sample of eligible voters in 
Serbia by the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia. The probability-based 
sample with multiple stages of selection was used. It was based on the addresses from a 
national database of mailing addresses maintained by the Serbian Post. The total 
sample consisted of 3,455 households and one-individual-per-household principle 
resulted in the total sum of 1,568 respondents interviewed (the weighted response rate 
was 50.1%). The face-to-face interviews were conducted using the Computer-Assisted 
Personal Interviewing (CAPI) method. Data were collected in the period from 
December 2012 to February 2013.   
Variables and measures. The Serbian post-election study covered a wide variety 
of political beliefs, attitudes and values. Several fundamental political beliefs and 
attitudes, usually regarded as some of the main features of the democratic political 
outlook, often used in the post-communist political culture studies (Gibson, 1996; 
Dekker, 1996; Duch & Gibson, 1992) and very relevant for Serbian political context, 
were treated as cultural variables. These included authoritarianism, political tolerance, 
nationalism and socialist egalitarianism. Authoritarianism has been one of the most 
important concepts in explaining human political behaviour for decades, related with 
numerous attitudes and beliefs (see, for example, McFarland, 2010). It also bears special 
relevance for explaining political behaviour in Serbia (Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009; 
Todosijevic, 2006, Kuzmanovic, 2010), being one of the most important aspects of 
Serbian political culture in the past several decades. Nationalism has a special relevance 
in the Serbian context as well since it has not only been (more or less) the official 
ideology of the ruling class for decades, but one of the most important dimensions of 
differentiation between the supporters of the relevant political parties in Serbia 
(Todosijevic, 2006; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Political tolerance is one of the most 
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important components of the democratic political culture, often used in post-
communist studies (Gibson, 1998; Karpov, 1999; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003), 
while socialist egalitarianism represents the general support for the economic aspect of 
societies liberalization, i.e. the rejection of some of the most important aspects of the 
former socialist political system (planned economy and economic egalitarianism).   
Variables were measured in the following ways: 
Authoritarianism. Six items of the scale of authoritarianism (α=.65) were 
selected based on some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006). The items represented the 
content of the well-known F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and RWA scale (Altemeyer, 
1988). Each item was followed by a five-point scale. The scale included items such as 
“Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values for children” or 
“Authorities should censor the media”. Authoritarianism was operationalized as the 
first component yielded by the principal component analysis, explaining 31.18% of 
variance. All items showed positive factor loadings on the first component (see 
Appendix, Table 1). 
Nationalism. Nationalistic attitudes were measured by seven items of the scale 
(α=.72) covering a variety of themes that are most often the content of the nationalistic 
worldview (Dekker et al., 2003). A similar scale was used in some previous studies 
(Todosijevic, 2006). The scale included items such as “No nation has such a glorious 
and at the same time tragic history as the Serbs” or “There are few nations that 
contributed to the world’s culture and science as ours”. The principal component 
analysis yielded one factor, explaining 44.31% of variance. The obtained factor scores 
were used as a measure of nationalism. All items showed positive factor loadings (see 
Appendix, Table 2). 
Political tolerance. Political tolerance was measured by the least liked group 
method (Sullivan et al., 1979), using three items (α=.82). Respondents were asked to 
(dis)agree (on a five-point scale) on whether the members of the most disliked group 
they had in mind should or should not be banned, allowed to organize public 
demonstration or nominate themselves for public office. The principal component 
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analysis yielded one component, explaining 73.43% of variance. Factor scores were 
treated as a measure of political tolerance. All items showed positive factor loadings 
(see Appendix, Table 3). 
Socialist egalitarianism. The Serbian post-election study included one item 
related to respondent’s general belief regarding the governmental role in economy and 
economic egalitarianism, which was treated as an indicator of socialist egalitarianism. 
Respondents were asked how strongly they (dis)agreed (1. strongly disagree/5. strongly 
agree) with the following statement “The government should take measures to reduce 
differences in income levels”. 
The selection of institutional variables used in the analysis was guided by 
previous research with similar methodology and study aims (for example, Whitefield, 
2005; Whitefield & Evans, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 1997) as well as the scope of the 
available data. Instrumental variables included several economic and political 
evaluations of the functioning of the Serbian democratic political system.  
Evaluation of democracy. Measured by one four-point scale item “On the whole, 
are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy works in Serbia?”. 
Evaluation of economy. Respondents were asked to estimate whether the state of 
the economy in Serbia had become better, stayed about the same or got worse. 
Government evaluation. Measured by one four-point scale item “Having in 
mind the results of Government, how good do you think the government has done its 
job, during the last 4 years (before last elections)?”. 
Freedom and human rights evaluation. Respondents were asked to estimate the 
level of respect for individual freedom and human rights in Serbia on a four-point scale 
(1. no respect at all/4. a lot of respect). 
Perceived representation. Respondents’ evaluation of how well elections ensured 
that the views of voters were represented by Members of the Parliament (1. not well at 
all/4. very well) was treated as a measure of perceived representation. 
Electoral system evaluation. Respondents evaluated the method of electing 
representatives as very good, good, bad or very bad. 
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Higher values in the afore-mentioned variables implied more positive 
evaluations. 
Support for democracy. General approval of the democratic political system was 
the main dependent variable in the analysis. It was measured by a standard four-point 
scale (1. agree strongly/4. disagree strongly) item: "Democracy may have problems but 
it’s better than any other form of government”. 
Socio-demographic variables. Respondent’s gender, age (measured in years), level 
of education (primary/secondary/tertiary), monthly household income (estimated on 
the 11-point scale, 1. up to 9,999 RSD/11. 100,000 RSD or more) and an estimated 
likelihood to improve the standard of living (1. very unlikely/4. very likely) were 
included in regression models as well.  
 
Results 
The data were analyzed using the hierarchical regression analysis. Support for 
democracy was in the first step regressed on socio-demographic variables. Cultural 
variables were then added in the second step, while in the third step the institutional 
variables were included as predictors as well. The data are shown in Table 1. 
The first model explains only 4% of variance in support for democracy. 
Respondent’s monthly household income (β=.134, p<.001) and an estimated 
likelihood of improving one’s standard of living (β=.130, p<.001) were the only 
significant predictors. Other predictors controlled for, the more affluent individuals 
showed higher support for democracy and vice versa. The same applies for the 
respondents believing in the possibility of improving their financial standard of living. 
The objective as well as subjective economic status obviously influenced one’s attitude 
towards the democratic political system. Although the socio-demographic model rather 
describes than explains variation in support for democracy, these findings can be 
interpreted as a demonstration of a deprivation or a frustration based attitude towards 
democracy among Serbian citizens. Not having enough means as well as thinking that 
one deserves more than one has can be a cause for a critique and cynical attitude 
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towards the democratic regime, which is being blamed for the unsatisfactory standard 
of living and a lack of opportunities for its improvement. The importance of self-
interest for the preference of democracy is quite in line with the propositions of the 
rational choice model. 
The non-significant effects of gender, age and the level of education are 
informative as well. The differences in socialization practices and experiences related 
with gender and especially age are obviously not that important for allegiance to 
democracy. Age is considered to be one of the most relevant socialization variables, 
which gains special relevance in the post-communist societies. The culturalist model 
predicts that younger cohorts, especially those not socialized under the authoritarian 
regime, should be more supportive of democracy. Some empirical evidence has shown 
that there were generational differences in that sense  (Hahn, 1991; Hagenaars et al., 
2003; Klingeman et al., 2006; Siemienska, 2006) and great similarity between youth in 
the post-communist countries and those in the old democracies (Catterberg & 
Zuasnabar, 2010; Moreno et al., 2010; Siemienska, 2003). This finding does not support 
the assumptions of generational differences in the Serbian society.  The level of 
education, systematically linked with a more liberal political outlook, does not play an 
important role in explaining individual differences in support for democracy.  
 
Table 1. Hierarchical regression analysis – three models of support for democracy. 
Predictors Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Socio-demographic factors    
Gender (male)  -.041   -.043   -.037  
Age  .062   .078   .066  
Education  .061   .048   .033  
Household income  .134 ***  .128 ***  .108 ** 
Likelihood to improve standard of living  .130 ***  .130 ***  .065  
Cultural factors    
Authoritarianism   -.119 ***  -.104 ** 
Nationalism   -.014   -.017  
Political tolerance   .020     .044  
Socialist egalitarianism    -.023   -.034  
Institutional factors    
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Evaluation of democracy     .115 ** 
Government evaluation     .229 *** 
Evaluation of economy    .012  
Freedom and human rights evaluation    .020  
Electoral system evaluation    .008  
Perceived representation    009  
Adjusted R Square  .04   .05   .12  
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Adding cultural variables in the model improves its explanatory power 
significantly (R square change=.014, F 4, 919 = 3.54, p<.01), but only slightly (5% 
of variance). The influence of the two economic variables remains significant even 
when respondent’s income loses its intensity. This can be interpreted as an argument in 
favour of the claim that the effect of respondent’s economic status on support for 
democracy is, at least partly, moderated by certain dispositional and attitudinal factors, 
such as some of those added in this step. There is empirical evidence that nationalistic 
and authoritarian attitudes are related with economic and cultural deprivation in Serbia 
(Kuzmanovic, 1994; 2010), which could imply the indirect effects of socio-demographic 
characteristics through attitudes and dispositions. The data in this study partly 
correspond to it. Only one added variable significantly predicted the support for 
democracy – authoritarianism (β=-.119, p<.001). Higher authoritarianism was related 
with lower support for democracy, which is quite in line with the theoretical 
considerations on authoritarian personality as well as numerous research findings 
showing relations between authoritarianism and other attitudes and values that are 
antithetical to a democratic political outlook (Adorno et al., 1950; Meloen, 1993; 
McFarland, 2010) or the level of state authoritarianism (Meloen, 1996). It is important 
to note that, other predictors in model controlled for, none of the remaining cultural 
variables had a significant influence on the support for democracy. Out of all political 
attitudes and beliefs included in this study, authoritarianism seems to be by far the 
most important in explaining allegiance to democracy. Adorno et al. (1950) stated that 
political, economic and social beliefs of an individual were deeply rooted in his/her 
personality, which may be “regarded as determinant of ideological preferences” (p. 5, 
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italics in the original). It seems that, in the case of Serbia, this holds not only for 
preference for democracy, but perhaps also for nationalism, political tolerance and 
socialist egalitarianism, which does not gain significance once the level of 
authoritarianism and demographics are controlled for.  
Finally, adding the institutional variables significantly improves the model’s 
explanatory power (R square change=.014, F 4, 919 = 3.54, p<.01) and doubles the 
percent of the explained variance (12%). The most important predictors of the support 
for democracy are satisfaction with government performance (β=.229, p<.001) and 
Serbian democracy (β=.115, p<.001) in general. Those who evaluate these more 
positively are more supportive of democracy, which is what would be expected under 
the institutional model paradigm. None of the remaining institutional factors 
significantly influences the support for democracy. 
The influence of authoritarianism on the support for democracy remained 
significant after the inclusion of the institutional variables, although the intensity of 
influence was slightly decreased (β=.104, p<.001). Monthly household income was 
also positively related to support for democracy but additionally lost its intensity 
(compared to Model 2). Again, this demonstrates the indirect ways of influencing the 
support for democracy, through dispositions as well as some evaluations. This 
especially stands for the perceived likelihood of improving the standard of living 
which, after the inclusion of instrumental variables, lost its significance. Political 
evaluations obviously moderate the effects of individual (relative) deprivation. 
 
Conclusions 
The presented data have several important implications. Bearing in mind the 
two competing models, empirical evidence presented here is rather ambiguous, neither 
discarding the explanatory power of any nor granting one’s primacy. If one had to 
choose the most important predictor of the support for democracy in Serbia, it would 
undoubtedly be the institutional factor – the satisfaction with government 
performance. This finding can be well explained by the propositions of the rational 
choice model: the evaluation of system performance most significantly contributes to 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
149 
 
citizens’ allegiance to the democratic system. Furthermore, it (at least slightly) 
moderates the effects of some structural and cultural factors.  
Creating and upholding the functional Serbian democracy seems to be one way 
of causing allegiance to it. Two important implications stem from this. The relevance 
of the system performance suggests the importance of an effective functioning of the 
democratic regime, which implies the very important role of the political elites. 
Securing benefits for the many would bring the prevailing satisfaction with the system 
performance and, in the end, a more favourable view on democracy. On the other 
hand, if the support for democracy is solely influenced by self-interest and individual 
or group benefits, one cannot help but wonder whether it is merely a lip service to 
democracy, as often argued by the proponents of the culturalist model (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) – only instrumental support for democracy 
(based on its effects) and not intrinsic support (based on  democracy as a value in itself). 
This raises the question of stability of this type of support for democracy in a 
transitional society with its ups and downs in performance. If there is no deeper 
commitment to democracy, it is a small step from criticism of poor performance of the 
democratic regime to the rejection of the democratic political system. 
However, at least in the Serbian political context, allegiance to democracy is 
influenced by some more general factors as well. Authoritarianism explains some 
variation in the preference for democracy not accounted for by institutional variables. 
Other things controlled for, the higher the authoritarianism the less favourable is the 
attitude towards the democratic political system. One of the most fundamental and 
general determinants of political preferences, treated here as the cultural factor, plays 
its part. As stated before, authoritarianism has been a very important component of 
Serbian political culture for decades and obviously still is, after twelve years of 
democracy. Furthermore, there are reasons to treat authoritarianism as a form of 
traditional parochialism in the Serbian context (Biro, 2006; Kuzmanovic, 1994; Rot & 
Havelka, 1973), the idea not completely discarded by the original view of 
authoritarianism as a personality or dispositional variable (Sanford, 1973).  This points 
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to the relevance and continuity in political tradition, which speaks in favour of the 
cultural model.  
In understanding and describing the development of support for democracy in a 
post-communist society, a more integral and coherent approach is needed. It would 
include the structural, cultural and institutional variables. Some authors argue that 
„instead of asking  whether institutions cause culture or culture causes institutions, we 
should look for their joint effects“ (Elkins & Simeon, 1979, p. 143) and that political 
culture evolves in a “reciprocal relationship between institutions … and values, 
fundamental political beliefs and implicit understandings” (Brown, 2005, p. 187). The 
consonance between the two is greater and more easily achieved if democratic 
institutions develop upward (from within the society) than downward (imposed on the 
society). The former statement more likely describes the Serbian situation, but 
nonetheless data presented here point to combined effects of the cultural and 
institutional variables as found elsewhere (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007) and accurately 
described as a partial or dual adaptation to “external modernity and domestic reality” 
(Sakwa, 2005, p. 43). If there is a certain way for creating the democratic political 
culture, it is to be found in creating “democrats” as well as creating democracy. The 
two will then mutually reinforce. 
 
Acknowledgement 
This paper is a part of the project “Social Transformations in the European Integration Process: 
A Multidisciplinary Approach” (No. 47010), which is financed by the Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia. 
 
References 
1. Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J. and Nevitt Sanford, R. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. New York: Harper & Brothers.  
2. Almond, G. & Verba, S. (1963/1989). The civic culture. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
3. Almond, G. (1983). Communism and political culture theory. Comparative Politics, 15, 127-
138. 
4. Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right wing authoritarianism. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
5. Bennich-Bjorkman, L. (2007). Political culture under institutional pressure. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
6. Biro, M. (2006). Homo postcommunisticus. Beograd: XX vek. 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
151 
 
7. Biro, M., Mihic, V., Milin, P. and Logar, S. (2002). Did socio-political changes in Serbia 
changed the level of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism of citizens? Psihologija, 35, 37-47. 
8. Brown. A. (2005). Conclusion. In S. Whitefiled (ed.), Political culture and post-communism 
(pp. 180-202). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
9. Catterberg, G. & Zuasnabar, I. (2010). Youth, values and democracy: Exploring tolerance 
toward diversity among Third Wave generations. In R. Inglehart et al. (eds.), Changing 
human beliefs and values, 1981-2007 (pp. 55-72). Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, S. A. de C. V. 
10. Dahrendorf, R. (1990). Reflections on the revolution in Europe: In a letter intended to have 
been sent to a gentleman in Warsaw. New York: Random House. 
11. Dalton, R. (1994). Communist and democrats: Democratic attitudes in the two Germanies. 
British Journal of Political Science, 24, 469-493. 
12. Dekker, H. (1996). Democratic citizen competence: Political-psychological and political 
socialization research perspective. In F. Farnen et al. (ed.), Democracy, socialization and 
conflicting loyalties in East and West – Cross national and comparative perspective (pp. 386-
410). New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
13. Dekker, H., Malova, D. and Hoogendoorn, S. (2003). Nationalism and Its Explanations. 
Political Psychology, 24, 345-376. 
14. Dekker, P., Ester, P. and Vinken, H. (2003). Civil society, social trust and democratic 
involvement. In W. Arts, J. Hagenaars and L. Halman (eds.), The cultural diversity of 
European unity (pp. 217-253). Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
15. Duch, R. M. & Gibson, J. L. (1992). „Putting up with“ fascist in Western Europe: A 
comparative, cross-level analysis of political tolerance. The Western Political Quarterly, 45, 
237-273. 
16. Eckstein, H. (1988). A culturalist theory of political change. American Political Science 
Review, 82, 789-804. 
17. Elkins, D. & Simeon, E. B. (1979). A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political 
Culture Explain?. Comparative Politics, 11, 127-145. 
18. Fleron, F. (1996). Post-soviet political culture in Russia: An assessment of recent empirical 
investigation. Europe-Asia Studies, 48, 225-260. 
19. Gibson, J. (1996). A mile wide but and inch deep(?): The structure of democratic 
commitments in the former USSR. American Journal of Political Science, 40, 396-420.  
20. Gibson, J. (1998). Putting up with fellow Russians: An analysis of political tolerance in the 
fledging Russian democracy. Political Research Quarterly, 51, 37-68. 
21. Gibson, J. (2002). Becoming tolerant? Short-term changes in Russian political culture. 
British Journal of Political Science, 32, 309-333.  
22. Golubovic, Z., Kuzmanovic, B. and Vasovic, M. (1995). Drustveni karakter i drustvene 
promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba. Beograd: Institut za filozofiju i drustvenu teoriju i Filip 
Visnjic. 
23. Gray, J. (1979). Conclusions. In A. Brown & J. Gray (eds.), Political culture and political 
change in communist states (pp. 253-272). London: Macmillan.  
24. Hagenaars, J., Halman, L. and Moors, G. (2003). Exploring Europe's basic value maps. In 
W. Arts, J. Hagenaars and L. Halman (eds.), The cultural diversity of European unity (pp. 23-
58). Leiden, Boston: Brill. 
25. Hahn, J. (1991). Continuity and change in Russian political culture. British Journal of 
Political Science,21, 393-421.  
26. Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy’s third wave. Journal of Democracy, 2, 12-34. 
27. Inglehart, R. & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, culture change, and democracy – The 
human development sequence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
28. Inglehart, R. (1990). Culture shift in advanced industrial societies. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
29. Jackman, R. & Miller, R. (1996). A renaissance of political culture. American Journal of 
Political Science, 40, 632-659. 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
152 
 
30. Karpov, V. (1999). Political tolerance in Poland and the United States. Social Forces, 77, 
1525-1549. 
31. Klingemann, H. D., Fuchs, D. and Zielonka, J. (ed.) (2006). Democracy and political culture 
in Eastern Europe. London and New York: Routledge. 
32. Kuzmanovic, B. (1994). Autoritarnost. In M. Lazic (ed.), Razaranje drustva (str. 151-173). 
Beograd: Filip Visnjic. 
33. Kuzmanovic, B. (1997b). Stepen i cinioci autoritarnosti. In S. Mihailovic (red.), Izmedju 
osporavanja i podrske – javno mnjenje o legitimitetu trece Jugoslavije (str. 229-245). Beograd: 
Institut drustvenih nauka. 
34. Kuzmanovic, B. (2010). Autoritarnost – vapaj za jakim i pouzdanim vođama i disciplinom. 
In Grupa autora, Kako građani Srbije vide tranziciju (str. 87-104). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung, Centar za studije socijalne demokratije i CeSID. 
35. Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisities of democracy: Economic development and 
political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53, 69-105. 
36. McFarland, S. (2010). Authoritarianism, social dominance, and other roots of generalized 
prejudice. Political Psychology, 31, 453-477. 
37. Meloen, J. D. (1993). The F scale as a predictor of fascism: An overview of 40 years of 
authoritarianism research. In W. F. Stone, G. Lederer and R. Christie (Eds.), Strength and 
weakness: The authoritarian personality today. New York: Springer-Verlag. 
38. Meloen, J. D. (1996). Authoritarianism, education and democracy. In F. Farnen et al. (ed.), 
Democracy, socialization and conflicting loyalties in East and West – Cross national and 
comparative perspective (pp. 20-38). New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
39. Mishler, W. & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, distrust and scepticism: Popular evaluations of civil 
and political institutions in post-communist societies. The Journal of Politics, 59, 418-451. 
40. Mishler, W. & Rose, R. (2002). Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of 
post-communist regimes. European Journal of Political Research, 41, 5-36. 
41. Moreno, A., Siemienska, R. and Basanez, M. (2010). Generational differences in support for 
democracy and free market economics: Evidence from new and established market 
democracies. In R. Inglehart et al. (eds.), Changing human beliefs and values, 1981-2007 (pp. 
33-54). Mexico: Siglo XXI Editores, S. A. de C. V. 
42. Muller, E. N. & Seligson, M. A. (1994). Civic culture and democracy: The question of 
causal relationships. American Political Science Review, 88, 635-652. 
43. Niemi, R. G. & Hepburn, M. A. (1995). The rebirth of political socialization. Perspectives 
on Political Science, 24, 7-16. 
44. Pantić, D. & Pavlovic, Z. (2009). Political culture of voters in Serbia. Belgrade: Institute of 
Social Sciences. 
45. Pantic, D. (2002). Vrednosti biraca pre i posle demokratskog preokreta 2000. godine. In V. 
Goati (ed.), Partijska scena Srbije posle 5. oktobra 2000. (131-158). Beograd: Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung i Institut drustvenih nauka. 
46. Pavlovic, Z. (2007). Svetsko javno mnjenje o demokratiji – da li je demokratija univerzalno 
pozeljan oblik vladavine?. In D. Pantic and Z. Pavlovic, Javno mnjenje – koncept i 
komparativna istrazivanja (str. 109-134). Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka i Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung. 
47. Pavlovic, Z. (2010). Prihvatanje demokratije i demokratske orijentacije u Srbiji u kontekstu 
društvenih promena. Psiholoska istrazivanja, 13, 35-58. 
48. Peffley, M. & Rohrschneider, R. (2003). Democratization and political tolerance in 
seventeen countries: A multi-level model for democratic learning. Political Research 
Quarterly, 56, 243-257. 
49. Reisinger, W., Miller, A., Hesli, V. and Maher, K. (1994). Political values in Russia, 
Ukraine and Lithuania: Sources and implications for democracy. British Journal of Political 
Science, 24, 183-223. 
50. Rot, N. & Havelka, N. (1973). Nacionalna vezanost i vrednosti kod srednjoškolske omladine. 
Beograd: Institut za psihologiju i Institut društvenih nauka. 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
153 
 
51. Sakwa, R. (2005). Partial adaptation and political culture. In S. Whitefield (ed.), Political 
culture and post-communism (pp. 42-63). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
52. Sanford, N. (1973). Authoritarian personality in contemporary perspective. In J. Knutson 
(ed.), Handbook of political psychology (pp. 139-170). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
53. Schwartz, S. H. & Sagie, S. (2000). Value consensus and importance: A cross-national study. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 31, 465-497. 
54. Siemienska, R. (2003). Intergenerational differences in political values and attitudes in stable 
and new democracies. In R. Inglehart (ed.), Islam, gender, culture and democracy (pp. 145-
167). Willowdale: de Sitter Publications. 
55. Siemienska, R. (2006). Poland: Citizens and democratic politics. In H. D. Klingemann, D. 
Fuchs and J. Zielonka (eds.), Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe (pp. 203-234). 
London and New York: Routledge. 
56. Sullivan, J., Piereson, J. and Marcus, G. (1979). An alternative conceptualization of political 
tolerance: Illusory increases 1950s-1970s. American Political Science Review, 73, 781-794. 
57. Todosijević, B. (2006). Politics in Serbia 1990-2002: A cleavage of world views. Psihologija, 
39, 121-146. 
58. Welzel, C. & Inglehart, R. (2009). Political culture, mass beliefs and value change. In C. 
Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. Inglehart and C. Welzel (eds.), Democratization (pp. 126–144). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
59. Whitefield, S. & Evans, G. (1999). Political culture versus rational choice: Explaining 
responses to transition in the Czech republic and Slovakia. British Journal of Political 
Science, 29, 129-154. 
60. Whitefield, S. (2005). Political culture and post-communism. In S. Whitefield (ed.), Political 
culture and post-communism (pp. 1-14). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Appendix 
 
Table 1. Authoritarianism scale – Factor loadings on the first principal component 
 
Obedience and respect for authority are most important values for children .702
People just reject youthful rebellious thoughts as they age .576
Forgetting physical punishment leads to immoral conditions .497
Authorities should censor the media .689
Solve social problems by eliminating immoral people .686
People can be divided into strong and weak .524
Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; no rotation; 38.18% of variance. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Nationalism scale – Factor loadings 
 
The Serbs should be proud of their people .658
Serbia has a more glorious and tragic history than other nations .798
Serbia contributes more to world culture and science .789
More important politicians are patriots than experts .493
Serbia should seek peaceful reunification .553
Schools should pay more attention to patriotic education .647
Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; 44.31% of variance. 
 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
154 
 
 
 
Table 3: Political tolerance scale – Factor loadings 
Disliked group should organize public demonstrations .884
Disliked group should nominate for public office .909
Disliked group should not be banned .773
Note: Extraction Method - Principal Component Analysis; 73.53% of variance. 
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Abstract 
This article examines two modes of the EU’s external governance – bilateral and 
multilateral - in relations with the Eastern neighbourhood countries and the role of 
civil society’s organizations in the process. It is argued that European Union is seeking 
to transport not just the norms and standards of the EU acquis communautaire but 
also the interactional institutional structure based on multiple and multi sector, 
transgovernmental networking into its closest external environment. It is aimed to 
involve the civil society organizations into most of the stages and interactional modes 
of the EU’s relations with the Eastern Partnership countries. The study involves the 
EU’s documents analysis, qualitative interviews conducted between 2011-2013 from 
the respondents of the EU’s institutions, and the members of the Eastern Partnership’s 
civil society forum.  
 
 
“The civil society dimension is vital for the overall success of the ENP…Information to the 
public of the EU and the ENP partners is a key component of the civil society dimension”. 
(Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP , Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006:1). 
 
The EU wants to foster democratic reforms, governance, stability in those countries and make them 
more sustainable and you can not go without the civil society…<> We are source of information 
but not only of course.  
Interview, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, member of the steering committee, 09 05 
2013, interview by phone, EaPCSF2. 
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Introduction 
The European Neighbourhood policy was established by the European Union 
in 2003-2004 with a goal to create the stable, democratic and prosperous 
neighbourhood. The first decade of the policy implementation is coming to an end. 
Despite the ambitious goals, the wide range and various institutional modes of 
partnerships and initiatives the results of the policy are very modest. Furthermore, 
looking at the scores of democracy in civil and political liberties research23 made by the 
Freedom House organization, in the Eastern Partnership countries one might find that 
the situation is getting worse in several countries, e.g. Ukraine, when comparing with 
the situation after the Orange revolution (2004), and the high people expectations at 
that time. Therefore, on the one hand, the EU’s policy and the seeking of 
democratization in the post soviet space face several challenges and shortcomings. On 
the other hand the negotiations for the free trade, including Association Agenda, 
DCFTA, visa dialogues, are intensifying. The Eastern Partnership summit in 2013 in 
Vilnius is expected to become a focal point in the region.  
European neighbourhood policy and it’s results have been analyzed by a 
constantly growing group of scholars (van Vooren, 2012; DeBardeleben, 2008; 
Korosteleva, 2011; Schimmelfennig, Lavenex, 2009). Several scholars (Tassinari, 2009; 
Casier, 2010), emphasize integration – security dilemma, which became evident within 
ENP as it is not allowing to re-apply the most effective instrument of the EU 
(enlargement perspective) in it’s external environment. Others relate problems with 
the EU asymmetric power and normative dictate directed towards the neighbours 
without possibility to receive the “carrot” of europeanization (Bonvincini, 2006; 
Tassinari, 2005; Casier, 2008; Hillion, 2008). The problems are also raised by the lack 
of solidarity between the EU member states on what kind of policy should be applied 
in relations with the southern and the eastern neighbours. But the most agree that 
strong interdependence, various soft security problems and the political and 
                                                        
23For more information look at the Freedom in the world: http://www.freedomhouse.org/ 
report/freedom-world/2006/ukraine. E.g. Ukraine’s status in 2006 was ‘free’ while in 2013 ‘partly free’. 
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economical potential of the relationship do not permit the EU to isolate itself from the 
neighbouring countries. These neighbouring countries, mostly undemocratic and 
unstable ones, surround the European Union as an external ring and raise the questions 
for the Union of how this common neighbourhood might be governed.  
This article mostly focuses on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, the so called 
Eastern dimension of the European neighbourhood policy, which involves six post 
soviet countries- Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. One 
segment of the European neighbourhood policy- civil society dimension- is analyzed in 
the paper. The article examines the international governance of the EU’s Eastern 
neighbourhood policy, and the institutional modes of how the civil society 
organizations are being integrated into this process and what role they are provided to 
attain. 
 The European neighbourhood policy might be evaluated as the process of 
international democratization and institutionalization, whereas almost all the stages 
seek to involve civil society organizations into its governance. Both the negotiations 
for and the implementation of the European neighbourhood policy, highlight the 
importance of involvement of civil society organizations in order to have better results 
and outcomes.  
Therefore, the main object is the integration of civil society organizations as the 
non-governmental actors into the international governance (neighbourhood) process. 
The research question underlines the importance of non-state and non-governmental 
partnerships in international politics and, the most importantly, the ways of how they 
are integrated, and what kind of problematic aspects the process create. As the research 
shows the official declarations made by the European Union institutions, mainly the 
European Commission, do not always reflect the practical reality of the processes. 
Therefore, article seeks to provide the full picture of how the civil society 
organizations are promoted within European neighbourhood governance officially, 
and what has been achieved in this process so far.  
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In most of the cases the role and the activities of civil society organizations are 
analyzed within internal political processes. However, today an increasing number of 
the researchers also look at how the civil society organizations have become important 
agents in foreign policy and in international relations field. Kristi Raik (2006) analyzed 
the EU’s instruments, foundations for the non-governmental sector’s support for the 
Eastern European countries, Kristian L.Nielsen, Eiki Berg and Gulnara Roll (2009) 
examined the possibilities of civil society organizations as the agents in European 
neighbourhood policy. T.Rommens, R.Thiers (2009), similarly to this article, 
researched the involvement of civil society organizations into the creation and 
implementation of European neighbourhood policy, making the case study of South 
Caucasus region. The activities of civil society organizations and their role are 
increasingly important objects as well as partners for the supranational EU’s 
institutions, like the European Parliament and the European Commission.  
 
Innovative partnerships and international governance   
 The international governance as the process is very much tied with the new 
institutionalism and the social constructivism (Thierry Balsacq, 2009). The notion of 
governance in international politics and European arena is associated with the new 
order and modes of regulations (Bartolini, 2011)24 and how the problems might be 
solved by creating innovative partnerships. These types of partnerships creating 
interactions between state institutions, multinational corporations, non-governmental 
organizations, supranational institutions and local actors are needed collectively to 
solve the problems25 because of increasing interdependences and the diminishing role of 
the sovereign states, especially in the European continent. Mathias Albert and Tanja 
Kopp-Malek (2002: 470) „...view the entirety of discourses on global and European 
                                                        
24 Bartolini Stefano, New modes of European governance: an introduction in New modes of governance in 
Europe. Governing in the shadow of hierarchy (ed. Adrienne Heritier ir Martin Rhodes), Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011: 1-19    
25 Torfing Jacob, Peters B.Guy, Pierre Jon, Sorensen Eva. Interactive Governance. Advancing the 
paradigm. Oxford University Press, 2012. P. 21 
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governance as an indicator of the establishment of ‚post-Westphalian‘ vocabularies 
within IR‘s way of conducting ‚normal science‘26“.  
The governance model is understood differently by scholars, and its poly-
semantic meaning is often defined by formulating continuum from strictly hierarchical 
governance techniques to self - regulatory networks (Jan Kooiman, 2005; 2010), even 
though in most common sense the governance model is explained as an antithetic to 
hierarchical governance. The notion of governance has different meanings in 
comparative politics, international relations or European studies fields.  
In the European and the EU‘s neighbourhood policy studies, the governance is 
often divided into the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ one (Bosse, Polglase-Korosteleva, 2009)27. 
The first one is related to the EU‘s strict conditional policy (hard Europeanization) 
through the negotiation packet/hierarchy, and the second one – when the EU seeks a 
regulatory change through socialization (soft Europeanization) and networking 
(Lavenex, 2007).  
The institutional setting of international governance in the EU’s external 
environment has been researched by an extending group of scholars (Lavenex, 2007; 
Ganzle, 2008; Bosse and Polglase-Korosteleva, 2009; Filtenborg, Ganzle, Johansson 
2002; Cardwell, 2008; Schimmelfennig, 2009; 2012).  
Ones of the most outstanding scholars in the field such as Sandra Lavenex and 
Frank Schimmelfennig (2009) formed the theoretical framework of „European external 
governance“. They asked in which circumstances the EU‘s external governance could 
be the most effective. According to them: “the notion of governance is particularly 
suitable to grasp this process of rule expansion beyond formal membership in the EU 
polity” (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig,2009: 795). Other scholars (S.Lavenex, 
D.Lehmkuhl and N.Whichmann, 2009) analyzed the different EU‘s external 
                                                        
26Albert Mathias, Kopp-Malek Tanja,; The pragmatism of Global and European governance: emerging 
forms of the politikal ‚beyond Westfalia‘; Millennium: Journal of International studies, 2002 Vol.31, No. 3 
P. 453-471   P.470 
27 Bosse Giselle and Polglase-Korosteleva Elena, Changing Belarus?: The limits of EU Governance in 
Eastern Europe and the promise of partnership, Cooperation and Conflict, 2009 (44/2): 143-165.  P. 146 
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governance modes’ efficiency conditions in relations with the Western, Eastern, and 
Southern neighbours in a specific selected sectors (BUSP, trade policy, encouraging 
democracy, environment area). According to their research results sectoral dynamics 
are stable and not necessarily depend on the macro level institutional structures 
(Lavenex, Lehmkuhl, Whichmann, 2009). Other researchers group (E.Barbe, O.Costa, 
A.H.Surralles, M.Natorski, 2009) selected to examine the EU’s relations with the 
certain ENP countries (Morocco, Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia). The main object of 
their research was the adoption of the rules in the common foreign and security policy. 
These scholars came to a conclusion that, in this sector and in the relations with these 
countries, negotiations are more often based on the international or collectively agreed 
rules than only based on the EU‘s acquis normative base (Barbe, Costa, Surralles, 
Natorski 2009). Richard Youngs’ (2009) argues that hierarchical (conditional based) 
model could exist only in the relations with Balkan countries, while network 
governance is more appropriate in the relations with Ukraine and Southern 
Mediterranean countries (Youngs, 2009).  
Therefore, in the European studies the governance model is analyzed through 
multiple, sectoral, multi-sector cooperation aspects, and most often is based on the 
scholarly positions of the institutionalism making the disjuncture between the 
hierarchical mode of the governance and the network based one.  
The EU’s governance research also involves the notion of border/frontier. 
Authors examine the governance by analyzing geopolitical, cultural, institutional, 
discursive, interactional, legal and other types of frontiers existing between the EU and 
its external environment (Smith, 1996; Ganzle, 2008; Korosteleva, 2011). According to 
them the international institutionalism based on the networking governance 
theoretically creates the possibilities for horizontal relations, some degree of autonomy 
(Simon Hollis, 2010), involves lower levels as well (Keohane, Nye, 1989) and lessen the 
boundaries, highlights mutual recognition and socialization (Barbe, Costa, Herranz and 
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etc.2009)28. Scholars, that encourage adopting the network governance in the relations 
with neighbouring countries, accent the benefit of such a form of cooperation, creating 
a relationship based on openness and mutual responsibility.  
In the article it is argued that both modes of governance are existent in the EU‘s 
relations with the Eastern neighbours. Also, it is suggested that the European Union 
seeks to transport not just norms of acquis communautaire to the Eastern 
neighbourhood countries, but also the institutional setting of its internal system based 
on multi-sectoral, transnational, multilateral networking. Two modes of the 
governance system are analyzed in the article: a) bilateral which is more related with 
the hierarchical mode of the relations, negotiation process for the Association Agenda; 
b) multilateral, which is related with the multi-sectoral, transnational networking in 
the Eastern partnership’s four platforms, and other regional forums. The attention is 
paid on how the both modes of the governance integrate the civil society 
organizations.  
International institutionalism as theory and research covers various norms, 
practices, and rules in a certain international environment and, in order to realize the 
connection among them and the occurring institutional/normative change, it is 
important to focus on how the institutions are created and developed (A.Sweet, 
N.Fligstein, W.Sandholtz, 2001).  
 
Research method  
The methodology used in this article is mostly of a qualitative nature. 
Following the governance and institutionalism theory and seeking to find out the 
institutional modes, the ties between the bilateral and multilateral frameworks of the 
EU’s neighbourhood policy, hierarchical and network governance institutional setting 
and the role of the civil society in the process, the qualitative type of research has been 
                                                        
28Barbe Esther, Costa Oriol, Herranz Anna, Nogues-Johansson Elisabeth, Natorski Michael, Sabuite 
A.Maria; Drawing the neighbours closer…to what?: explaining emerging patterns of policy convergence 
between the EU and its neighbours, Cooperation and Conflict, 2009 44: 378-399, p. 383-384 
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conducted. The documents analysis and the qualitative semi- structured interviews are 
two most important methods used in the research.  
In order to attain mostly the official side of the research question, an amount of 
the documents of the European Union were analyzed, starting with the common letter 
written by Christopher Patten and Javier Solana in 2002, and ending with the review 
of European neighbourhood policy of 2013. The document analysis includes various 
kinds of the ENP documents: regulations, annual strategic plans, ENP Action plans, 
documents and working papers of the European Commission and the European 
External Action Service, country reports and regional strategies. It is seek to find out 
the official part or the declarations of what kind of role is given for the civil society 
and the integrating approaches of civil society organizations into European 
neighbourhood governance.  
The 14 qualitative semi-structured elite/experts interviews were conducted in 
Brussels and in the other places from the personnel of the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), the European Commission and the European Parliament, the diplomat 
of the Embassy of Lithuania in Brussels, and the representatives of the Eastern 
Partnership civil society Forum. The latter were conducted by phone in May 2013. 
The letters were sent out to all the steering committee members and to the other 
addresses provided at the website of the Eastern Partnership Civil society Forum. 
Unfortunately, only two representatives agreed to give the interviews. Other empirical 
research was conducted in 2011. The duration of the interviews varied between 24 
minutes to 94 minutes. The interviewers were asked to give their position on the 
modes of the governance in the Eastern neighbourhood policy, effectiveness of 
bilateral and multilateral institutional settings, the role of civil society.  
The selection of respondents was conducted according to the nature of their 
work and expertise. All the respondents work directly with the EU‘s neighbourhood 
policy making and implementation agenda, and programs. In order to ensure the 
discretion granted to the most of the respondents, they are encoded. The codes are 
given according to an institution represented by a respondent, and the numbers are 
given according to a date of an interview. Hence, it is only identified a respondent‘s 
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institution, a department, a date and a place of an interview. The list of the interviews 
is provided at the end of the bibliography.  
 
The European neighbourhood policy: what role for civil society?   
The formation of the ENP took several years of time (2002-2004) until it was 
defined as the conceptual framework of the policy. In 2003 in the “Wider Europe” 
initiative, the promotion of democratic governance to the neighbouring countries and 
the common values, such as the human rights, rule of law as the core elements, and 
strategic goals of the initiative were documented. One year later, in 2004, in the 
strategic document on the “European neighbourhood policy”, the similar seeking was 
defined, as well as the closer economical cooperation, political association and the first 
ENP Action plans started to be implemented. Even in these first documents an 
essential role was given for the civil society. Civil society organizations and the 
strengthening of people-to-people contacts are defined as the priority issue in the 
European neighbourhood policy. In most of the documents like in 200329 ‚Wider 
Europe, the strategy document of the European neighbourhood policy, or in 2006 
document written by the European Commission, the civil society organizations are 
highlighted as vital for the overall success of the policy implementation30.  
One of priority cooperation sectors- 
“ people-to-people issues, including civil society development, activities 
in the fields of media and journalists’ exchanges, promotion of good governance 
and respect for human rights, …” ( ENP strategy paper, 2004:21).  
 
In the regulation on the European neighbourhood and partnership instrument 
it is also defined as one of the priority of cooperation areas:  
 
“supporting democratization, inter alia, by enhancing the role of civil 
society organizations and promoting media pluralism, as well as through 
                                                        
29European neighbourhod policy. Strategy paper. COM (2004) 373 FINAL. P.19 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf 
30 Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf P.1 
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electoral observation and assistance” (Regulation, Laying down General 
provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
instrument, 2006: article2 (l) P. 4).  
 
Later, in 2009, the specific Eastern dimension of the European neighbourhood 
policy was created by the establishment of the Eastern Partnership and the Eastern 
Partnership civil society forum. These initiatives highlighted the importance of the 
regional cooperation and networking within different sectors and policies between the 
six Eastern Partnership countries and the European Union. Even though Eastern 
Partnership is defined as one of the most intensive EU‘s external policies (interview, 
LT1), but the goals in comparison with the European neighourhood policy remained 
the same, including „everything but institutions“ without full accession to the EU. In 
2011 during the Polish EU Council presidency, the civil society organizations received 
special attention. Two additional instruments were established: Civil society facility 
and the European Endowment for democracy. According to the respondent:  
 
„...which is similar to the American „National Endowment for 
Democracy“..., which is a NGO that is independent from the government... but 
receives the EU‘s support, and then decides how to distribute it. The idea, the 
establishment of such an organization would be to support the opposition 
movements not only in Belarus, but also in other countries such as Libya, Syria 
and elsewhere, in order to support various NGOs and human rights activists, 
and to do so in a more flexible and less formal way than the EU does...<>. 
We are working with the opposition, in the political dimension to help them 
organize themselves, to create the political ideas, mainly supporting them, when 
problems arise, or when they find themselves in jail or are oppressed, we put 
pressure on the regime, encouraging the extension of sanctions.. 
Interview,European Parliament, Diplomatic advisor to the President of the EP, 
12 10 2011, Brussels, EP2. 
 
Similarly to this point the head of the European Endowment for democracy, 
Jerzy Pomianowski, in his interview to “Carnegie Europe” highlighted the less 
bureaucratic procedures and more effective, fast support for the various pro-democratic 
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forces including “small, new unregistered groups31” (Dempsey, 2013). Potentially this 
European Endowment will increase the financing for civil society including political 
groups. According to the Europeaid in the period of 2011-2013 the Eastern 
neighbourhood Civil Society Facility covers 37 million euro32. Representatives of the 
Eastern Partnership civil society Forum agreed that the financing increased 
(nevertheless they couldn‘t provide the concrete numbers) and the civil society 
organizations by the EU institutions are seen as important partners, however as 
respondents noted not enough. On the other hand the respondents were happy to 
announce that:  
 
The Eastern partnership civil society forum as a partner is invited 
to…<>… all the platform meetings of the Eastern partnership. Interview, 
EaPCSF2. 
 
The specific and important role for the civil society according to the European 
neighbourhood and Partnership regulation is devoted in the election monitoring 
missions, in supporting the democracy, in promoting media pluralism, multicultural 
dialogue and people-to-people contacts33. As Chand K. Vikram suggests (1997:551):  
 
“Technical and financial assistance to domestic civic associations by 
international groups can play a major role in developing election-monitoring 
groups that can provide a nucleus for the formation of an organized civil 
society.” 34 
 
The diplomat of the European External Action service noted that the EU wants 
to convince the electorate, the civil society, that the European road of their country is 
                                                        
31 The full interview is available on the website: Judy Dempsey “Does Europe need an endowment for 
democracy?”January, 14, 2013. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=50602 Latest accessed on 
06 08 2013.  
32 Europeaid http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-east/ 
csf_en.htm 
33Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006. 
Laying down General provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument. 
L310/4 
34Chand K Vikram, Democratisation from the outside in: NGO and international efforts to promote 
open elections, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No 3, pp 543-561, 1997, p.551. 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
168 
 
a possibility (Interview, EEAS5) and the civil society organizations could become 
important partners. 
The other area where the civil society could become an important mediator is 
the conflict zones, ‘frozen conflicts’ areas (N.Mirimanova, 2010; N.Tocci, 2008).  
 
„However there is no theory in the respective EU documents that links 
the general strengthening of civil society with the enhancement of its peace 
building capacity except for vague declarations…” (Mirimanova, 2010:6)35.  
 
According to the representative of the Eastern partnership civil society Forum:  
 
“…We discussed in theForum that we should involve not just the 
representatives from the Eastern Partnership countries but also from these 
problematic regions. And when it comes to the case of Transnistria for us is a 
little bit easier to involve and we had the cases when the Transnistrian 
representatives participated in the meetings, the NGOs used to collaborate with 
us in some projects, in some activities, as for Armenia and Azerbaijan the 
situation there is more problematic. <>…Whether we can negotiate, I guess 
the role of civil society is not so much as negotiating as create these bridges 
between the country itself and the problematic region, to involve civil society 
from the problematic region, to see what is going on, to be aware of initiatives 
of the governments, to get to know what is going on in the whole country”. 
Interview, Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, member of the steering 
committee, 22 04 2013, EaPCSF1. 
 
The problematic issue emphasized by the respondents is that the civil society 
organizations from these problematic regions are very much controlled by the 
government and cannot make load declarations. According to G. Aybars, K.Onnik 
(2012:7):  
 
“Both state and non-state actors should place a particular focus on youth 
since they have little to no contact with their counterparts across conflict-
lines”36. 
                                                        
35 Mirimanova Natalia, Civil society building peace in the European neighbourhood: towards a new 
framework for joining forces with the EU, MICROCON Policy working paper 10, March, 2010, p.6  
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The process of international democratization and institutionalization of the 
European Neighbourhood policy involves various actors (supranational, national 
governmental bodies, non-governmental organizations, and private sector institutions) 
and modes of interactions (bilateral, multilateral).  
 
Table 1.  Involvement of CSOs into the European neighbourhood governance  
The ways of integration of CSOs Seeking 
 
 
Bilateralism 
(bilateral 
approaches) 
1. NGOs, CSOs integration 
into the negotiations of the 
ENP Action Plan, Association 
Agenda (setting of priorities); 
2. NGOs, CSOs integration 
into the implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of 
ENP Action Plan, Association 
Agenda.  
1. To strengthen dialogue between civil 
society and national government of the 
ENP country;  
2. To involve civil society into internal 
state reforming;  
3. Independent NGOs, CSOs are the 
important source of information in the 
partner country; 
 
 
 
 
Multilateralis
m 
(multilateral 
approaches) 
1. Creation of long term 
regional networks of civil 
society organizations (EaP 
Civil society Forum, Black Sea 
Synergy forum);   
2. Multilateral programmes 
(Eastern Partnership four 
platforms, Black sea synergy).   
 
1. To establish permanent contacts 
between civil society in the region and 
spread of information, good practices;  
2. Networking and strong partnerships 
of CSOs may have a bigger impact 
either towards the EU for funding or for 
national bodies; 
3. To establish the trust among civil 
society in the region, “bottom-up 
regionalism”. 
 
Source: created by the author with reference to European Commission (2004, 2006), Raik 
(2006), Rommens, Thiers (2009), Tassinari (2005).   
 
This policy (ENP) is perceived as a long term process seeking to create a 
stronger institutionalization of the relations by creating common rules of the 
neighbourhood governance in almost all the sectors of the cooperation, specifically in 
the ones which have the strongest impact on the neighbourly relations, like energy 
policy, common trade, migration and asylum policies. In the official and diplomatic 
discourse this process of international institutionalization is named the approximation 
of common rules and standards. Table 1 defines two modes of the EU’s policy 
                                                                                                                                                                     
36 Gorgulu Aybars, Krikorian Onnik, Turkey’s South Caucasus Agenda: the role of state and non-state 
actors, Imak Ofset Basim Yayin San., 2012: p.7 
http://www.epfound.org/files/southcaucasusagenda24_07_12web.pdf Latest accessed on 14 07 2013  
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governance in relations with the Eastern neighbours, and further in the article these 
two institutional settings and the role of civil society in it are examined.  
 
Bilateral cooperation: ENP Action Plans, Association Agenda 
The European Commission recognizes that the power of civil society capacity 
varies in different neighbouring countries, thus, the dialogue with civil society, first of 
all, should take place on a bilateral basis on the European Neighborhood Policy Action 
Plan, Association agenda template37, the so called ‚national platforms‘in the ENP 
governance process.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
 ENP policy formation and implementation 
Source: author (S.Rakutiene doctoral dissertation, 2012:111) 
 
 
                                                        
37 Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 
2006.P.2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf 
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Such political agenda is accomplished by the basis of the bilateral EU – specific 
neighboring country Action plan, or later Association agenda formulation and 
implementation. Action plan with a country, participating in the ENP, is formed by 
the basis of already signed treaty of Association or Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, and it does not change, but add to already mentioned treaties. Bilateral 
Action Plans differ from a treaty in the way that they are fixed-term, and specifying 
particular reforms, that are to be implemented by a neighboring country within the 
negotiated term (3-5 years). The very process of implementing this plan is quite similar 
to the format used in the Enlargement policy. However, the degree of conditionality 
policy differs, as well as the ultimate aim – no perspective of a membership given. 
After the Action plan is implemented the negotiations for the Association Agenda is 
taking place. This bilateral institutional setting is associated with the hierarchical mode 
of the ENP governance. As the countries negotiating for the Association agreements 
which potentially will open up for them possibilities to participate in the EU common 
market and the visa dialogues seeking to create visa free travel regime- within both 
have to implement EU rules, part of acquis communautaire (interviews with EEAS4, 
EEAS6).  
The importance of civil society and its potential in the official EU‘s documents 
is already marked at the first stage of shaping the ENP – when negotiating the 
priorities and aiming for reforms in a specific country‘s Action plan or currently the 
negotiations for the Association Agenda arguing that it is the civil society who clearly 
sees the processes in its own country, and, therefore, has to be integrated as soon as the 
negotiation process start. Negotiations on the Action plans proceed in the EU and a 
neighboring country‘s representatives (government) Council, which are identified as 
Associations, or Partnership and Cooperation Councils (depending on a signed treaty). 
This Council is the basic stage of the current EU neighborhood policy formulation. 
The Council also forms sub-committees, consisting of the EU and the neighbouring 
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country representatives. According to the Commission (2006:) discussions with civil 
society usually take place prior to sub-committee meetings38. As the respondent noted: 
 
„...on the national platforms we agreed that we will have these regular 
meeting with the EU and Moldova, at least once a quarter, we will be raising 
the most worrying issues related with public policies in Moldova or concrete 
situations. The last time we had the meeting and raised the questions related 
with free trade agreement, concrete information and transparency in this field. 
We discussed the corruption and violence issue. Interview, EaPCSF1. 
 
On the one hand, the respondents agreed that civil society could express their 
opinion, make the concrete proposals. However, both respondents of the Eastern 
Partnership Civil Society Forum said that they have no possibility to participate fully 
in this negotiation process. 
 
“…national platforms express some concerns for example the negotiation 
on free trade agreement, <>… that civil society doesn’t know exactly the 
contents of these agreements what Moldova is negotiating exactly about this 
trade agreement. …Yes, recently there was a steering committee meeting and we 
raised this question, and visa, free trade agreements, there is the same situation 
when we speak about almost all the Eastern Partnership countries… Interview, 
EaPCSF1. 
 
The similar answer was provided by the other respondent:  
 
“Association agenda, Association agreements or DCFTA they are 
political bilateral appointments, this is negotiations between governments and 
they are not published. Therefore it is difficult for civil society to see what is 
agreed there. ..You can not have an input when you do not know what is 
exactly negotiated. <>…in the negotiations we are not taking part and even 
not getting the information what was negotiated on agreements”. Interview, 
EaPCSF2.  
 
                                                        
38Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 
2006.P.2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
173 
 
Therefore, speaking about the negotiations for the ENP bilateral agreements 
practically the civil society representatives do not have the real possibilities to act in 
the process.  
Finally, the European Commission carries out regular assessments, reports, 
evaluates the progress of implementation of the ENP Action Plans (The Commission's 
role here is very similar to the one it has in the Enlargement policy). The European 
Commission‘s document „Strengthening the ENP“, 2007 notes that civil society 
organizations have an important role not only in consultation for the Action Plan 
priorities, but also monitoring and evaluating processes. In the 2006 paper 
„Strengthening civil society dimension in the ENP39“, it is also emphasized that the 
monitoring of the ENP Action Plan implementation cannot be done solely by official 
sources, because civil society always observes the impact of policies on everyday life 
and, especially, human rights, the business climate, the environment, access to 
government information fields better (European Commission, 2006). From the 
Commission's (2006) point of view, it is very important to strengthen the dialogue 
with civil society organizations, and their dialogue with their government by including 
local civil society in some specific processes of reforms. However, as respondents 
noted, this also depends on the national government as the situation in Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia is very different from the Belarus or Azerbaijan. The EU's Eastern 
Regional Programme Strategy Paper (2007 - 2013) states that the support (assistance)40 is 
provided for civil society organizations‘ assessments, monitoring, and information 
activities. „Civic associations can provide opportunities for concerned parties to relay 
information, testimonial, and analysis to governance agencies“41 (Scholte, 2001:17). 
Civil society organizations are important source of information, but not only as one 
respondent highlighted (Interview, EaPCSF2).  
                                                        
39 Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 
2006.P.2 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf 
40 European neighbourhood and partnership instrument, Eastern regional programme, strategy paper 
2007-2013 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rsp_en.pdf 
41 Scholte Aart Jan, Civil society and democracy in global governance, CSGR (Centre for the study of 
globalisation and regionalism) , University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom Working paper No. 
65/01, January 2001, p.17 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
174 
 
According to the respondents, the monitoring processes involve civil society 
organizations better in comparison with the negotiations.  
 
“Well of course in depends, there were different organizations in 
different years. There were organizations monitoring visa facilitation, of 
Moldova- EU accession process. It depends on the subjects, transparency 
International is monitoring the implementation of anti-corruption project. We 
give the evaluation to the representative of the EU delegation to Moldova”. 
Interview, EaPCSF1. 
 
“Civil society organizations are consulted when we speak about the 
progress reports, we are consulted by the EU delegations and can give an input, 
Furthermore Civil society Forum is now conducting the next monitoring of 
the roadmap and we want to present the report before the summit, to see how 
the country is doing, implementing the roadmap, is it going to the right 
direction”. Interview, EaPCSF2.  
 
Comparing the results with the previous research, it could be stated that the 
situation within the negotiations process did not get better, while the involvement of 
civil society organizations into monitoring process, consultations with them, increased.   
Meanwhile, in 2008 the Open Society Georgia Foundation and the Eurasia 
Partnership Foundation study revealed that the involvement of civil society in Georgia 
ENP Action Plan 2006-2007 monitoring „was quite low“42, and was limited with 
cooperation with „only about 10“ NGOs. The experts of these independent funds 
stress the necessity of a wider and deeper involvement of NGOs in the implementation 
of the neighborhood processes. Also, 59% of the respondents were dissatisfied with the 
level of communication with the EU, and asked for more frequent and regular 
meetings of working groups, and for specific schemes of the involvement of civil 
society in the processes of neighborhood43. One of the problems noted by the majority 
of the respondents was the absence of the Government in the meetings and discussions 
                                                        
42Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation. Civil society and monitoring 
implementation of European Neighbourhood policy Action plan. Civil society Survey results. Tbilisi, 
2008,  p.3 http://www.epfound.ge/files/enp_survey_2.pdf 
43Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation. Civil society and monitoring 
implementation of European Neighbourhood policy Action plan. Civil society Survey results. Tbilisi, 
2008, p.8 
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organized by the civil society44. Rommens and Thiers (2009: 30, 31), who analyzed the 
development and implementation of the Georgian Action plan, noted that the 
inclusion of Georgian NGOs and civil society is lacking45. The experts of Anti-
corruption resource center (2008:5) also supported the research findings explaining that 
civil society is not sufficiently included in the European Neighbourhood Policy, while 
its the higher inclusion would prevent corrupt activities in the neighborhood process46. 
Civil society organizations encourage the European Commission to create more 
specific schemes and give better support in relations with national government. It is 
recognized that the establishment of relationship with the government usually depends 
on personal contacts47. However, the European Commission (2006) accents that their 
role, just like the EU's members role is „to promote“, but it cannot determine the 
agenda for civil society organizations48, which are independent from the government 
sector. The European Commission also stressed out that it refuses to openly and 
systematically engage into political struggles in other countries (Raik, 2006:21)49, while 
the independent civil society groups, which need external support, in most countries 
are defined as the opposition, and government hostile forces, and this creates a problem 
for everyone to sit down to the common table of negotiations. Kristi Raik emphasizes 
that in order to avoid accusations of political intervention, the EU has to act and 
support civil society through „international foundations and  NGOs“ (Raik, 2006:21)50. 
                                                        
44Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation., op. cit. P.9 
45Rommens T., Thiers R., Strengthening the ENP through regional civil society cooperation. CEU 
political science journal. Vol.4, No.1 p.28-48 February 2009, p.30 
46Anti-Corruption resource centre. Transparency International. Corruption and the European 
Neighbourhood policy. 2008, P.5  http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=161  Latest 
accessed on 06 08 2013 
47Open Society Georgia foundation, Eurasia Partnership foundation. Civil society and monitoring 
implementation of European Neighbourhood policy Action plan. Civil soiety Survey results. Tbilisi, 
2008, p.4 
48 Strengthening the civil society dimension of the ENP. COM (2006) 726 FINAL OF 4 December 2006.  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/non-paper_civil-society-dimension_en.pdf 
49 Kristi Raik. Promoting democracy  through Civil society: how to step up the EU’s policy towards the 
Eastern neighbourhood. CEPS working document. No.237/February 2006. P.21 
50 Kristi Raik. Promoting democracy  through Civil society: how to step up the EU’s policy towards the 
Eastern neighbourhood. CEPS working document. No.237/February 2006. P.21 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
176 
 
As the European Endowment for democracy was already created, a step towards this 
direction has been made.  
 
Multilateralism and regional networking 
As indicated in the first table, the European Union is actively promoting the 
„networking“ of civil society activities, participation in the multi-regional cooperation 
processes. The ENPI Strategy Paper emphasizes the importance of the promotion of 
civil society cooperation at the regional level, creating a relationship between the 
partners and the EU51. Regional cooperation is considered extremely important in 
establishing new contacts, sharing of the „good practices“, spreading the information 
and solving common regional problems (as a form of “effective multilateralism” 
underlined in the European security strategy (2003).  
Multilateral regional cooperation in the EU neighbourhood proceed in various 
levels, ranging from multilateral intergovernmental forums (Eastern Partnership four 
multilateral platforms and panels52), multilateral parliamentary assemblies (Euronest 
with the Eastern partnership countries), and, finally, in order to form working on 
lower level- common multilateral networks of civil society. In the Eastern 
neighbourhood currently there are two regional initiatives approved: Eastern 
partnership53, and Black Sea synergy54. Eastern Partnership multilateral dimension 
created four platforms and many more panels for intensive networking among various 
actors: supranational, governmental/diplomats, bureaucrats and civil society 
representatives. This institutional setting is very similar to the EU‘s internal 
institutional interactional model starting from the summit55, also having meetings of 
                                                        
51 European Neighbourhood and partnership instrument. Eastern regional programme. Strategy paper 
2007-2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rsp_en.pdf  p.18 
52Eastern Partnership Four Platforms are: Democracy, good governance and stability; economic 
integration and convergence with EU policies; Energy security; People to people contacts 
53 Eastern partnership, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/eastern/index_en.htm 
54 Black Sea synergy, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm 
55Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Praque Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 
7 May, 2009, Brussels, 7 May, 2009: 8435/09 ( Presse 78). European External Action Service,  
The Eastern partnership Warsaw Summit (29-30 September 2011) http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/ 
2011_eap_warsaw_summit_en.pdf 
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the various sectors of ministers, working committees and groups, parliamentary 
Assembly (Euronest) and also civil society representatives. This system creates the 
good conditions for the intensive socialization and networking, mutual learning 
process is taking place. As the Lithuanian diplomat noted one of the most important 
achievements between the Prague and Warsaw Easter Partnership summits was the 
establishment of these networks. “We now have a net. It’s time to catch a fish” the 
respondent highlighted, various institutional modes of interactions are working and 
now it’s time to get the concrete results of the projects (Interview, LT1).  
On the basis of the empirical research data, we could distinguish types of the 
intergovernmental, transgovernmental, inter-parliamentary and civil society 
networking. Political networking, which could be classified into the intergovernmental 
and inter-parliamentary networking, covers the development of the relations between 
the EU and Eastern neighbourhood partnership countries’ politicians (MPs, ministers, 
parliamentarians), who make decisions of the most strategic importance. The 
transgovernmental networking covers the EU institutions, the EU member states 
institutions and Eastern partners institutions‘ bureaucrats relations56, cooperation form 
when implementing the EU‘s political initiatives. The forum of the civil society of the 
EU‘s Eastern neighbourhood create the conditions for an active networking between 
the EU Eastern partnership countries‘ civil society‘s representatives, and the EU 
representatives. Eastern Partnership civil society Forum started to be invited into the 
working groups of the Eastern Partnership four platforms just recently57 (2012), and as 
the respondents underlined, this is a good opportunity for them to convince the 
European partners about the better EU policies or decisions towards their countries. 
 
                                                        
56Commission of the European Communities, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, meeting doc. 319/09, 
1.12.2009 http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/2009_eap_implementation_report_en.pdf ; Calendar of 
events in the framework of the Eastern partnership multilateral track in the 2nd half of 2011. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm 
57European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security 
policy. Joint Communication Delivering on new European Neighbourhood policy, Brussels, 15.5.2012 
JOIN (2012) 14 final 
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“Civil society organizations at the each of the meetings have two 
representatives and they are experts they work on these issues of the platforms 
and panels”. Interview, EaPCSF2.  
 
In the documents establishing these regional initiatives, as well as the ENP 
Strategy Paper the establishment and strengthening of human contacts is highlighted as 
one of the priority areas of cooperation, in this case, on a regional level, as well as civil 
society‘s organizations  presence in the regional forums. These aims are already in the 
process of implementation, and currently there are already Black sea synergyforum58, 
and Eastern Partnership forum59 created. Similar forums have already been created in 
the Euro-Mediterranean partnership context, too. As the diplomat of the European 
External Action service noted: 
 
“Networking among politicians, is and has been but, I think, in these 
processes the networking among the people is much more important. The 
European Union focus a lot of its attention on the civil society, if you noticed, 
all the regional cooperation, policy for the region is supported by the civil 
society forums. Of course, there are countries where we have problems with 
the co-operation with the civil society organizations. For instance, there was a 
student, a PhD student, who came to Brussels and then lost her placement at a 
local university, and such cases are known to be discouraging for the civil 
society to cooperate with us, but this is more the exceptional cases. Hence, a 
cooperation and it’s density depends on a country, the society and on a 
question/issue. What issues we can solve with the civil society”. Interview, 
European External Action Service, official, department of ENP coordination, 
cross-border cooperation, 14 10 2011, Brussels, EEAS5.  
 
 The main aim of the establishment of such forums is a greater integration of 
civil society in the process of implementation of mentioned initiatives. Forums bring 
together non-governmental organizations at regional level, annual conferences, sharing 
of best practices take place. It is aimed to solve common regional issues, common 
projects are developed, se well as contacts among the civil society organizations of the 
regional countries, EU institutions, and NGOs in the EU member states are developed. 
                                                        
58 Black Sea forum, http://www.blackseaforum.org/seminar_10_11july2007.html 
59 Eastern Partnership civil society forum, 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/civil_society_forum_2009_en.pdf 
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One of the aims of regional forums is to strengthen mutual relationships, as well as a 
dialogue with a government of their own country. NGOs, united in important forums, 
may influence them more.  
 
 „...once a year we meet about 200 civil society organizations each year 
to … discuss the issues, we work in different working groups, and civil society 
organizations in different countries working on similar issues without a Forum 
would have be difficult to meet and to know it. When they meet, they can 
share their experience, their tactics, they can group together make common 
statements to the government, and of course they have another way as they 
come from civil society Forum and they are supported by many organizations 
and are different in comparing with one civil society organization in one 
country”. Interview,EaPCSF2.  
 
The respondents also emphasized the importance of the EU’s financing in order 
to have all these meetings:  
 
“the secretariat was established and financed by the Commission, and 
the financing of the Forum meetings, so yes the contribution is important part 
of the work, because you can imagine they would not have the funds to come 
together and to meet their counterparts, and as well the work in working 
groups, travel and accommodation are quite expensive and they get the funding 
from the EU side which is quite helpful”. Interview,EaPCSF2.  
 
Therefore the European Commission and other EU’s institutions, the financing 
coming from the EU are essential for the existent of these regional forums.  
Speaking about the Eastern Partnership civil society forum the respondents 
highlighted the negative aspects as well:  
 
“I am really not satisfied with this Forum and I understand that every 
forum has still a bureaucratic procedure, we spend a lot of time on election 
process, we spent a lot of time on discussing formal things, what I would be 
happier to see is very concrete proposals…<>… where each of this working 
groups are discussing concrete objectives, problems in the field, what can be 
done…How we can find resources to be much more concrete in our relations 
and activities in this platform.Interview, EaPCSF1.  
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Therefore the respondents seek a stronger input of the civil society forum into 
the concrete agendas.  
What is more, regionalsynergyof different countries‘ civil societies empower 
them more not only in the relations with their governments, but also in negotiations 
with the EU60. The EU‘s institutions have become not just important partners but also 
supporters:  
 
“As soon as we would have some studies, outcomes the proves of the 
spread of high corruption or other field we would rather prefer to present our 
results to European Commission to get some protection as if it is virtual but is 
very important for us, and then spread message among public 
institutions.<>… because speaking about the issue of Moldova’s accession 
towards this lets say European vector is important, and our government take 
the thing seriously that are promoted by the EU institutions.” Interview, 
EaPCSF1. 
 
Therefore countries seeking the stronger integration with the EU (like 
Moldova) are sensitive to receive the negative EU‘s position and the support from the 
external actors, EU institutions is an important factor influencing the rise of the civil 
society‘s activeness in the international politics when speaking about the Eastern 
neighbourhood.  
NGOs belonging to forums join specific networks: environmental, human 
rights, children and women rights, business associations, etc. The EU institutions also 
participate in such forums: the Commission, the Parliament, the advisory EU 
institutions – Regions committee, and European economic and social committee. The 
processes of multilateral cooperation are named as regionalism, and regional 
institutionalization, i.e. regionalization (in case of the creation of common regional 
institutions, and not only the development of regional-multilateral projects). The 
system of civil society‘s regional networking is usually explained as a creation of 
regionalism „from the bottom“. Sandra Lavenex stated that networks, networking 
                                                        
60Rommens T., Thiers R., Strengthening the ENP through regional civil society cooperation. CEU 
political science journal. Vol.4, No.1February, 2009: 26-48 Budapest. p.35  
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creation are associated with the development of a decentralized control system and the 
empowerment of civil society‘s organizations  
 
„that do not necessarily exist in the ENP countries…<>... such policy 
networks are very much based on non-legal instruments such as processes of 
mutual learning and exchange of best practices, where influence relies on 
knowledge and expertise61“.  
 
Regional institutionalization is understood as a process of socialization, during 
which is aiming to establish common regional values and practices. Furthermore, it is 
accented that the regional cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood is initiated by the 
external actors. Fabrizio Tassinari identified this as a regionalism „from the outside“, 
and saw a threat that externally influenced regionalism (eg. regional initiatives of the 
EU) does not create the conditions for further self-regional cooperation (2005:16). For 
instance, the political, civil society forums – Eastern partnership forum was established 
by the European Commission initiative, Black Sea synergy forum – by the Romanian 
government initiative. Thus, were formed not by the civil society organizations 
initiatives, but were „dropped“ from national and supranational actors, i.e. „from the 
above“ in order to accumulate the regional cooperation processes. In this context, it is 
not entirely correct to classify the civil society regional cooperation activities, 
happening in the Eastern neighbourhood, as the regionalism „from the bottom“, as 
these projects and initiatives were initiated „from above“. The European Commission 
(2009), understanding all these aspects, in the concept paper of the Eastern partnership 
forum establishment accented that in the future the Commission‘s role in the 
coordination of the forum‘s activities has to decline to the least possible62, in order that 
all the responsibility and initiative would be in the hands of civil society. 
                                                        
61Lavenex Sandra, A governance perspective on the European Neighbourhood policy: integration 
beyond conditionality? The Study of the European Neighbourhood policy: methodological, theoretical 
and empirical challenges, University of Nottingham, 25-26, October, 2007. p.10 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_icmcr/Docs/Lavenex.pdf Latest accessed on 06 08 2013. 
62Eastern partnership civil society forum, Concept paper, 2009, P.6 
http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/civil_society/docs/concept_en.pdf Latest accessed on 06 08 2013. 
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While evaluating the success of the regional and sub-regional cooperation, the 
following criteria were established: establishment of the civil society and human 
contacts (the quantity of the important contacts); events, uniting partners of different 
countries, amount; new establishment and constancy of the cross-border cooperation 
initiatives by the civil society; common actions of the civil society organizations63.  
 
The weakness and the potential of the post-soviet civil society  
The scientists and other experts agree that civil society in post soviet states 
continue to be very week (M.Simecka, 2009; K.Raik, 2006). As the member of the 
European Parliament noted:  
 
“Problematic situation, as I had to monitor the functioning of some non-
governmental organizations and one can clearly see that, on the one hand, some 
of them are genuine, but there is a part that is a sinecure where political leaders 
dive straight from politics into NGOs, and have a privileged position and their 
offices look more impressive than that of the former Soros Open Society 
premises. There are very privileged ones, which are clearly favorite ones of the 
local politicians, and so we are seeing some imitation or simulation.“ 
Interview,European Parliament, member of the EP, Committee of Human 
rights, 12 10 2011, Brussels, EP3.  
 
The research also shows the very small trust in the NGO sector. As e.g. 
according to the research “…trust in NGOs is quite low in Armenia (only 5% fully 
trust), Azerbaijan (7% fully trust) and Georgia (4% fully trust64)”. The representatives 
of the Eastern Partnership civil society forum agreed this is a problem which is also 
sometimes undermining the decision-making of the Forum as well:  
 
“Well of course the issue of gang is an issue common in this area. We 
even discussed this issue in the steering committee meetings, and we had the 
cases when the leaders in national platforms of some civil society organizations 
                                                        
63ENPI Eastern regional indicative programme 2007-2010, p.14 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_eastern_rip_en.pdfLatest accessed on 06 08 2013. 
64 The research was conducted in 2011 by CRRC. Gorgulu Aybars, Krikorian Onnik, Turkey’s South 
Caucasus Agenda: the role of state and non-state actors, Imak Ofset Basim Yayin San., 2012: p.7 
http://www.epfound.org/files/southcaucasusagenda24_07_12web.pdf Latest accessed on 14 07 2013  
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
183 
 
had an evidence of that, but since there is no very clear condition what would 
be gang, and there is no official definition and we don’t know rules to separate 
these gangs from the non governmental NGOs. It is not easy to do this 
separation.  And of course when you have to take a decision at the level of 
national platforms these gangs would reward report… And it is very difficult to 
make a decision at the whole platform. But it is also the way we have to go 
through if we want to grow into a democratic country.” Interview,EaPCSF1.  
 
As the respondent noted sometimes this problematic issue might hinder the 
effectiveness of the cooperation and the outcomes. According to the respondents, 
today the specific attention is made for the development of civil society. The EU is 
financing the projects for the strengthening of the civil society activities and their 
professional development.  
 
“The structures are developing, Now, for example, we are involved in 
two projects of strengthening the abilities of civil society organizations, that 
organizations would become more professional by making applications and 
things like this”. Interview,EaPCSF2.  
 
The consolidation of the post-soviet civil society capacities and building of 
professionalism were defined by the respondents as the core objects in order to have 
better role, and provide concrete proposals in the public policies field for both sides: 
government and EU’s institutions. On the other hand the respondent also highlighted 
the potential of future leaderships of these countries as a birth, outcome of current 
regional socialization and mutual learning processes. 
 
“It is an essential thing, and we can see if the civil society projects 
succeed in some extent. Then, one can simply talk about an alternative 
leadership in those countries. If, rather than reproducing itself or giving a birth 
to the alike-themselves leaders of the country's political life, would have a 
chance to finally have other leaders who would have come from the civil sector, 
from the disento and unlike thinking, social criticism dimensions, from 
politicaly free academic level,  it would be a  chance,  undoubtedly”. 
Interview,European Parliament, member of the EP, Committee of Human 
rights, 12 10 2011, Brussels, EP3. 
 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
184 
 
Therefore potentially the intensive EU‘s partnership with the civil society 
organizations, regional networking and innovative international partnerships might 
bring the institutional changes into the EU‘s closest external environment-
neighbourhood. While now many problems are highlighted. In some countries the 
problems are raised by the ethno-political conflicts, resulting in fragmentation of civil 
society in the country (N.Tocci, 2007, 2008). While, in the other countries the civil 
society isolation and political participation problems are raised by the political regime. 
Today it is agreed that the strengthening and consolidation of civil society are 
important not just for civil activeness and political participation but, also, in giving the 
important role for civil society in the negotiations for the solution of international 
decisions and the building of the new generation of innovative international 
partnerships.  
 
Conclusions 
The EU in the relations with the Eastern Partnership countries forms an 
institutional structure, which creates opportunities for the constantly intensifying 
interactions and networking among the EU supranational, national (member-states), 
and neighbourhood countries‘ representatives in different levels. Two modes of 
neighbourhood policy governance- bilateral and multilateral- were examined in the 
article. As speaking about the bilateral mode of the governance and the negotiations for 
the Association Agenda the role of civil society is very minimal in the process. The 
respondents emphasized that they are not receiving the information what is negotiated 
for and cannot contribute to this process. On the other hand respondent agreed they 
are consulted by the EU delegations in their countries when the monitoring and 
evaluation of the policy implementation is made.  
The multilateral mode of the ENP governance is promoted within regional, 
multilateral networking. The networking is being created not only among political 
players, but also among societies, because the regional cooperation is supported by 
forums of civil society that are funded and organized by the EU institutions. In this 
way the cooperation of civil society organizations, and the networking with each 
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other, and with the EU are promoted. In this case, intensive relations with the 
neighbouring countries' civil society representatives are built, and, according to the 
empirical research data, it is aimed to convince the neighbourhood countries‘ electorate 
that stronger association and integration to the EU are one of their nations ways to 
choose. Civil society organizations make the networking of the regional civil society 
representatives in the Eastern Partnership Civil society Forum, but also they started to 
take part in the Eastern Partnership four platforms where they have the possibility to 
convince European partners- supranational and EU member states- about the better 
decisions and choices for their country. The EU funding for such a kind of meetings is 
essential in order to have the civil society organizations present in the forums. Other 
problematic issue underlined by the respondents is the weakness of the civil society 
organizations, the issue of so called ‘gang’ who simulate the NGO, the privileged ones 
by the regimes but since there are no rules and procedures to dismiss them from this 
common governance process they are the ones who undermine the effectiveness of the 
regional cooperation. 
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Abstract 
The global financial crisis which affects extensively the Eurozone and especially the 
countries of the European periphery, is accompanied by austerity measures and 
expenditure restraint especially in the areas of Health Care and Social Security policies. 
Undoubtedly, in countries that are under financial supervision by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the fiscal adjustment measures focus primarily on reducing the 
services of the welfare state. From 2010 onwards the policies applied to Greece in order 
to face the financial crisis affect the middle economic groups and mainly the vulnerable 
social and economic groups. On the public spending cuts perspective, the benefits of 
the welfare state faced a dramatic reduce without increase in the effectiveness of social 
security services. Spending on health care, tackling unemployment policies and social 
insurance services have undergone a dramatic decline in a period less than three years. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the welfare state and the welfare culture 
more generally can become viable without dramatically reducing the minimal but 
important social role associated with the different welfare models. In this prism, policy 
makers should find alternatives to finance the need for social spending and reduce the 
cuts as they create huge social problems. One factor that may contribute to the future 
economic sustainability of the Greek welfare state is the expansion of the use of 
renewable energy resources, the profits from which can be used to support the social 
expenditure financing. It is well known that it will take several years to achieve this 
goal but this solution seems to be a viable alternative that will offer “life” and hope to 
the Greek welfare state and, respectively, to Greek society.  
 
Keywords: welfare culture, health policies, financial crisis, public policies, citizenship, 
renewable energy resources. 
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Introduction 
According to specific theories about the role of culture in social policies, there 
is a strong belief that culture is a dependent variable in their assessment (Jo, 2011; 
Marshall, 1972, van Oorschot, 2000). But, although recent developments of cultural 
analysis of welfare have been conducted (Pfau-Effinger, 2004; van Oorschot, 2006) 
there is still a lack of analysis and data collection about the effect of culture on social 
policies. “Culture” can be defined as the “system of collective constuctions of meaning 
by which human beings define reality” (Neidhard et al., 1986: 11), and when it is 
interrelated with social policies it can be named as “welfare culture” (Pfau-Effinger, 
2005: 4). There are two different notions (sub-meanings) of analyising and exploring 
the paths of this term. More specifically, the first notion includes “the whole complex 
of values, institutional traditions and institutional practices of welfare states”(Pfau-
Effinger, 2005: 4). The second aims at analysing the ideas related to the welfare state 
policies (Pfau-Effinger, 2005; Hinrichs, 1997; Kaufmann, 1991; Offe, 1987, 1990).    
The aim of this paper is to analyse the case of the Greek welfare culture, 
according to the second notion of the idea of welfare culture, in order to explore the 
inefficiencies of the Greek welfare system and propose possible ways of creating a 
sustainable welfare culture and state. The Greek financial crisis has imposed the 
necessity of implementing reforms in order to create a more efficient welfare state. 
This pressure affected the society and because of the existence of specific ideas which 
facilitate the development of a passive welfare state, created huge conflicts against the 
government. It is true though, that reforming the welfare state is essential but it can 
only be achieved if the ideas of the society will adjust to this new reality. Based on 
these principles, the analysis will be conducted according to the notion of the welfare 
culture which refers to the stock of knowledge, values and ideas related to the social 
actors, the institutions of the welfare state and the implementing welfare policies (Pfau-
Effinger, 2005) aiming at proposing solutions of the creation of a new viable, effective 
and socially fair welfare state.  
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Welfare State in Greece: Policies, Culture, Inefficiencies 
Due to the similarities that South European welfare states reveal, the academic 
debate related to the existence or not of a south European welfare state model which 
contains the Greek welfare state, has been recently intensified (Castles, 1995; Liebfried, 
1993). In this context and in contrast to most of the North and West European welfare 
states, Greek welfare state deferred to develop and acquire a complete form due to 
various historical factors such as the dictatorship of the period 1967-1974 (Castles, 
1995; Rhodes, 2009). Its rapid growth during the 1980s, when National Health System 
and general welfare policies were established (minimum pension for all citizens, social 
benefits, etc.), contributed to the creation of an integrated institutional framework of 
social solidarity and welfare but it had not resolved specific issues that proved decisive 
in the emergence of intrinsic malfunctions. The welfare culture that was developed 
during this period included values such as solidarity and social justice. On the other 
hand, partisanship and clientalism led to huge waste of public funds. Several of the 
current dysfunctions of the Greek welfare state originated from the existence of 
cliental relations and the perception of the large public sector maintenance as a solution 
for labor rehabilitation. This concept of stateness developed after the restoration of 
democracy in 1974 and expanded during the 1980s when public sector was inflated and 
extensive welfare state was created. In some of the Mediterranean European states that 
reveal similarities (Spain, Portugal, Greece) and mostly in Greece, the socialist party 
which assumed governance in the 1980sfailedto over turn the paternalistic 
characteristics in the developing welfare state. Furthermore, due to the existence of 
strong leftist unions and maximalist party apparatuses, socialist parties like PASOK 
(Panhellenic Socialistic Movement) in Greece, quickly implemented policies of a 
“modernizing and sometimes self-promoting and corrupt bourgeoisie” (Rhodes, 2009: 10).   
According to Ferrera (1996),Southern European welfare states, including Greek, 
are facing corruption, clientalisman partisanship, having a serious negative impact on 
public funds which in equally benefit specific privileged groups. This problems 
characterised as "the welfare syndrome". 
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Family has a very strong role in southern European societies and especially in 
Greece, compared to west and north Europe (Ferrera, 1996). Due to the importance of 
family in Greece, the welfare state adapted to this situation by creating a strong 
institutional framework of labor protection and extensive benefits as an attempt to 
confront breadwinner fathers’ unemployment (Jo, 2011: 16). Moreover, family is still 
an institution which supports its vulnerable members, providing rudimental 
redistribution by "filling specific welfare protection gaps" (Rhodes, 2009: 10).  
Benefits and services provided by welfare state during the 1980shad solved 
several social problems and became an important redistribution measure. However, the 
main issue was the existence of excessive and in several cases in effective financing of its 
services and benefits. Therefore, the only viable solution since the creation of the 
Greek welfare state its reform in order to become effective and sustainable, while 
finding alternative funding resources. Since 1990, several reforms failed due to 
corporatist interests and clientalism. As a result, welfare benefits were not socially fair 
but they were applied because of the pressure from specific interests (Matsaganis, 2011). 
The absence of social dialogue between social partners who rarely showed convergence 
intention was an important element of the Greek system which can be characterized as 
reform resistant (Lavdas, 1997) with limited reform capacity (Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou, 2008) acting as a deterrent for any serious welfare state reform. 
Therefore, while the creation of the National Health System was highly 
ambitious, its implementation faced tremendous problems. More specifically, even 
though Greece has more than two hundred Health Care Centers, their practical 
contribution is dramatically inadequate as they are underfunded and understaffed. In 
addition, the continuous depreciation and underfunding of public health system 
degrades the quality of primary health care services and strengthens private initiatives 
in health sector (Sbarouni et al., 2012). This depreciation has negative impact on the 
economically disadvantaged social groups who are not able to pay for their health care 
in private health care facilities  and lack equal health protection opportunities, which is 
one of the most important principles of the public health system.  
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All the stated factors contributed to the creation of a dysfunctional public 
sector and welfare state. The culture which was created, facilitated statism, stateness, 
clientalism and the influence of specific trade union and party interests in every 
reformative attempt. Working in the public sector was the main concern of the 
majority of citizens. The welfare system provided unequal attribution of benefits with 
limited social and economic criteria and did not take into account the new conditions 
such as the increasing life expectancy. Consequently, it became ineffective in solving 
the huge social problems and wasteful (Tzagkarakis and Kamekis, 2013). These factors 
accentuated the necessity of reforming the welfare state services. The financial and 
fiscal crisis since 2009has intensified social problems due to the implementation of 
austerity measures but it also imperatively raised the need to find alternatives for 
funding and reforming the welfare state. 
 
The impact of financial and fiscal crisis on welfare state 
The financial and fiscal crisis in Greece, which was a result of external and 
internal factors65, has a tremendous impact on the society due to the imposed austerity 
measures from the Troika (International Monetary Fund, European Commission, 
European Central Bank). These include huge budget cuts on public spending and in 
several occasions, horizontal cuts on social benefits. The main aim of austerity 
measures in the welfare state was to reduce public spending but also to retain a 
significant level of quality and effectiveness of welfare services. Unfortunately, this 
attempt had negative impact on the society mainly because welfare state was not yet 
able to implement reforms effectively. More specifically, rates of youth and general 
unemployment have dramatically increased and Greeceis currently display in the 
highest unemployment rates in the European Union66, and the number of people who 
                                                        
65 Internal factors are the intrinsic weaknesses of the Greek economic model and its huge public dept and 
external are the role and the pressures form international markets on national and supranational 
institutions especially after the collapse of a number of specialized lending institutions in the USA 
(Matsaganis, 2011). 
66 According to Eurostat (2013) the percentage of general unemployment in Greece is 27,1% (the highest 
in the EU) and the percentage of youth unemployment is 59,1% (the highest in the EU). 
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fall in to vulnerable groups shows an increasing ratio67. It is not worthy, that according 
to Eurostat (2012) the percentage of citizens towards the risk of poverty is one of the 
highest in the European Union (31% of the total population). 
The financial problems which citizens face in Greece, due to the ongoing 
depression, have a negative impact on trusting government, parties and welfare state 
services. The dramatical increase in social vulnerability rates and the high 
ineffectiveness of the welfare state services are two significant consequences of 
horizontal cuts in welfare benefits and services (Kotroyannos et al., 2013). 
The implementing measures aim at changing the existing misconception on the 
form of the state (clientalism, stateness) and led to the emergence of extremist political 
views and behaviours based on populism and on the promise to maintain the status 
quoin the public sector and the state welfare. It should also be noted that due to the 
existing inefficiency and failure of the welfare state, the limitation of services and 
benefit sex acerbated social and economic problems and led several citizens to social 
marginalization and to the adoption of extreme political behaviours. 
Therefore, there is a necessity to develop a complete reformative strategy of the 
welfare state in order to become less expensive and more efficient. This reform 
requiresnon-interference from the unions and acceptance of the perception of the 
creation of an active and “selective”68 welfare state which can respond to current 
economic conditions. 
 
Conclusion-Policy Proposals 
Undoubtedly, financial crisis has negative impact especially on vulnerable social 
groups, however, it can become a trigger for radical changes in welfare state and public 
                                                        
67 The group of NEETs, young people 15 to 24 years old who are not in Education, Employment or 
Training, is an example of a social vulnerable group that its percentage is increasing. According to 
Eurofound (2012) the percentage of NEETs in Greece is one of the highest in the EU (17,4%). 
68 The term “selective” refers to the selectivity of cases that need provision from the welfare state in the 
context of social solidarity and not to an unequal and socially unfair selection. By implementing this 
type of “selectivity” welfare state will be more effective and flexible in reducing social inequalities while 
spending less public funds. It is required for the Greek welfare state, in order to survive during the 
current economic conditions, to transit from a passive and universal form to a more selective, active and 
flexible.   
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sector to the benefit of society. These reforms should firstly aim at changing society’s 
attitude towards specific social issues, such as the role of the public sector, and secondly 
at implementing the required reforms which will benefit the society, during the 
current economic situation. Political initiative, regardless of political cost, and 
acceptance of the concept of creating a completely new model of the welfare state is 
required in order to achieve these goals. 
A key reform objective is the transition from passive welfare state, that 
separates the economy from society, to active, which will respond to the new 
economic conditions and will cut spending while offer provisions where they are most 
necessary. According to Rosanvallon (1995), this transition can be performed either 
through the subordination of society  to market (neoliberal perception)or through the 
creation of an intermediate economic space. This includes the adoption of programs to 
resolve the key issues that have been created. Specific examples of these policies are: to 
facilitate the entry of young people into the labor market as a measure to decrease 
youth unemployment, to adopt programs that will re-educate and retrain those 
excluded from the labor market to subjects related to the needs of the labor market, to 
recruit unskilled workers and provide them with training in order to obtain a 
specialization that will benefit the finding a future job, to protect and encourage long-
term unemployed to re-enter the labor market. 
All these measure scan not succeed unless a long-term, of at least ten years, 
educational policy planning that puts education and training before the needs of the 
labor market, it is created. The mentioned policies can be characterized as "selective" 
because they aim at the protection of specific social groups which are facing serious 
economic problems and provide their members with the necessary incentives and 
guarantees for integration in employment, which is the main socioeconomic problem 
in the whole European Union. 
Citizenship is a very important concept which has contributed to the proper 
functioning of society and its mechanisms in several countries, especially in Western 
Europe. In Greece this culture is not wide spread as there is a perception that 
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government agencies are solely responsible for the proper functioning and efficiency of 
social services. Moreover, the sense of responsibility and citizen participation for the 
common good is still limited. 
Citizenship, voluntarism and participation are fostered in early social life from 
the education system. This is the mechanism that can create piece by piece the culture 
of belonging and offering to society. However, the Greekeducation system involves 
minimum citizenship education and does not develop the attitude of participation and 
offering to the society. The development of citizenship culture, mainly from education 
system and NGO’s, will certainly made more convenient the successful transition from 
a passive form of welfare state and culture to active by generating a participatory, 
contributory and provisional civil society. 
The Greek welfare culture will change if it overcome certain perceptions that 
hinder the development of a modern and sustainable welfare state. In addition to 
welfare services reform and the development of participatory and contributionary 
culture to the society, the problem of financing services will remain unless further 
innovative policies be implemented. One of these could be the use of public 
investments as a vehicle to promote employment and economic welfare. But public 
investment scan fulfil this purpose only if applied correctly and in specific sectors such 
as renewable energy resources, without hampering private investment. The fact is that, 
by exploiting its natural wealth, Greece can enhance its welfare state. 
In this direction, a legislative framework that allows the state to impose taxes 
on the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions can be implemented (Buchs, Duwe, Bardsley, 
2009) and aportion of the revenue for this tax to finance the welfare state, either 
directly or indirectly, through redistributive measures such the reduction of electricity 
cost for low income households. 
Furthermore, Greece has natural resources (sun, wind, waves, hydrocarbons) 
which if it can properly manage them, through exploitation of renewable energy 
sources infrastructure supported by public investments, without elimination of private 
investments in this sector, will raise revenue that can be used to support social funding. 
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Additionally, such a policy will open new “green” job vacancies that will reduce 
unemployment and alleviate the economic pressures to welfare state.  
The political initiative and willingness of the entire range of democratic forces is 
required in order to achieve effective utilization of renewable energy resources for the 
benefit of citizens. The continuation of radicalism and unwillingness by some radical 
left-wing and populist parties, which base their existence in implacability and 
populism, hinders any attempt for reform. Moreover, the increasing left radicalism 
feeds extremism and strengthens the opposite extremity of the right (nationalists, 
neonazists)69. This political context has generated polarization and does not contribute 
in raising serious alternatives for the “survival” of welfare state. 
All these proposals aim at the creation of a new model of welfare culture in 
Greece in which welfare state will be flexible and intervene where it is most needed, 
will be able to perform any reforms are necessary in order to save resources, will create 
a new culture of participation and contribution to the community, will promote 
transparency, reduce clientalisman dexploit the natural wealth of the country for the 
benefit of the society while respecting the principles of environmental protection. 
Clearly, all these suggestions cannot be implemented immediately. In order these 
objectives to be successful, long-term, coordinated and scientifically documented policy 
design, that will provide economic rationalization, effectiveness and solidarity to 
welfare state and the principles of citizenship to civil society, is required. 
 
References 
1. Buchs, M., Duwe, S., Bardsley, N. (2009), Green ways of financing the welfare state?, 
University of Southampton, 
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/71210/1/Panel_8_Buchs_Duwe_Bardsley.pdf, (accessed: July 
2013),   
2. Castles, F. G. (1995), ‘Welfare state development in Southern Europe’, West European 
Politics, 18:2, 291-313. 
3. Eurofound, (2012), NEETs – Young people not in employment, education or training: 
Characteristics, costs and policy responses in Europe, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg. 
                                                        
69 The neonazist, nationalist party “Golden Dawn” received 6,92% and elected 18 representatives in 2012 
national elections. Recent public opinion polls estimate that its percentage will increase in a case of 
elections.  
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
202 
 
4. Eurostat, (2012), Poverty and Social Exclusion in the EU27, Eurostat News Release, 
171/2012, 3 December 2012. 
5. Eurostat, (2013), Euro Indicators-Unemployment, Eurostat News Release, 70/2013, 30 
April 2013. 
6. Featherstone, K. and Papadimitriou, D. (2008), The Limits of Europeanization: Reform 
Capacity and Policy Conflict in Greece. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
7. Ferrera, M. (1996): ‘The “Southern Model” of Welfare in Social Europe’, Journal of 
European Social Policy 6/1, 17–37. 
8. Hinrichs, K. (1997), ‘Social insurances and the culture of solidarity: the moral infrastructure 
of interpersonal redistributions-with special reference to the German health care system’, 
ZeS-Arbeitspapier 3. 
9. Jo, K. N. (2011), ‘Between the cultural foundations of welfare and welfare attitudes: The 
possibility of an in-between level conception of culture for the cultural analysis of welfare’, 
Journal of European Social Policy 21:5.  
10. Kaufmann, F. X. (1991), ‘Wohlfahrtskultur-Ein neues Nasobem?’, in Nippert R. P. (ed.), 
Kritik und Engagement. Sociologie als Anwendungswissenschaft, Munich: Oldenburg.  
11. Kotroyannos, D., Lavdas, K. A., Tzagkarakis, S., Kamekis, K., Chourdakis, M., (2013), 
‘Solidarity and the Welfare State in Greece’, GSTF International Journal of Law and Social 
Science, 2 (2): 7-11. 
12. Lavdas, K. A. (1997), The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of 
Integration. London: Macmillan. 
13. Leibfried, S. (1993), ‘Towards a European Welfare State? On Integrating Poverty Regimes 
into the European Community’, in C. Jones (ed.), New Perspectives on the Welfare State in 
Europe, London: Routledge. 
14. Marshall, T. H. (1972), ‘Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism’, Journal of Social Policy 1 
(1): 15-32. 
15. Neidhard, F., Lepsius, R. M., Weiss, J. (eds.) (1986), Kultur und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft 27 
der Kolner Zeitschrift fur Sciologie und Sozialpsychologie, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.  
16. Matsaganis, M. (2011), ‘The Welfare State and the Crisis: The Case of Greece’, Journal of 
European Social Policy 21: 501. 
17. Offe, C. (1987), ‘Democracy against the welfare state? Structural foundations of 
neoconservative political opportunities’, Political Theory 15: 501-537. 
18. Offe, C. (1990), ‘Akzeptanz und Legitimitat strategischer Optionen in der Scozialpolitik’, 
in Sachβe C. and Engelhardt T. H. (eds.), Sicherheit und Freiheit. Zur Ethik des 
Wohlfartsstaates, Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp. 
19. Pfau-Effinger, B. (2004), ‘Culture and path Dependency of Welfare State Development’, 
Paper presented at the ESPAnet Conference 2004 (September 2004, University of Oxford). 
Available at: www. Spsw.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/static/Espanet/espanetconference/papers/ 
ppr%5B1%5D.5.BP.pdf (accessed: July 2013). 
20. Pfau-Effinger, B. (2005), ‘Culture and Welfare State Policies: Reflections on a Complex 
Interrelation’, Journal of Social Policy 34 (1): 3-20. 
21. Rhodes, M. (1996), ‘Southern European Welfare States: Identity, Problems and Prospects 
for Reform’, South European Society and Politics, 1:3, 1-22.  
22. Rosanvallon, P., (1995), La nouvelle question sociale. Repenser l'État-providence, Le Seuil. 
23. Sbarouni, V., Tsimtsiou, Z., Symvoulakis, E., Kamekis, A., Petelos, E., Saridaki, A., 
Papadakis, N., Lionis, C. (2012), ‘Perceptions of primary care professionals on quality of 
services in rural Greece: A qualitative study’, Rural and Remote Health 12: 2156.  
24. Tzagkarakis, S., Kamekis, A. (2013), The Impact of Economic Recession in Greece on 
Welfare Rights, 6th Biennial PhD Symposium on Contemporary Greece & Cyprus, 
London School of Economics, http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/ 
hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Events/2013_PhD_Symposium/Papers%20for%20webs
ite/Tzagkarakis%20Stylianos%20-%20Kamekis%20Apostolos.pdf, (accessed: July 2013). 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
203 
 
25. van Oorschot, W. (2000), ‘Who Should Get What, and Why? On Deservingness Criteria 
and the Conditionality of Solidarity Among the Public’, Policy and Politics 28 (1): 33-48. 
26. van Oorschot, W. (2006), ‘Making the Difference in Social Europe: Deservingness 
Perceptions among Citizens of European Welfare States’, Journal of European Social Policy 
16 (1): 23-42. 
 
 
About the Authors 
Dimitrios Kotroyannos is Professor of Political Philosophy at the 
Department of Political Science of University of Crete and Director of 
Centre for Human Rights of the Department of Political Science of 
University of Crete. He has studied Political Science and Political 
Philosophy at the Political Department of Law School of the University 
of Athens and at University of Strasbourg (D.E.A. (Études Politiques 
Approfondies), Université de Strasbourg III (Robert Schuman). Doctoral 
Thesis: La Raison d’ État chez Hobbes et Spinoza.He has been Dean of 
Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Crete, Head of the 
Department of Political Science of the University of Crete, Member of 
the Senate of the University of Crete, Member of the board of the 
Postgraduate Program in Bioethics of the Department of Philosophy and 
Social Sciences of the University of Crete, Member of the board of the 
Postgraduate Program in “History and Social Theory” of the Department 
of History and Archaeology of the University of Crete, Member of the 
Strategic Planning and Development Committee of the University of 
Crete, Alternate member of the board of the Institution of Historical and 
Social Research “Spyros Kallergis”.  
Books and other publications: Most significant publications are: The 
Problem of Self-Imposed Servitude in Étienne de La Boétie.Athens, Kritiki 
(in Greek), History of Social Sciences (Scientifically responsible and author 
in cooperation with Gregoropoulou B. Givalos M. and Maniatis G.), 
“Natural Law and Human Rights”, Social Sciences Review, v. 75, p. 46-88. 
(in Greek), “L. Strauss: A problematic approach of reconstructing Natural 
Law”, Aksiologika, v. 1, p. 183-199. (in Greek), “History and political 
reason in Hobbes and Spinoza”, Aksiologika, v. 2, p. 126-191. (in Greek), 
“Montaigne and the philosophical tradition”, Aksiologika, v. 5, p. 115-144. 
(in Greek), “Montesquieu and history”, Aksiologika, v. 11-12, p. 269-291. 
(in Greek), “Descartes: the New Ethics”, in Faraklas George and 
Prelorentzos John (ed.), Politics of Rationalism, Athens, Exadas, p. 73-93. 
(in Greek), “The Concept of Myth in Sorel” (with Aheimastos M. And 
Theotokas N.), in Noutsos P., (ed.), And Now What? The Future of the 
Socialist Idea in 21st Century, Alternative Publications, Athens, p. 172-188. 
(in Greek), “Le Libéralisme de Léo Strauss”, Pouvoirs, No 91, σ. 183-194, 
“Human Rights and Social Justice”, in Noutsos P., (ed.), Power 
andSocieties in “post-bipolar” Era,  University of Ioannina, Philosophy 
Sector, Athens, p. 97- 100 (in Greek), “The concept of popular dominance 
in Spinoza”, Aksiologika, special edition 2,  p. 113- 124 (in Greek), 
“University in the Era of Post-Modernity”, Panepisthmio, v. 5, p. 61- 71 
(in Greek), “The art of politics in LeoStrauss”, Tetradia Politikis Episthmis, 
v. 1, Fall 2002, p. 143- 175 (in Greek), “University Politics and the stake 
of quality” (with Papadakis N. ), in Papadakis N. (ed.), State, Society, 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
204 
 
Market and Politics in Education, Athens, Savvalas publications, p. 186-
201 (in Greek), “Higher Education Politics in the New Economy. 
Development and quality in the New University” (with Papadakis N.), in 
Gravaris D. & Papadakis N. (ed.), Education and Educational Policy 
between State and Market, Athens, Savvalas publications, 2004, p. 229- 249 
(in Greek), “Solidarity and Welfare State in Greece” (with Lavdas, K. A. 
Tzagkarakis, S. Kamekis, A. Chourdakis, M.), GSTF International Journal 
of Law and Social Sciences (JLSS), Volume 2, Number 2. 
 
 
 
Apostolos Kamekis is Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Medicine at 
the University of Crete with a thesis on: “Prescribing in Primary Health 
Care in selected countries of southern Europe: Design and evaluation of pilot 
interventions to upgrate the circumstances in a European research program”. 
He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of Crete (2007) 
and a MA in Political Analysis and Political Theory (2009). He has 
participated in international conferences in Greece and E.U. countries 
and has published on European Politics, Immigration, Political Parties, 
Public Policies, Educational Policy, Lifelong Learning and Health 
Policies. He is Researcher of the Centre for Human Rights of the 
Department of Political Science of the University of Crete and in the 
Department of Social Medicine and Primary Health Care of School of 
Medicine of University of Crete . 
 
 
Stylianos Ioannis Tzagkarakis is Ph.D. Candidate of the Department of 
Political Science of University of Crete. He holds a BA in Political 
Science from the University of Crete (2008) and a MA in Political 
Analysis and Political Theory (2010). He has participated in international 
conferences in Greece and Europe and has published on Political Parties, 
Immigration, Social Policy and European Politics. Recent papers: 
“Solidarity and Welfare State in Greece” (with Kotroyannos, D. Lavdas, 
K. A. Kamekis, A. Chourdakis, M.), GSTF International Journal of Law 
and Social Sciences (JLSS), Volume 2, Number 2,  “The Impact of 
Economic Recession in Greece on Welfare Rights”, 6th Biennial PhD 
Symposium on Contemporary Greece & Cyprus, London School of 
Economics.He is researcher of the Centre for Human Rights and of the 
Centre for Political Research and Documentation of the Department of 
Political Science of the University of Crete and has participated in 
research projects about social vulnerability and social policy.   
 
 
Marinos Chourdakis is Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of 
PoliticalScience at University of Crete. His doctoral thesis is “Educational 
Policy, Lifelong Learning and Employability: European Framework and the 
case of Greece”. He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of 
Crete (2006) and a MA in Political Analysis and Political Theory (2009). 
His main research interests focus on European and Public Policies in 
Higher Education Policy, Lifelong Learning, Employment and Training. 
He has also participated in summer schools and international conferences 
and has publications in Educational Policy and Political Parties. He is 
member of CHR (Centre for Human Rights) and CPRD (Centre for 
Policy Research and Documentation). He has also cooperated as 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
205 
 
researcher with NCPAL (National Centre for Public Administration and 
Local Government) for study of “Educational Needs of Public Officials” 
(2009) and SSF (State Scholarships Foundation  in research project of 
“Impact Assessment of Lifelong Learning Programs” (2009). He is also 
member of research team for the study about “Neets (People who are - 
Not in Education, Employment or Training) in Greece” (2011). 
 
 
  
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
206 
 
  
 
 
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
207 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Attitudes and Mentalities  
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
208 
 
 
 
  
 
Eastern European Political Cultures. Modeling Studies 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
209 
 
 
 
Patterns of Paradigmatic Preferences and Tendencies in the 
Political Culture Studies of the  
Eastern European Political Phenomena 
 
 
 
Camelia Florela Voinea 
University of Bucharest 
Romania 
 
 
 
During the past decade, the Political Culture studies have shown a strong 
interest for the transition to democracy and democratic consolidation political 
phenomena in the newly appeared Eastern European democracies. Another area of 
high interest seems to be the study of the impact of recent (communist and post-
communist) history on the current political unfolding in the domestic politics of the 
Eastern European ex-communist countries.  
The idea of this chapter was to look for the particularities of the Eastern 
European Political Culture research, for its relevant ideas, theories and authors and, 
least but not last, to identify schools of thought on political culture which are 
currently influencing the political science research. The reason is that the “look from 
inside” provided by this volume might offer different perspectives and different 
explanations over the Eastern European political phenomena after 1989 and about 
major political change, in general. This chapter has intensively used two sources which 
provided insight in this subject: the ECPAM Conference Series and the EQPAM 
journal. These two sources mirror the latest developments in political culture research 
in the Eastern European countries after 2010. The authors, also members of the EPAM 
Research Group, have been concentrating in these papers on political culture studies, 
from either analytical or computational perspectives. The analysis of the patterns of 
paradigmatic preferences and tendencies should show if there is any convergence or 
shared areas of interest among independently developed research programs.There have 
been identified two fundamental areas of research: (1) theoretical and empirical 
research, and (2) computational modeling and simulation.  
Theoretical fundamental research addresses the domains of: political science and 
political sociology, political philosophy and philosophy of culture, psychology and 
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social-psychology, anthropology. An important characteristics is that the fundamental 
researches are developed as interdisciplinary approaches. 
Computational modeling and simulation research addresses the domains of 
philosophy of science, complexity theory, artificial life, agent-based simulation 
systems, artificial society, artificial polity. 
In the area of empirical analysis, much of the efforts have been directed towards 
fundamental research and survey analysis. At a close look, these researches classify 
political culture studies into several interesting theoretical areas, like: political heritage, 
political culture values and their processes of change during the transition to 
democracy and democratic consolidation processes (Srbljinovic 2012, 2013; Ferić and 
Lamza Posavec, 2013), conspiratorial thinking (Blanuša, 2013), voting behavior and its 
connections to political atttitudes, beliefs, norms and normative systems (Petricušić, 
2013), political identity (Atanasov and Simoska, 2012, 2013), strength of democracy 
and corruption (Voinea, 2013),democratic consolidation (Petrović, 2012, 2013; Repak, 
2012, 2013), feminism (Nadić, 2013), electoral systems and representation, gender 
discrimination (Petrescu, 2013), the impact of the communist past onto the authority 
and legitimacy of current democratic institutions: democratic institutions, mentalities, 
multiculturalism  (Atanasov, 2012, 2013; Atanasov and Cvetanova, 2012, 2013), 
territorial indentity, spatial mobility, and urban space,  (Uršič, 2013), participative 
democracy and citizenship (Petrović, 2012a,b), philosophy of culture and political 
philosophy issues like the role of the Balkans in the imagery of Europe, ethicity and 
nationalism (Koprivitsa, 2012, 2013). There have been identified some themes of 
particular high interest in the Southern Europe political culture research, like stateness 
and sovereignity, Europeanization, precommitment and constraint theory (Lavdas, 
2012a,b). 
There have been identified some fundamental research issues in Political 
Methodology, like situatedness and contingency of political phenomena (Srbljinović 
and Neumann, 2013), explanation and modeling, mechanism and processes, agent-based 
modeling and simulation (Voinea 2012, 2013a; Gulyás, 2013; Legéndiet al., 2013; 
Neumann, 2012), policy complexity (Fent et al., 2012), political attitude computational 
modeling and simulation (Voinea, 2012, 2013a; Jancović, 2012, 2013), cognitive 
modeling (Voinea, 2013b), voting behavior and computational modeling and 
simulation (Johnson, 2013), norms and normative systems (Atanasov and Cvetanova, 
2013; Ferić and Lamza Posavec, 2013; Petricušić, 2013). 
 
Interdisciplinary Research and An Unifying Theme 
We may identify some specific themes of political culture research which share the 
interest of several authors from many Eastern European countries: 
1. Political heritage and political culture in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe 
2. Political Identity, Multiculturalism, Ethnicity and Nationalism in Balkans 
3. Voting Behavior: empirical findings vs. agent-based simulations 
4. Democratic institutions in the Eastern Europe after 1989 
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5. Political Methodology, Political Mechanism and Processes for Political Phenomena 
Modeling 
6. Artifical Society, Artificial Polity and Agent-Based Simulations of political phenomena 
These recurrent research themes show that the current political culture research 
in Eastern Europe is mainly oriented towards the evaluation of the relevance and actual 
impact of the political heritage on the quality and stability of the democratic institution 
construction processes in the Eastern European countries. 
The prevalence of political culture issues (going from values, beliefs, norms, 
attitudes to political institutions, legitimacy, authority, identity or voting behavior) 
proves that the Eastern European research is mainly oriented towards political culture 
explanation and modeling of the unfolding of political phenomena after the fall of 
Berlin Wall until the present times. It is this particularity which makes the Editors 
believe that it might be considered the political philosophy dimension which unifies all 
these approaches into a meaningful approach. This major orientation reinforces our 
confidence that it is the main unifying theme which succeeds to aggregate all these 
variate research works like pieces in a huge puzzle of the contemporary thinking on 
the nature and outcomes of the Eastern European political phenomena after 1989. It 
therefore includes theoretical and empirical research as well as computational and 
simulation modeling research. While the former helps the reader identify the nature of 
phenomena and the political mechanisms and processes which could better describe 
and explain them, the latter identifies ways of configuring the possible outcomes of 
such phenomena, and of explaining their impact on the individual actors and 
institutions. 
 
Particularity of the Recurrent Patterns of Preferences in Political Culture 
Studies 
One particularity of these recurrent patterns of preference is that there is a 
systematic concern to both the political theoretical and the political methodology 
aspects. The researches reported here prove a high focus on several relationships, like: 
(i) political culture – political mechanisms, with a special concern to the types and 
explanative powers of the mechanisms and processes underlying governance and 
transition to democracy,  (ii) political attitude – political behavior, with a special 
concern on the conflict between competitive normative systems, and (iii) political 
values – political norms, with a special concern on the political heritage from both 
communist and post-communist times. 
These few relevant features make us believe that the EPAM Research Group 
suceeded so far to bring to the light a major dimension of research in Eastern European 
political culture: the intimate mental picture of the traces left by the communist 
regimes in the minds of several generations. And not only in their minds, but deeply in 
their culture: behavior, values, norms and attitudes. These traces need to be described 
and explained by a complex model of the “parallel worlds” context in which these 
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generations have lived, some of them for almost a lifetime: the world of inside 
reflection about the political regime, and the world of the real political regime.  
The conflict between mental life and social file which has characterized the 
political culture of several generations during the communismis not an easy subject of 
study: it needs a complex approach which usually combines political and economical 
studies with culture, history and ideology studies. This dimension is particular to the 
times and trends in the political methodological, sociological and social psychology 
research on the current unfolding of the Eastern European political science and 
analysis developments.  
They prove a clear political culture dimension, sustained and illustrated by this 
look from inside, which actually makes the subject of this volume, and almost sure, 
one of the main goals of future research developments.  
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